If you wanted to bring everybody in the world to the level of the Western median income, total world income would need to be multiplied by 2.5. And you would need to reduce incomes of all those who currently make more than the Western median (~10% of global population).
Obviously, one-half of Western population would have to have their incomes cut; those with the Western mean income by some 15%.
If you were to do the same calculation in current exchange rates, the numbers are even bleaker.
The take home message is:
the idea that somehow we can all live at the Western median income and the entire GDP of the world need not increase much is...well, a pure fantasy.
Four years ago when the Russia-Ukraine war began I wrote three pieces.
One was on short-term economic prospects of Russia.
Russia’s economic prospects: the short-run branko2f7.substack.com/p/russias-econ…
Like most economists I was wrong. Russia did weather four years of war and loss/freezing of about $500b in reserves much better than people thought. I believed that within a year Russia would be faced by significant shortages, inflation and price controls. Nothing like that has happened so far. Why: it is a topic for research.
Then I wrote a piece on the novelty of technologically regressive import substitution. The idea there is that Russia being cut off from Western technology (on which its companies overwhelmingly relied) will have to move into replacing Western technology by the less advanced domestic technology ("regressive import substitution"). I think I was right on that. globalpolicyjournal.com/blog/18/05/202…
In a dinner conversation w/ a friend, we said, let see in a simplest possible way which countries did well in the transition from socialism to capitalism. I then made this simple calculation: find out the average growth rate of real GDP per capita between 1985 (a "normal" socialist year) and 2024 (the latest available year for all). Here is the graph, with countries ranked in increasing order.
Not surprisingly, the best is Poland which in some 40 years tripled its GDP per capita (average growth 3.1%). Not surprisingly too, Ukraine is the only country with a decline in real income.
The success cases are also Albania (3%), Armenia (2.7%), Estonia, Bulgaria, Belarus (2.5-2.6%)
Slovakia did better than the Czech Republic.
All Yugoslav republics are below 2% per annum, but the best is, interestingly, Bosnia, followed by Montenegro.
Russia's 40-year growth record is a disappointing 1 percent per annum per capita. It is worse than under Brezhnev's "stagnation".
Last night I could not sleep so I created a taxonomy of people who work on inequality/redistribution. For each of these groups I have names of economists but it could be too controversial. So I decided to stay with the taxonomy only.
Group A are "socialists", or people who want to change power & distribution within the key locus, locus of production. Some want to give decision-making power to workers only; others want to constraint the power of shareholders, to make workers more important in managing companies thereby changing distribution "internally". They are the most radical b/c they change the nature of capitalism in production.
Group B focuses on pre-redistribution. They leave capitalist relations of production formally the same, but they want to increase the minimum wage, empower trade unions, improve health insurance provided by companies, limit duration of work. They are meliorists like Fabians.
It is Weekend No. 7 and (as I have been doing for the past six weeks), I will now review Chapter 7 of "Visions of Inequality". It has become the most controversial part of the book b/c of its strong critique of lack of concern of neoclassical economics with income distribution.
It asks the Q: why were neoclassicists uninterested in income distribution? It provides three reasons: endogenous evolution of economics away from class structure to individual "agents" (that are all fundamentally identical); political reasons (the Cold War) and funding of the research by the rich.
It is important to realize (and very few people have) that the chapter opens up with a review of inequality studies in systems of state ownership of the means of production and makes an analogy between the denial of class structure in these societies and under capitalism; and thus why both were uninterested in studying income distribution.
No concern with class => no concern with inequality.
The most that neoclassical economics ever did in inequality studies was mere empiricism. Nothing else. No integrative study of inequality, no theories of how inequality is determined nor how it would evolve. It was in true sense what Marx called "vulgar political economy". One such example is Alan Blinder's "Theories of income distribution".
The list (in no particular order) of the books that I liked the most and read in 2025, with their reviews:
Quinn Slobodian, Hayek's Bastards
Gold, volk and IQs branko2f7.substack.com/p/gold-volk-an…
In Chapter II of "The Great Global Transformation" I discuss opinions of key authors on whether trade (and thus globalization) lead to peace or war. I begin with Montesquieu who is famous for his doux commerce. Then continue with Smith whose views are much more complex and definitely worth reading. Then Schumpeter who in his early work believed that capitalism and trade generate peace in order to change later
when he saw monopoly capitalism with its predatory behavior and struggle for markets as a more efficient, "normal", capitalism. And I end with Hobson, Rosa Luxembourg and Lenin who regarded competition for foreign markets & raw materias as leading to wars.
So we have an entire gamut of theories, from those who see trade as promoting peace among nations to the opposite.
It is in that context that World War I becomes important. It happened in the midst of the greatest trade and capital interdependence ever (up to that date) which, according to the pro-peace view of trade, was the least war-enabling condition possible.
Hence, a very fundamental problem for pro-peace view of trade.