I am reading through the 124 page Inspector General report on @Chicago_Police

Here is a THREAD with things that stick out to me.

Link to the IG report if you want to verify:
The report is from May 29-June 7 2020.

The report aims to offer "a comprehensive account of the facts, including how involved parties––members of the public, CPD’s rank-and-file, and CPD’s command staff, among others––experienced the protests and unrest."
"CPD’s response that night was marked by poor coordination, inconsistency, and confusion. Even so, senior members of CPD and the Mayor’s Office reported viewing Friday night’s response as something of a success, referred to by some as a 'win.'"
P.9 confirms CPD wasn't wearing/turning on body cams (BWC)

countless interactions between CPD members and members of the public were not captured on BWCs.
P.9 also confirms reporting we did at the @ChicagoReporter that officers were hiding their name badges and star numbers

"there were widespread complaints—and evidence—of CPD members obscuring their badge numbers and nameplates while deployed during the protests and unrest."

"emails from three of CPD’s highest-ranking members—the First Deputy Superintendent, the Chief of Operations, and the Chief of Staff—requested on July 13, 2020. OIG and IMT repeated the request for these emails (...) CPD did not produce them until January 15, 2021"
This mean that the highest ranking members of CPD simply REFUSED to turn over email to the Office of the Inspector General. It took them over half a year to get some of the emails they requested.

This happens to reporters all the time with CPD but they do it with the IG too.
P. 18
"CPD and the City’s response to those events involved multiple City departments, outside law enforcement agencies, and other County, State, federal, and private entities."

Private entities hired by the city are likely the ones I saw carrying aluminum bats through Uptown.
P. 19 reminds us that CPD ultimately falls "under the ultimate authority of" @chicagosmayor
P. 26 CPD burying head in the sand

"Despite the May 28 protest (...) and the unrest happening in other major cities, senior members [of CPD] reported in interviews with OIG that they saw no indication that there would be unrest in Chicago following the killing of George Floyd"


"command staff believed that such unrest was unlikely to occur in Chicago, based principally on the fact that it had not historically occurred after high-profile events, including the 2015 release of the video of the murder of Laquan McDonald by a CPD officer."
P.27 details how the police forced through "kettling" protesters both North and South with no real plan.

"The Commander gave these orders without communicating a plan"
P. 29

A senior member from the Mayor’s Office emailed CPD command staff members on Saturday morning, writing “Thank you all for your incredible work last night—you made Chicago proud.”
P. 31
Lightfoot said "she made the decision to raise the bridges on Sat. According to the Superintendent, Lightfoot and the Superintendent began to discuss raising the downtown bridges on Fri night, as a potential means to limit the number of protesters able to access Trump Tower
P. 37 Mayor Lightfoot authorized the use of pepper spray.

"According to Mayor Lightfoot, the Superintendent requested that she authorize the use of OC spray at this location, and the Mayor gave the authorization."
P. 37 Raising the bridges:

"a senior staff member from the Mayor’s Office and the Chief of CPD’s Bureau of Counter-Terrorism and Special Operations spoke with a senior member of CDOT, and instructed CDOT to begin the process of raising the bridges, on the decision of the Mayor."
P. 37
"During protests at the 2012 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) summit in Chicago, raising bridges had been discussed and rejected as an ineffective tool for emergency crowd control."
P. 39 Lightfoot watched on a live feed.

"Mayor Lightfoot, who watched the events unfold over live video feed, recalled the process of clearing the Wabash Avenue Bridge taking more than four hours"
P. 43 CTA shut downs were Mayor Lightfoot's decision.

"At 6:00 p.m., all CTA train stops into the Loop were suspended. The decision to bypass downtown CTA stops was made by the Mayor’s Office at the recommendation of CPD senior command staff."
P. 44
Chicago Freedom School provided shelter to hundreds of protesters:

"Department of BACP investigators and CPD entered the school and issued a cease and desist order for “preparing and serving large quantities of food without the proper retail food establishment license.”
P. 46 CPD denied seizure medication

"CPD member comments, “chick’s having a seizure, I guess” and further notes that she appears to be breathing and that there is nothing to be done. The member then closes the door of the transport vehicle (...)without rendering aid."
P. 46

"an officer calling an arrestee a 'little bitch' after the arrestee complained about being in pain."
P. 46 A cop tells detainee they would be raped in jail.

"A CPD member is also captured recounting to fellow officers how the member made an arrestee cry by telling the arrestee that they would be raped in jail given their thin physical stature."
P. 47

"In the same video, after a radio call related to a car pursuit, an officer can be heard telling other officers that CPD should just shoot the tires out and shoot the occupants of the vehicle in the head."
P. 48

"According to Mayor Lightfoot, who was at the EOC, several decision points were brought to her directly, including raising the bridges, enacting the curfew, and calling in the National Guard."
P. 49

CPD members described their strategy as “whack-a-mole,” running from one situation to another, lacking coordination and communication. (...) CPD members from all ranks assessed the Department’s command staff and supervisors as lacking skills and expertise in crowd control.
P. 49
Lightfoot: “I know that is a huge volume, but we need to make sure that if there are any accusations of misconduct by CPD, we have the video to disprove it, and also if we need evidence for any of the arrests made or TBD, we have the video support."
P. 52
"CPD attempted to rent 150 vans for officer transport on Sunday. The rental company did not have 150 vans in the area available, so CPD personnel travelled around the state to pick up vans from approximately a dozen locations and drive them back to Chicago."
P. 53

"The Department did not have plans in place to respond to the looting. District command staff described their districts as being in 'complete chaos.'"
Chief #1: "Seventy to 75% of the City’s revenue comes from downtown, and CPD therefore needed to protect downtown. (...) CPD was a “half step” slow to react and did not have enough manpower to cover all of the impacted neighborhoods."
P. 59
"On June 6, the Mayor also announced the City’s procurement of three private security firms—including Monterrey Security —to provide 100 unarmed security guards to monitor commercial corridors and notify CPD of crime."
P. 59 footnote:
"Monterrey Security is a private security firm founded by Juan Gaytan, a former CPD member, which has run afoul of City contracting rules and has long counted among its leadership a number of former high-ranking CPD officials."
P. 60 Finding 1

P. 60

"CPD’s data indicates 3,775 total arrests between 5:00 p.m. on May 29, 2020 and 11:59 p.m. on June 7, 2020."

Hard to get an accurate count though
"CPD did not follow its mass arrest procedures and generate a single RD number for use with all related arrests."
P. 71
"The lack of mass arrest training was evident in CPD’s response on May 30. Senior level command staff members were unfamiliar with or confused about mass arrest protocols."
P. 71 (cont)

"One District Commander who deployed around Trump Tower—one of the epicenters of the arrests—described themselves as unsure how the procedures worked."

"One officer described CPD’s general lack of organization as the 'saddest shit ever.'"
P. 73

"there were CPD Legal Affairs officers assigned to the protest."
P. 74
"In sum, even after the fact, and with the benefit of an after-action review and report (...) the accounts of senior leadership on this point were sharply conflicting and profoundly confused."
P. 76

"That District Commander similarly told officers “everyone goes to jail” if they damaged a police car, punctuating that statement with the instruction: “[T]ake your handcuffs out and put them on somebody.”"
P. 77

"Not a single officer who spoke with OIG recalled having ever been trained or instructed on any plans regarding the enforcement of a curfew."
P. 78
A lot of protesters complained to me that their friends were locked up without a charge...

"CPD Failed to Take the Necessary Steps to Ensure That Arrestees Were Transported with Arrest Paperwork or Charge Information"
P. 79
"Yet at Area 3 Headquarters at Belmont and Western, multiple CPD members estimated that upwards of 90% of mass arrestees brought there on May 30 were released without charges."
P. 80
"One protester reported that their friend was arrested “on the bridge in front of Trump Tower… just for being there.” This person was reportedly “squeezed” onto a “police bus” with “around” 40 other people and was eventually released without charges."
P. 80
CPD was basically just guessing at charges...

"This same member said that when people came in without mass arrest cards, processing members relied upon whatever information the transport officers could give them to generate a charge."
P. 80
"Conversely, OIG gathered some evidence of overcharging, where—due to a lack of arrest documentation—an arrestee may have been charged when no charge was appropriate"
"Later, however, the transport officers convinced an officer, who was not involved in the protestor’s arrest, and who, according to the protester, could not have known the circumstances behind it, to write a charge on their arm."
P. 81
"In reflecting on the protests and unrest, Mayor Lightfoot reported her sense that 'a lot of the people that were arrested got the charges dismissed, which breeds a lot of anger, a lot of resentment, [and] delegitimizes policing.'"
P. 82

"On average, arrestees were detained for a total of 14.0 hours. The briefest total detention time recorded was 1.2 hours and the longest was 53.3 hours."
P. 84
"The delays in transport and processing meant that many arrestees could not be located for lengthy periods until they were fully processed."
P. 84 (cont.)

"For instance, one protester recounted during a community listening session that, after they were arrested and taken to the 18th District, 'multiple attorney[s]…were unable to ascertain [their] location for hours.'"
P. 84 (cont.)

"This same protestor testified that they were held for 12 hours at the 18th District before they were released without charge."
P. 84 (cont.)
"For arrestees ultimately released without charge because CPD could not substantiate any justification for holding them—that is, in the absence of a documented, lawful reason for any detention at all—these delays are of particular concern."
P.91 As a Marine vet, this is troubling.
"IEMA senior official explained that National Guard troops generally are not trained in the non-lethal use of force, & that it was therefore a high priority to avoid putting them in a situation where they would need to respond with force."
P.92 regarding @UChicago police

"In an interview with OIG, UCPD leadership declined to discuss UCPD uses of force during the protests, on the grounds that UCPD is a private organization"
P. 96
"Finally, OIG reviewed OEMC data on all instances of firearm pointing notifications called in over the same period. Between 5 p.m. on Friday, May 29, and Sunday, June 7, OEMC data evidences 246 incidents of CPD members pointing their firearms."
"according to [Supt.] Brown’s account, the need to control crowds or to stop looting were not sufficient rationale for him to authorize the use of OC spray."

I can assure you from first-hand experience, OC spray was used for crowd control.
P. 98
"In an interview with OIG and the IMT, Mayor Lightfoot stated that Superintendent Brown sought and received her authorization before authorizing the use of OC spray for crowd control on Saturday, May 30 on the east side of Trump Tower."
P. 99

"CPD did not meet its reporting obligations for the use of OC spray, as set out in General Order G03-02-02. None of the incidents of OC spray deployed for crowd control by SWAT were recorded in TRRs."
P 101

"CPD Underreported Uses of Baton Strikes and Manual Strikes, Resulting in an Inadequate Record of Severe and Potentially Out-Of-Policy Uses of Force"
P. 101 notes the baton force policy that CPD routinely violated

"The use of a baton as an impact weapon is authorized only against an assailant; it is not authorized for use as an impact weapon against a resister, regardless of whether resistance is passive or active."
P. 102

"One community member stated, “At the protest on May 31st, I witnessed an officer deliberately hit a teenage girl in the face with his baton, visibly shattering the bridge of her nose.” Another said, “an officer hit me in the throat with his baton."
P. 102 (cont.)

"This community member stated, “[the officer] pressed his baton horizontally against my chest and also my neck…He was pressing the baton against my neck so hard that I couldn’t fall to my knees. I was hanging by his baton…"
P. 103
Read this report:
"the officer says, “stop fucking resisting,” punctuating each word with a closed fist strike."
P. 103 Another mention of Chicago Police Board President attacked by CPD.

"gave a public statement that he was “a victim of police aggression” when he was struck five times in the legs with batons while walking through the scene of a protest."
P. 103
"In interviews, members of CPD’s command staff who were in the field during the protests were consistent in reporting that that they saw officers comport themselves well under pressure and saw little or no evidence of excessive force."
P. 103 (cont.)
"These perceptions of CPD’s use of force during the protests are profoundly at odds with the reported experiences of many protest participants, as the courtroom testimonials and interviews with community members demonstrate."
P. 105
"On three other mass arrest cards, all from Sunday, May 31, the reporting officer initially indicated a takedown but then scratched out that report (see Figure 23 below for an example of one of these three)."
P. 106
"CPD’s mass arrest card process is flawed from an accountability & transparency perspective. Only 153 mass arrest cards from May 30-June 2 were produced to OIG. It appears that records of a significant number of mass arrest cards were not retained by CPD at all."
P. 108
CPD sent Bureau of Internal Affairs (BIA) to the field, a potential conflict of interest for accountability.

"By sending BIA personnel to the field, CPD risked those members being involved in or witnesses to acts of alleged misconduct"
P. 108 - CPD straight up admits they just didn't turn on their body cameras (BWC) on May 30.

"CPD command staff acknowledged that members’ BWCs should have been activated throughout the demonstrations but were not."
P. 109 - Don't worry, CPD sent an email...

"At the request of CCSAO, CPD command began to send out emails on June 1, reminding officers to activate their [body] cameras during the mass demonstrations, and continued to do so throughout the week."
P 109 - When body cams were needed most...

"Between May 30-June 1, when mass protests and unrest were at their peak, the % of arrests captured on BWC was at its lowest. On no day during the week did all arrest reports associated with the protests and unrest have BWC footage. "
FIFTY SEVEN PERCENT of force arrests weren't captured on body cam.

"OIG found that 49 of the 113 (43%) reported uses of force were captured on BWC footage."

The report indicates high likelihood many force incidents weren't recorded at all.
P. 111
OIG confirms the litany of complaints to COPA and other agencies about CPD officers covering up or removing their badges and/or star numbers.

Interestingly enough, my reporting with @ChicagoReporter makes a brief appearance.

"A recurring theme in reports published from peer jurisdictions on the May and June protests and unrest is that the police were not adequately prepared to confront the scale of these challenges."
P. 114 (cont.)

"OIG’s interviews with rank-and-file CPD members laid bare that, at least in some quarters, chaos and confusion in the command staff ranks struck a serious blow to morale of front-line members who plainly felt failed by their Department."
P. 114
"out-of-policy, dangerous, and disrespectful actions by CPD members, the events of May and June 2020 may have set CPD and the City back significantly in their long-running, deeply challenged effort to foster trust with members of the community."

"These supplementary sources suggest that there were far more dangerous and potentially out-of-policy uses of force than CPD’s official records indicated."
P.116 Perhaps the most frustrating part of the conclusions

"The decision to deploy members without BWCs, combined with obscured identifiers and scant deployment records, make it difficult and impossible in some cases, to implement individual-level accountability for misconduct."
That is all I have folks. I hope you share and that you demand accountability.

Notes: A few things were edited for brevity (ex: turning an "and" into a "&"). But no content was edited, and all of this can be verified in the report which is why I linked page numbers.
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More from @JCB_Journo

18 Feb
The same department that the Mayor gave $281 million of federal COVID relief money when the public health department got peanuts.

The same department that can't get its officers to wear masks.
The same department that still can't get its officers equiped with body cams...nevermind getting them to actually turn them on.

The same department that had 78 complaints of officers removing or hiding their badges and stars during protests this summer.

Read 23 tweets
16 Nov 20
Tuition at DePaul cost $10,014 the year this person attended in 1993.

Adjusted for inflation it should cost $18,045 today.

Today DePaul tuition is $41,202
Also, people shouldn't have to live in roach infested living spaces to afford an education.
I had college for free under the GI Bill. I still think we should radically reform education costs and forgive student loan debt.

"I suffered so others should too" is a really sad ethos.

Free people up to spend, buy houses, invest, start a family, etc.
Read 9 tweets

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