“We are long-term investors. Volatility doesn’t matter to our portfolio.”
This is an appealing idea.
(thread)
However, volatility itself reduces the long-term compound rate of growth of a portfolio, via a phenomenon called variance drag. Let’s consider two return streams, both with average annual returns of 10%, but with annualized volatility of 10% and 20% respectively.
The long-term compound growth rates of the
two portfolios will be 9.5% and 8.0%!
The adjustment factor is equal to half of the variance (or squared volatility). A reduction in volatility from 20% to 10% for the same average annual return increases the long-term compound rate of growth by 150 basis points.
For sufficiently high volatility levels, a return stream with 10% average annual returns actually compounds at a
negative long-term growth rate!
Simple Example: Start with $1 billion of equities and suffer a 20% drawdown, the equity exposure falls to
$800 million. If equities turn around and rally 20%, the portfolio will make only $160 million, not the full
$200 million you lost.
This is the negative impact of volatility and drawdowns on the compound growth of a portfolio.
Now, another popular argument:
“Tail hedging involves buying option-based insurance against market drawdowns. Because markets generally charge a risk premium for insurance, the expected returns of a tail hedging strategy over long periods of time are negative..."
"...As a result, along-term-oriented asset owner should not allocate to hedging strategies, as they will detract from long-term compound returns.”
Like many popular arguments, this is only partly correct.
Over the long term, you should expect negative
returns from tail hedging strategies. The market would be wildly inefficient otherwise. Individual long convexity
trades at certain points in time may be mispriced...
...and smart, dynamic hedging strategies might
be able to reduce the cost of carry over time, but it is unrealistically optimistic to think that tail risk hedges
can make money systematically over time.
But what this argument is missing is the portfolio effect. Tail risk hedges are inversely correlated with the performance of risk assets and produce outsized returns during times of crisis.
As a result, if tail risk hedges are added to a long-term, regularly rebalanced portfolio, they can cushion
drawdowns and mitigate the mechanical reduction of risk asset exposure during times of stress.
In doing so, they can enhance the long-term compound rate of return of the overall investment program, **despite the hedges themselves losing money over long periods of time on a stand-alone basis**.
@BigDawgSaluki @PNL_Wizard @TheStalwart yeah if you're really super into managing it, some deep out of the money 1-month puts could be good against a COVID style crash
longer, slow bear markets are harder to hedge
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Let me explain in a little more detail what a martingale strategy is and why it's particularly susceptible to this kind of charlatanism and borderline fraud.
Let's say I have a coin flip bet, 50/50 heads/tails, heads I make $1 and tails I lose $1.
"fair coin" is about right, selling iron condors is a zero expected return trade at mid-market, actually negative expected return if you're crossing bid/ask spread at Captain Condor's size, but let's be generous
Captain Condor's "martingale" strategy is that every time he gets tails, he loses his bet size and doubles his bet size for the next coin flip. Every time he gets heads, he resets to his base sizing, bet $1.
if your "quantitative model" says to bet the life savings of your investors that that S&P cannot move 30 basis points on one random day with 90,000 iron condors, you have the wrong idea of what a quantitative model is supposed to be
making a spreadsheet that says "this thing barely ever happens five times in a row", and using that to justify some insanely massive risky zero-edge trade after it just happened four times in a row, is batshit fucking crazy
there is ~zero statistical relationship between the incidence of one iron condor paying off today and the next one paying off tomorrow, just like the s&p being up today has ~zero statistical relationship with the s&p being up tomorrow
Sam Altman is a fascinating new type of person -- someone who is transparently a sociopathic liar and grifter and immensely unlikeable to 99% of humanity, but within Silicon Valley tech bro circles is viewed as incredibly charismatic and visionary
Good morning. I'm on a posting break but everyone is sending me this so just a brief explanation. 🖤
The headline is correct, but the implications are not. The VIX complex is very expensive on a relative basis right now and hedge funds are short it against other vol exposures.
VIX basis to at the money forward S&P volatility is very high, so volatility hedge funds are short VIX futures and long S&P forward volatility and variance against it
The VIX term structure is very steep (extremely high roll-down and volatility risk premium) so hedge funds are short it and short delta against it or long other volatility exposures against it
Okay. I promised a quick thread on put/call parity after that poll yesterday, even though typically I like to stick to topics that aren't well covered in the public domain.
We'll start with the basic idea and then talk about nuances that make it not quite true (esp. for retail).
Put/call parity describes the fact that, if you can go long or short the underlying, whether an option is a call or a put doesn't really matter, it just affects its delta, or sensitivity to the underlying (which can be adjusted by holding a position in the underlying!)
In particular, the simple version of put-call parity says that owning the stock hedged with a long put option with strike K is effectively identical to owning a call option with strike K and holding the present value of K in cash.
The people wanted a covered calls / option selling mega-thread, a one-click response to all the charlatans out there trying to farm retail investors.
Systematically, blindly selling options is a BAD IDEA. Underperforms owning equities by a lot. Let's go through why and how.
Okay. The starting point here is flows. Before 2010 or so, options markets were sort of a backwater. Risk premium was relatively high, so if you backtested simple option selling strategies like covered calls or cash-secured puts, they looked pretty good (see PUT INDEX, BXM INDEX)
Then pension fund consultants started to write white papers and pitch "equity like returns with lower risk via option selling" to their massive clients. And by 2012, tens of billions of dollars of institutional money started to flow into benchmark-oriented option selling...