So impressed by how much newsworthy detail is in there, really needs some time for proper processing. Good thing I’m on a walk with a sleeping baby.
First things first. Yes, US intelligence has failed in the past. But the IC has learned a lot of lessons. See last page on estimative language, methodology. Also the “minority view.” So, if the joint IC has high confidence in a specific assessment, then I have high confidence.
This "scope note" is likely to get lost in the press coverage, but is of towering importance: the Intelligence Community does not assess impact and success of foreign influence operations, and does not weigh external impact on organic U.S. developments and divisions. So, caution.
Overarching takeaway: Russian intelligence actors and proxies were far more prolific, more aggressive, and more risk-taking in the 2020 election cycle than many assumed, myself included. They were also more covert and more disciplined than in 2016. Expect more.
A highly remarkable data-point. 2014.
Hello Rudy 👋
What is the US firm that was hired by Russian proxies to petition US officials? And what's the documentary and where did it air in late Jan 2020?
This sure looks like somebody has decent visibility into Russian targets
The unclassified intelligence assessment stops short of attributing the infamous Hunter Biden/New York Post leak to Russian proxies — but it appears more likely today that there was at least some form of Russian involvement.
Still, given the magnitude of the Hunter Biden leaks, I would think we still want like to see a more specific assessment, with more public evidence. My initial warning stands, especially this part: washingtonpost.com/outlook/2020/1…
This is probably correct. And, yes, Facebook deserves a good amount of praise for having been particularly proactive. Twitter also delivered.
This btw reads as if the Burisma subsidiary phishing attempts were unsuccessful, but text is ambiguous.
Important to be cautious here. None of this influence activity was strategically significant or effective. Russian activity in 2020 was less impressive than in 2016. And a hard look at the data shows that—highly likely—not even 2016 moved the needle.
Note of caution: I would not put too much weight on the leaked DIA assessment: it’s low confidence; it came too quickly; not available in full text; it got politicized; and done by one of the least impressive outfits of the USIC, if I may stick my neck out just a little bit.
First off, proper BDA needs to be done on the ground in Fordo, in ways that are highly likely very difficult to pull off, given the nature of the damage, and therefore need time. The IRGC, obviously, has the best ground access.
The IRGC, however, also has the an interest in misdirection and deception, in both public and private statements, given that they know they are owned — meaning any SIGINT here is perhaps not as reliable a source as it otherwise might be.
It appears that foreign influence operations on this platform are picking up, as expected. So here are a few high-level observations. Under normal circumstances I would write a proper longer piece. But in the interest of time, here you go. A few trends, questions, and hypotheses:
Most of the exposed Russian tradecraft is sloppy, and often the engagement on X is fake. But not always. One day after this remarkable WIRED story came out, the U.S. IC confirmed the attribution to Russia to reporters (Confirmation npr.org/2024/10/22/nx-…) wired.com/story/russian-…
The U.S. IC is reacting very fast. They expose content as foreign malign influence without amplifying it at the same time. That is excellent. It would be even better if there was one central reference point for all announcements, including press-call drops, perhaps with delay.
"Influence and Cyber Operations: An Update," the new OpenAI threat intelligence report, out a few hours ago. The document is interesting for one specific reason that hasn't been mentioned in public reporting so far cdn.openai.com/threat-intelli…
This is the money paragraph, from today's OpenAI report "Influence and Cyber Operations: An Update."
tldr: AI labs sit at a middle section of adversary kill chains—if staffed & equipped properly, the labs are potentially uniquely well positioned for threat intelligence insights
The report also has some interesting LLM TTP examples
JUST OUT — September was a wild month for scholars of modern covert influence operations. No longer do we have to rely on a campaign's digital footprints alone. My first analysis of ~3K leaked internal files and fresh FBI evidence on "Doppelganger."
This video was an internal production by the Social Design Agency, a disinformation firm in Moscow, produced in early August 2023, likely to be viewed by Vladimir Putin. Note the memo reproduced in the description, discussing the video.
Several weeks ago German media (WDR, NDR, SZ) received a leak of internal files from the biggest Russian disinformation contractor, Social Design Agency, often referred to as Doppelganger. "Western security officials" confirmed authenticity. First story by @FlorianFlade et al
Another exclusive @tagesschau, this one is excellent. I wish they would excerpt or screenshot the source documents though tagesschau.de/investigativ/n…