After Assad’s chemical weapons attack in Douma in 2018, John Bolton wanted Trump to bomb Syria’s military and governing infrastructure. Jim Mattis, concerned about inadvertently getting into a conflict with Russia, advocated a narrower list of targets. Mattis won out.
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Applebaum’s position throughout the war has been consistent: Ukraine should continue fighting until victory.
It sounds clean, simple and morally righteous until you remember that the Russians have more of everything, that the smaller side is at a disadvantage when the war becomes an attritional meat-grinder and that her previous hot-takes (which center more on activism than analysis) have been wrong.
She’s also a big believer in the Domino Theory, which should automatically disqualify you as a serious thinker. But that’s not the way it works in the foreign policy space.
I would also note that Biden took Applebaum’s advice for three whole years, so she doesn’t get to pretend her wisdom wasn’t acted upon. The result: more Ukrainian casualties, offensives that failed—exacerbating Ukraine’s manpower problems—and Kyiv facing peace terms that are arguably worse than they otherwise would be.
Comparing the Venezuelan military to the U.S. military is superficial and dangerous because it suggests a U.S. intervention would be straightforward. The issue isn’t whether Venezuela would win (it wouldn’t) but rather what comes after the conventional conflict is over. (1/5) 🧵
The blunt reality is that nobody knows what would happen—not even Maria Corina Machado, who I’d remind you has a huge incentive to present the best-case scenario to U.S. officials in order to push them into green-lighting an intervention. (2/5)
Venezuela is a country 12x the size of Panama with around 25 million people, boasts extremely varied geography, porous borders and multiple armed factions. It also has abundant natural resources, mostly captured by illicit actors, who won’t give this trade up no matter who sits in the Miraflores presidential palace. Post-Maduro conflict is likely inevitable. (3/5)
Before pulling the trigger on bombing land targets in Venezuela or undergoing an even more ambitious regime change operation in Caracas, the Trump administration should stop, take a breath and start exploring the consequences of such a weighty decision. (1/10) 🧵
First and foremost, would bombing land targets in Venezuela actually do much to stem the flow of drugs into the United States?
History suggests it won't. Drug traffickers can (and will) re-build labs, explore new trafficking routes and innovate in order to ensure they can maintain their profit margins. And if one trafficking group doesn't do it, another will. The monetary incentives are just too high. (2/10)
Second, does Maduro actually control a drug cartel?
The Trump administration has repeatedly made these claims. Just read the various indictments of Maduro and top Venezuelan military/political officials. I don't think there's any question that some of these figures are indeed looking the other way as Colombian traffickers use Venezuela as a transit route—and it's likely some of these Venezuelan generals might be an integral part of the trade to enrich themselves. (3/10)
Assad’s future looks more precarious than ever. The HTS-led coalition is on its way to Homs, and if that city is captured, the coastal areas—where Russia’s naval and air bases are located—are effectively cut off from Damascus. (1/7) 🧵
The Russian response has been tepid thus far. The Kremlin is giving statements that it continues to support the Syrian government in its fight against terrorists and has launched some airstrikes in support of Assad’s forces. But the rebel advance southward continues. (2/7)
Russia has invested a significant amount of capital in keeping Assad afloat, who is viewed in Moscow as an annoying but relatively pliable partner. Indeed if it wasn’t for Russian air power, Assad would have been dead or in exile a long time ago. (3/7)
Israel and Assad's relationship is complicated. (1/5)
On the one hand, Israel views Assad as an Iranian lackey, a man who basically turned his country into an Iranian outpost to keep himself in power. Israel has struck Syria hundreds, if not thousands, of times over the last decade to destroy Iranian weapons shipments to Hezbollah. In September, Israeli special operations forces raided an underground missile production facility inside Syria. Netanyahu also warned Assad last week that he's a target if he enables Hezbollah's re-arming. (2/5) nytimes.com/2024/09/12/us/…
At the same time, Assad is also viewed as the devil they know. While that devil is brutal, inhumane and inscrutable, he's also preferable to a bunch of jihadists overrunning Damascus and turning one of Israel's neighbors into a caliphate. 3/5)