Wesley Morgan Profile picture
Mar 22, 2021 32 tweets 17 min read Read on X
Now that THE HARDEST PLACE is out, I'm going to do a photo thread—there was only room in the book's photo insert for 20ish, but people I interviewed shared hundreds more fantastic ones with me.
"In 2002, we barely had maps," one of the early Rangers in Kunar told me. "We basically had Russian maps."

He wasn't exaggerating. Here's a map used by Marines in the Pech early in the war. Image
The Soviets got to Kunar in the early weeks after their Christmas 1979 intervention. The main base they set up was on the Asadabad peninsula that now houses the provincial gov't complex & a cricket pitch (viewed here in photos from helicopters posted on Soviet veterans' forums). ImageImage
Soviet units were heavy & mechanized/motorized during their early years in Kunar, as these photos of BMPs/BTRs in the Pech valley—which blew my mind when I first saw them, the tracked BMPs especially—show.

As you can see in the third photo, there were problems with this approach ImageImageImage
Contrary to the common stereotype, the Soviets learned from this experience, and during the latter half of their time in Kunar, they operated as a light, flexible force, doing small, frequent air assaults & multi-day patrols to heights where US forces would venture only rarely. ImageImageImage
This evolution didn't just apply to Soviet SOF units, like the 334th Separate Spetsnaz Group working eastward out of Asadabad. The 66th Separate Motorized Brigade, whose AO was Kunar/Nangarhar, transformed one of its battalions into a roving, SOF-like air assault unit. ImageImageImageImage
As THE HARDEST PLACE describes, the US evolution in Kunar was opposite—from light/flexible to heavy/motorized, driving MRAPs as wide & heavy as BTRs

This is the earliest photo I have of US SOF in Kunar in 2002—Rangers working out of Topchi (later FOB Wright), an old Soviet base Image
As JSOC’s attention turned from Afghanistan to Iraq at the end of 2002, the most active US force in Kunar became a succession of Green Beret teams based at Asadabad. The famous Jim Gant deployed to Kunar as commander of one of those teams, ODA 316, in the spring of 2003. ImageImage
In November 2003, the 75th Ranger Regt's 1st & 2nd Battalions & the 1st BCT, 10th Mountain Division flew & drove deep up the Pech.

The Ranger mission was called Winter Strike, the 10th Mountain one Mountain Resolve.

Here's 1/10's 2-22 Infantry at Bagram before they flew up: Image
Before one 10th Mountain battalion (2-22) flew up the Pech to Nangalam on the evening of Nov 6, 2003 in CH-47s, another (2-87) drove up during the day to secure the LZ, which would become the future site of Camp Blessing

Here are the brigade & battalion commanders during the op: Image
Thanks to @CarterTroy, here is a photo from 2-87's Nov 2003 push up the Pech to Nangalam.

The twin convoy & air assault mirrored a two-battalion Soviet operation in 1980. The Soviet movement had been interrupted by the disastrous battle of Khara, but 2-87's went quietly. Image
@CarterTroy 2-22's mission: march up the Waygal to a mountainside settlement bombed a week earlier in a CIA-directed air strike & try to figure out whom it had killed (backstory on the botched, tragic strike in ch. 2).

That's the site where THE HARDEST PLACE's lower cover image was taken: ImageImage
While 2-22 trekked up the Waygal, 1/75 Ranger battalion flew out to the Kantiwa valley much deeper up the Pech, where few US troops would go again.

1/75 was expecting a fight but didn't get one. They wound up staying at a fort belonging to the family of their target, Haji Ghafor ImageImageImage
2/75 headed even further north, to the Parun valley.

Neither Ranger battalion found anybody/anything they were looking for, even as they moved on to other Pech side-valleys that would become famous later (Korengal, Watapur).

Rangers nicknamed the mission "Winter Strikeout." ImageImageImageImage
JSOC commander McChrystal's idea for Winter Strike—that Ranger Regt would pick bin Laden's trail back up—was hobbled by a lack of interpreters who spoke any of the 5 Nuristani languages they encountered.

Best the Rangers had were CIA's Pashto CTPTs (in choc-chip camo here). Image
At Thanksgiving, McChrystal visited the Rangers in some of the far-flung valleys & heard out their assessment that Winter Strike wasn't finding much.

Here are 1/75 commander Lt. Col. Mike Kershaw & 2-87 commander Lt. Col. Dave Paschal serving up turkey in the Pech, November 2003 ImageImage
On Nov. 14, 2003, an IED struck a 2/75 Ranger convoy outside Kandigal, by the Korengal's mouth, killing 2/75 assistant armorer Sgt. Jay Blessing.

“I just thought the world of Jay,” his mentor at 2/75, Korea/Vietnam vet Ray Fuller Sr., told me. “Jay was a splendid Ranger." ImageImage
As Winter Strike wound down, a Green Beret team took over the Nangalam encampment the Rangers & 10th Mountain had been using.

This base was what Winter Strike left behind, & it was named after Blessing, the first American killed in Kunar or the Pech. Here it is being dedicated: ImageImage
One more from Winter Strike: this video, which @franzjmarty took the other day, shows where the Kantiwa valley—home of 1/75 Rangers from early Nov to late Dec 2003, rarely visited by US troops again—joins the Pech. While the bulk of 1/75 flew in, one company hiked up this.
The Green Berets who became the first long-term residents of Camp Blessing at the end of 2003—and the first American troops to live day in, day out in the Pech—were ODA 936, a Utah National Guard team from the 19th SF Group.

Here some of them are: Image
ODA 936 was led by Capt. Ron Fry (memoir here: amazon.com/Hammerhead-Six…). The team's approach was to work closely with district leaders to stand up a militia & build a small "ink blot" of security around Nangalam. They didn't go looking for fights, especially in the Korengal. Image
Ron Fry's ODA 936 was replaced by ODA 361, which took the opposite approach.

"Commander Ron was a jirga guy," one Nangalam man told me. “Commander Luke was not a jirga guy. He was our district governor & our police. He liked to fight, & he was the first to fight the Korengalis.” Image
Both teams embraced imagery of SF's Vietnam heyday, naming pets & modeling pieces of the base in tribute to John Wayne's 1968 "The Green Berets." Note tiger-stripe camo they outfitted their local "indig" militia with (photo from two teams' brief spring 2004 overlap period) Image
Both ODA 936 and ODA 361 were squaring off against an Egyptian al-Qaida operative who seemed to function a bit like a Green Beret himself, training & advising local militants in the Pech. He went by the nom de guerre Abu Ikhlas al-Masri & had been living in Kunar since the '80s. Image
With the Green Berets at Camp Blessing was a platoon from 3/6 Marines.

The Marines were there for security, but they would wind up inheriting the Pech counterinsurgency mission in the fall of 2004 when CJSOTF-A headquarters at Bagram pulled ODA 361 out of the valley. ImageImage
Here’s a sketch a Marine from 3/6 did of Nangalam from OP Avalanche above Blessing.

During a big attack on Blessing at the end of August 2004, insurgents took one of these OPs & used it to fire a DShK into the base below—the first attempt at overrunning a US outpost in the Pech Image
A month later, on Sept 23, insurgents reprised the attack while 3/6 battalion commander Dale Alford (now a major general) was visiting Blessing. Alford is seen here during an earlier visit with 25th ID’s Greg Gadson, who would lose his legs to an EFP during the Iraq surge. Image
Alford was struck by the Pech fighters’ skill, comparing them to AQI fighters he dealt with the next year in Qaim.

“In the Pech, you didn’t find a dead enemy soldier...they could drag [them] away faster than anybody I’ve ever seen,” he told me. Here’s the terrain: Image
When ODA 361 left Blessing in late 2004, the Pech mission—including making use of the local militia the Green Berets had stood up—passed to a new platoon of Marines, from 3/3 out of Hawaii.

Here's platoon commander Justin Bellman with a monkey the SF guys also left for them. ImageImage
Bellman had been at Blessing a day when one of the outgoing SF soldiers asked if he wanted to see a firefight.

“They took me out to the Korengal Lumberyard, where they knew we were going to get into a firefight, and damned if we didn’t,” Bellman told me.

Here's the lumberyard: Image
ODA 361's Korengal approach—going in at every opportunity, seeking firefights—set the tone for 3/3 Marines, which didn't know anything about how ODA 936 had operated.

Pretty soon, company-plus-sized missions to the Korengal Lumberyard were a regular occurance. March 2005: Image
A new battalion, 2/3 Marines, rotated into Afg in spring 2005 and put a platoon at Blessing.

The insurgency in Kunar was picking up and coming under the direction of the Taliban's Peshawar Shura. A militant who went by the name Ahmad Shah became 2/3's bogeyman in the Korengal. Image

• • •

Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to force a refresh
 

Keep Current with Wesley Morgan

Wesley Morgan Profile picture

Stay in touch and get notified when new unrolls are available from this author!

Read all threads

This Thread may be Removed Anytime!

PDF

Twitter may remove this content at anytime! Save it as PDF for later use!

Try unrolling a thread yourself!

how to unroll video
  1. Follow @ThreadReaderApp to mention us!

  2. From a Twitter thread mention us with a keyword "unroll"
@threadreaderapp unroll

Practice here first or read more on our help page!

More from @wesleysmorgan

Dec 5, 2023
Even if we accept the IDF claim that the ratio of Gazan militants to civilians killed is 1:2 and not worse, this spokesman's claim that this ratio is "unprecedented in the modern history of urban warfare" (and thus admirable) is false.

*Fallujah,* of all places, disproves it.
During the brutal, heavily documented Nov 2004 second battle of Fallujah, US troops estimated that they killed 2,100 insurgents.

The Red Cross estimated that US forces killed 800 civilians during the main clearance, and the Iraq Body Count Project estimated 580-670.

Image
Image
Image
Those estimates of civilian deaths may well be low—but even if you double them, and even if you trim hundreds off the US's claimed insurgent death toll, you only get a 1:1 ratio.

Again, Fallujah was brutal. This is not to suggest it was some kind of "clean" battle.
Read 9 tweets
Nov 30, 2023
Detailed and disturbing investigation of IDF targeting practices in @972mag by @yuval_abraham, with both anonymous and official sources describing the bombing of "power targets" and loosening of intelligence and collateral damage standards since Oct. 7. 972mag.com/mass-assassina…
“Power targets” appear to be how the IDF has implemented “Dahiya doctrine” in Gaza: strikes on government buildings, infrastructure, and high-rises that—although justified by the presence of Hamas offices or personnel—are meant to pressure Gazans into restraining Hamas.

Image
Image
Image
This is what IDF spokesman Adm. Hagari was talking about when he said on Oct. 9 that "the emphasis is on damage and not on accuracy," and what IAF chief of staff Tishler was referring to when he told reporters bombing was occurring "on a large scale and not in a surgical manner." Image
Read 14 tweets
Nov 24, 2023
Third report I’ve seen that the largely female 414th Intelligence Battalion—responsible for Gaza border surveillance—sent specific warnings about the coming attack up their chain of command, only to be ignored and have their base overrun (at least 20 414th KIA, plus hostages).


Image
Image
Image
First of the previous reports on the 414th Bn’s ignored warnings, based on interviews with surviving unit members, who feel IDF has ignored them since, too (consistent with FT’s reporting that IDF intends to investigate only “after the war”) haaretz.co.il/news/politics/…
Read 5 tweets
Oct 30, 2023
Twenty years ago today, U.S. warplanes acting on CIA orders launched a devastating attack on the settlement of Ataza in the Waygal valley (marked on the maps of U.S. Army troops who hiked up to assess the damage as Objective Winchester), starting with a strike from a B-1B bomber. Image
The CIA was hoping to kill Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, but the strike wound up killing only civilians—family members of Mawlawi Ghulam Rabbani, a cleric who would’ve been very good to have on the U.S.-backed government’s side.

Photo: a Rabbani family member recounting it to me in 2017. Image
“It looked like doomsday,” one Rabbani family member who reached the scene at dawn told me. Those killed included the mawlawi’s son Ahmad; an elderly aunt, Sayimid; a young woman, Zahida; three young children, Hamida, Zaki, and Bibi Shirini; a baby, Hubaib; and a local holy man. Image
Read 9 tweets
Feb 21, 2023
Some new information about US military ops in Africa in the later part of the Trump admin in Mark Esper’s memoir.

In late 2020 before Trump ordered a drawdown, there were more than 1,000 US troops in Somalia, Esper says—more than the highest total (800) DOD ever said publicly. ImageImage
Esper says that in late Sept and early Oct 2020, Robert O'Brien pushed DOD to pull out of Somalia, suggesting Trump had ordered it but never providing evidence of it. There was a big meeting about it where Mark Meadows also pushed it, but Trump himself didn't seem involved. Image
Esper also describes the chain of events leading to SEAL Team 6's Halloween 2020 hostage rescue mission in Nigeria.

At the time, SOCOM and AFRICOM were preparing for a *different* hostage rescue mission. Then Walton was kidnapped and the US figured out where he was. Image
Read 5 tweets
Feb 10, 2023
US SOF were using Ukrainian operatives for reconnaissance and countering Russian disinformation. But the wording of the funding authority, Section 1202, forced the programs’ suspension when Russia invaded. Now the Pentagon is trying to get that changed. wapo.st/3loKgKk
The immediate issue here is a pair of so-called 1202 programs that were active from about 2019 until February 2022, which U.S. officials described to me. But the bigger issue is the fate of Section 1202 more generally, which DOD sees an opportunity to revise and broaden.
Section 1202 is based on an authority I've reported on in the past, Section 127e, which dates back to 2005 and has allowed US SOF to use local surrogates for everything from reconnaissance and IED detection in Afghanistan to direct-action raids in Africa. politico.com/story/2018/07/…
Read 29 tweets

Did Thread Reader help you today?

Support us! We are indie developers!


This site is made by just two indie developers on a laptop doing marketing, support and development! Read more about the story.

Become a Premium Member ($3/month or $30/year) and get exclusive features!

Become Premium

Don't want to be a Premium member but still want to support us?

Make a small donation by buying us coffee ($5) or help with server cost ($10)

Donate via Paypal

Or Donate anonymously using crypto!

Ethereum

0xfe58350B80634f60Fa6Dc149a72b4DFbc17D341E copy

Bitcoin

3ATGMxNzCUFzxpMCHL5sWSt4DVtS8UqXpi copy

Thank you for your support!

Follow Us!

:(