“We are long-term investors. Volatility doesn’t matter to our portfolio.”
This is an appealing idea.
(thread)
However, volatility itself reduces the long-term compound rate of growth of a portfolio, via a phenomenon called variance drag. Let’s consider two return streams, both with average annual returns of 10%, but with annualized volatility of 10% and 20% respectively.
The long-term compound growth rates of the
two portfolios will be 9.5% and 8.0%!
The adjustment factor is equal to half of the variance (or squared volatility). A reduction in volatility from 20% to 10% for the same average annual return increases the long-term compound rate of growth by 150 basis points.
For sufficiently high volatility levels, a return stream with 10% average annual returns actually compounds at a
negative long-term growth rate!
Simple Example: Start with $1 billion of equities and suffer a 20% drawdown, the equity exposure falls to
$800 million. If equities turn around and rally 20%, the portfolio will make only $160 million, not the full
$200 million you lost.
This is the negative impact of volatility and drawdowns on the compound growth of a portfolio.
Now, another popular argument:
“Tail hedging involves buying option-based insurance against market drawdowns. Because markets generally charge a risk premium for insurance, the expected returns of a tail hedging strategy over long periods of time are negative..."
"...As a result, along-term-oriented asset owner should not allocate to hedging strategies, as they will detract from long-term compound returns.”
Like many popular arguments, this is only partly correct.
Over the long term, you should expect negative
returns from tail hedging strategies. The market would be wildly inefficient otherwise. Individual long convexity
trades at certain points in time may be mispriced...
...and smart, dynamic hedging strategies might
be able to reduce the cost of carry over time, but it is unrealistically optimistic to think that tail risk hedges
can make money systematically over time.
But what this argument is missing is the portfolio effect. Tail risk hedges are inversely correlated with the performance of risk assets and produce outsized returns during times of crisis.
As a result, if tail risk hedges are added to a long-term, regularly rebalanced portfolio, they can cushion
drawdowns and mitigate the mechanical reduction of risk asset exposure during times of stress.
In doing so, they can enhance the long-term compound rate of return of the overall investment program, **despite the hedges themselves losing money over long periods of time on a stand-alone basis**.
@BigDawgSaluki @PNL_Wizard @TheStalwart yeah if you're really super into managing it, some deep out of the money 1-month puts could be good against a COVID style crash
longer, slow bear markets are harder to hedge
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Worth noting that the vix basis (spread of vix futures over S&P at the money forward vol) is at the high of its ranges of the last few years (barring the brief weird day last August)
In the pandemic it went as high as 15 but that was because there were insane massive short VIX call positions (Allianz Structured Alpha, etc) that got liquidated in the middle of a massive selloff
The VIX complex is typically used by volatility tourists, because it's simple to trade volatility with the click of a button without knowing what an option is
So elevated basis typically means outsized hedging flows by non-specialists
1. Lehman. Wells Fargo prop lost hundreds of millions of dollars on converts, bond basis and levered loans. Head of the desk went to the board and asked for $4 billion in balance sheet to buy everything in sight, got it, because Wells was in good shape. Better lucky than good.
2. August 2011. Had nice EURUSD and USDJPY volatility positions that helped the fund put up a good month. We added to bond basis, converts and levered loans. I sold CDS IG versus buying S&P volatility, that was choppy and the CIO covered it before it converged. But...
I shorted VXX calls in my PA after the initial volatility spike. The position got mangled by persistent backwardation and subsequent volatility spikes. I met the first and second round of margin calls and got 90% liquidated on the third. RIP, lessons learned
Okay this is a good thread topic and really is all about understanding positioning in tails and being in the flow of information as crises start to unfold. I'll tell some stories to illustrate.
Remember that all volatility selling is not the same. Some kinds of volatility selling are inherently stabilizing to markets. For example, the large institutional flows in call overwriting and cash-secured put selling for equity replacement are very stabilizing...
... as they supply dealers and volatility managers with long gamma positions, we buy when markets go down and sell when markets go up and reduce realized volatility. These are unleveraged positions which do not blow up or induce short covering.
This is a nice prompt actually. I'm going to use the word thread here because it was just so annoying trying to find all my old threads to link together :)
Putting together a thread-of-threads on options and derivatives. It's kind of hard because I never tag them with the stupid thread symbol (i hate it). If you have others of mine you like can you append them to the end please?