Ran across an interesting study from back in 2013: Chinese researchers evaluated the "strategic position" of 131 features in the Spratly Islands. Explicitly proposed improving the "strategic position" of features through artificial construction... (1/)
(2/) Looks like the research received state funding via the 863 Program. And the authors were all affiliated with the Nanjing University Jiangsu Province Key Laboratory of Geographic Information Science and Technology.
(3/) They analyzed a bunch of different factors, ranging from "maritime military deterrence effect" to "navigation ease" to "runway construction length conditions."
(4/) The authors noted that all of the features with the highest "strategic position" scores are occupied by other countries.
(5/) To close this gap and boost the "strategic position" of China's features in the Spratlys, they proposed land reclamation and island building.
China's island building campaign started right around the time this research was published.
(6/) Impossible to say whether this particular study informed China's subsequent activities in the Spratly Islands, but it still offers an interesting look at how researchers working for the Chinese party-state or the PLA may have been evaluating the situation.
(7/) Also, here's the translated title, abstract, and so on included at the end of the article:
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My new report with @RecordedFuture is the first comprehensive, publicly available analysis of how the People's Liberation Army (PLA) is organized on China's militarized islands in the South China Sea. THREAD: (1/) recordedfuture.com/peoples-libera…
In the report, I detail the organizational structures, duties, and facilities/assets of 9 specific units that maintain a presence on China's outposts, which mainly fall between the regiment leader and division leader grades. (2/)
These include units from the PLA Navy's (PLAN) shore command structure, the PLAN's naval aviation branch, China's national defense mobilization system, and the PLA Strategic Support Force (PLASSF). (3/)
Found video footage of the Chinese maritime militia command post on Tree Island in the Paracel Islands. We get a close look at their radar system, video surveillance stem, electronic sea chart system, and more. I've never seen any like this before! (1/)
The command post is on the 2nd floor of this building: (2/)
The radar system, which they say covers 40 nautical miles: (3/)
For my final investigation with @RadioFreeAsia and @BenarNews, I set out to expose China's maritime militia. The paper trail associated with this shadowy paramilitary force reveals classified projects, experimental systems, and more. THREAD: (1/) benarnews.org/english/news/i…
My investigation focused on the maritime militia belonging to Sansha City, which falls under Hainan province and administers China’s claims in the South China Sea from its headquarters on Woody Island in the Paracel Islands. (2/)
Sansha set up its new maritime militia in July 2013, with the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Hainan Province Sansha Garrison taking charge of training and commanding the force. By July 2016, it had over 1,800 members and more than 100 vessels. (3/)
SCOOP: China is using over $930,000 of foreign tech to control the South China Sea, mostly from US companies, including unmanned surface vehicle components and a military-grade countersurveillance device.
I found that Sansha City has acquired or plans to acquire hardware, equipment, software, and materials from at least 25 different companies based in the United States, Sweden, Austria, Italy, the United Kingdom, Japan, and Taiwan, amounting to 66 items across 13 contracts. (2/)
Sansha City is headquartered on Woody Island, is responsible for directly administering the PRC’s claims in the South China Sea, and has an extremely close organizational and operational relationship with the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). (3/)
I found that the Chinese government trademarked the entire South China Sea in 2014, filing thousands of trademark applications covering 281 specific rocks, reefs, and regions – including features already occupied by other countries.
Each of these trademarks is composed of the feature’s name in stylized Chinese calligraphy and is categorized under one of 45 international trademark classes. All of the trademarks belong to Sansha City, which administers China’s claims in the South China Sea. (2/)
Many also have an English transliteration of the feature’s name and an illustrated logo. These are the trademarked names and logos for Mischief Reef, Fiery Cross Reef, Subi Reef, and the entire Spratly Islands. (3/)
(2/) Thanks to China's investments in the BeiDou satellite navigation system, nearly every civilian fishing vessel operating in the South China Sea can perform a maritime surveillance role. This is because BeiDou has built-in two-way texting capabilities.
(3/) When Chinese fishermen are carrying out their normal fishing activities, if they spot a foreign vessel, they can use BeiDou to quickly report the foreign vessel to the authorities (e.g. the CCG or PLA).