In the late 1930s, the US faced a multifaceted problem. We had delayed mobilization and preparations for a war that we didn’t think would reach us.
When we had the time to prepare, Congress did not approve the resources. Now we were getting the resources but short on time.
We could employ a small well-trained force now/soon OR employ a large well-trained force a year later. But we could not do both.
With limited materiel (military equipment, weapons, supplies, etc.), we faced a similar problem.
We could send materiel overseas to arm and supply Allied troops who needed it now, OR we could send it to American training camps to facilitate the training of our @USArmy, which would not enter the fight until trained.
This issue with US military supplies was repeatedly expressed before and after the 1941 Lend-Lease Act.
The Lend-Lease Act was officially called “An Act to Promote the Defense of the United States” and it was essentially a program of supplying the Allies with food, oil, and military equipment (materiel) from 1941 until 1945.
So, to give us more time to prepare our military for war, we helped our Allies continue fighting. (Charts from ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/r… )
For a while, the @USArmy was low on recruits because many were sent to the air and sea forces, which were being readied for immediate duty. But recruits were also put to use elsewhere because the equipment needed to make the recruits useful to the Army was not yet available.
Much to the chagrin of Army commanders.
While our Army recruits waited for weapons to train on, some were diverted to industry to work for the war effort until they could train to fight.
“In the making of decisions, military wisdom was not always enough, for there were nonmilitary considerations which at times outweighed the military.”
“The reason was partly that a democracy is not ruled by warriors, even in wartime, but by a civilian authority, with the result that the wishes of Army or Navy had always to meet with approval of the President.”
Sometimes the problem was a greater, more pressing demand for manpower elsewhere, such as within the industrial economy. Other times it was that the military requirements were not well understood.
One of the greatest issues with shifting a peace-minded population to the temporary pursuit of war is that the realities of war are often in complete opposition to those of peace.
For example, in a typical peace-minded economy, someone trained for a job will put forth just enough effort to accomplish that job. He/she will avoid excess use of manpower as well as the excess use (or waste) of materials.
This is an easily understandable “economy of force” when considering industry during peacetime. But war is wasteful and somewhat irrational.
Military commanders do not use “just enough” in most contexts. A military force that is “just strong enough” will suffer heavy casualties. But a force that is “vastly superior” will accomplish a mission (ideally) without the serious loss of soldiers or time.
This, at least in theory, allows the military to effectively accomplish one task and quickly move on to the next, wasting little time and fewer resources (including soldiers).
A “vastly superior force” has a variable definition. It could be greater numbers of soldiers, or newer weapons and techniques. It could be the force capable of transporting men and supplies more effectively. And it is also a label that changes, sometimes quickly.
In 1940, Blitzkrieg showed the Germans as a “vastly superior force”, while in 1944, with the drive through Normandy and beyond, the Allies were the “vastly superior force”.
All of this seems pretty obvious now, but at the time it was not always clear who was or would be superior. And it is only our best guess as to how much materiel will be consumed, and how quickly, once the military is employed.
Military planners during peacetime have the unfortunate challenge of convincing civilian authorities that we must accept “wastefulness” and also prepare for it. “The nation that winds up for war with a surplus of equipment is likely to be the nation that wins…”
We learn these lessons painfully at times, and once the war is over, we often quickly forget until the next time, when we will again learn painfully. But these lessons can be recorded and studied. @USArmyCMH@Erikhistorian@ArmyUPress@KateDahls@AMRiotto
We’ll talk more about materiel as the series progresses. If you're just tuning in or you've missed any of the previous threads, you can find them all saved on this account under ⚡️Moments or with this direct link twitter.com/i/events/13642…
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Operation Chastise was a night bombing raid carried out by the @RoyalAirForce on the evening of 16 May 1943. This raid is also referred to as the Dambusters Raid because the bombers were targeting several dams in the Ruhr industrial area, in western Germany.
The Möhne Dam, the Sorpe Dam, and the Eder Dam. Destruction would affect hydroelectric power plants as well as the industries depending on the water. There was also potential for flooding cities and nearby areas if the dams were broken.
It seems like it’s about time for a #TankTwitter thread, so today we will talk about the first, largely intact, Tiger I captured by the Allies.
The Tiger I was a heavy tank that provided Hitler’s army with the first armored fighting vehicle to feature a mounted 88mm gun. It was big and scary, and it was expensive, both to build and to maintain, which is partly why only a little over 1300 were built.
On Tuesday we talked about the Battle of Sidi Bou Zid, and that thread also served as a primer for the third episode of the accompanying #WhyWeFight1943 podcast.
“In their January attacks Axis units puzzled Allied commanders by limiting their own advances and abandoning key positions. Soon, however, the enemy displayed more determination.”
On Tuesday, we talked about the secret multi-day trip that President Roosevelt took from the White House on 9 JAN to Casablanca, arriving on 14 JAN, in order to attend a highly classified series of meetings with his British counterpart, Winston Churchill.
This conference involved both FDR and Churchill, and their most trusted senior staff and senior military leaders. During the meetings they established the way forward for the Allies in this war, mapping out “the grand strategy for both the European and the Pacific Theaters.”
George Patton was put in command of the Western Task Force, which sailed from the east coast of the US right to Morocco for Operation Torch. The other two task forces sailed from the UK.
Patton was on the USS Augusta, which was under the command of Admiral Hewitt (next to Patton in the picture). That little pouch on the front of Patton's belt is actually a police handcuff pouch but Patton used it for a compass.
Everyone knows that the United States used two atomic bombs in the Pacific in World War II, and that the US was the only nation in the war to use this new type of weapon. This week we will take a look at the efforts to create these bombs.
The Manhattan Project technically ran from 1942 until 1946, but the American effort itself had actually started in 1939, and we had British counterparts already working on nuclear weapons development by the time the United States jumped on that train.⚛️