After Assad’s chemical weapons attack in Douma in 2018, John Bolton wanted Trump to bomb Syria’s military and governing infrastructure. Jim Mattis, concerned about inadvertently getting into a conflict with Russia, advocated a narrower list of targets. Mattis won out.
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First, some context. According to DoD, there have been 27 Houthi attacks against commercial shipping in the Red Sea area since Nov 19. U.S. and U.K. warships have successfully shot down many of these drones, anti-ship cruise missiles and ballistic missiles before reaching their targets. No casualties or major damage have been reported so far.
Yet despite the establishment of a U.S.-led maritime task force and last week's ominous ultimatum, the Houthis continue to attack Red Sea shipping lanes. UK PM Rishi Sunak is reportedly set to hold a full cabinet meeting tonight on possible military options. The Pentagon has already drawn up a list of targets.
An Israeli invasion of Gaza is going to be hell. It’s already hell. But what comes after could be just as worse, particularly if the Israelis find themselves sucked into re-occupying and administering a territory with 2.3m Palestinians. What’s the plan for the day after? 🧵
Hamas is a terrorist organization. But it has also served as the de-facto Palestinian government in Gaza for the last 16 years. Eradicate Hamas and you eradicate the Hamas government. Presumably Israel would want to find a replacement before their troops pull out.
There aren’t any good options. Nobody wants to touch Gaza, which has long been synonymous with poverty, underdevelopment, violence, and hopelessness.
I'm agnostic on Modi. But I do envy India's foreign policy and the way it looks at the world. India is a selfish country—but in an anarchic world system (sorry, the U.N. doesn't count) where there is no global government enforcing global rules, countries need to be selfish.
Whereas the U.S. tends to view the world in black-and-white, India sees a complicated world with various shades of gray. Whereas the U.S. views alliances in positive-sum terms, India views alliances as detriments to maximum flexibility. The word "alliance" is anathema.
Maximum flexibility is where it's at, and India practices it quite well. It tries to retain positive relationships with as many powers as it can. It shrewdly exploits situations to its own advantage (see: buying cheap Russian oil in bulk). And it leverages its weight in...
Wrong. “Working to hasten” NATO membership for Ukraine won’t shorten the war—It will do the opposite. It doesn’t take a genius to figure out why: if Putin knows Kyiv will be a NATO member after a Ukrainian victory, he will fight that much harder (and longer) to prevent it.
I would also be careful before assuming NATO membership would prevent any Russian military action against Kyiv for eternity. Why on earth would the Russians believe we are willing to fight and die for Ukraine in the future if we clearly aren’t willing to do so in the present?
Then there’s the question of whether bringing Ukraine into NATO is even necessary for Europe’s security. Kyiv obviously thinks it is, and you can’t blame them for thinking so. But for the rest of NATO, it really isn’t; Russia wasn’t going to invade and colonize the Baltics.
China and Cuba are seeking to boost their intel relationship, and Beijing is reportedly nearing a deal to build a joint military facility on the island. The U.S. is trying to dissuade Havana. But given the 60+ year embargo, why on earth would Cuba listen? newsweek.com/cuba-china-tie…
This specific case is a great illustration of how the embargo—which has failed in every sense of the word—is akin to tying one hand behind our back. Cuba has no incentive to back away from its relationship with Beijing, particularly when the U.S. isn’t offering anything.
Cuba remains a third rail in U.S. foreign policy. With the exception of Jimmy Carter (who flirted with normalization) and Barack Obama (who normalized as best he could), domestic politics continues to drive Washington’s Cuba policy. Unless that changes, Havana ain’t listening.
U.S. and Iranian officials have been engaged in indirect talks for months. The aim: find a way to deescalate relations and avoid a possible conflict neither side wants. As you might expect, the usual suspects (who created this situation in the first place) are freaking out.
Most of these organizations or individuals will tell you that they aren't opposed to diplomacy with Iran—they're only opposed to a bad deal. Even so, they're allergic to the idea of giving Tehran concessions. Their version of diplomacy is squeezing Iran until they capitulate.
Guess what? We tried that. We ditched the JCPOA, resumed the sanctions, and added even more. We spent about three years executing this strategy. The result was a more belligerent Iran, an Iranian nuclear program free of most constraints, and...you guessed it...less breakout time.