Thread by @syrpis

One more go at the Irish border 'trilemma' (see @rdanielkelemen's Venn diagram) and Brexit.

The implications of the latest developments are very stark. Thread.


1/

While the UK and the EU were in the same regulatory space (single market and customs union) there was no need for significant border checks between the two. 2/

Then along came Brexit. Over the years since 2016, Brexiters' position has hardened. Sovereignty and regulatory freedom were prioritised. And so, solutions which would have 'solved' (or 'de-dramatised') the Irish border issue were rejected. 3/

Membership of the single market was rejected. Theresa May's 'UK-wide backstop' was rejected. Few concessions to alignment with the EU were made in the (therefore thin) TCA agreed in December. 4/

That all meant that there was a need for a hard border between the UK and the EU. And a need for a solution which addressed the unique circumstances on the island of Ireland. 5/

Both sides were determined that the border should not go across Ireland. And both sides agreed, in the NI Protocol, that the de facto border should instead be between GB and NI. 6/

At the time the Withdrawal Agreement and the NI Protocol were agreed, there were hopes that the TCA would allow that border to be de-dramatised. But those hopes came to nothing. 7/

The resulting situation is problematic. As @hayward_katy explains here, the EU's external border now relies on the UK. 8/
blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/2021/03…

Worse, the UK Govt, and Unionists in Northern Ireland, have consistently misrepresented the nature of what was agreed. The PM breezily states that there will be no customs checks (and indeed no non-tariff barriers) - and people appear to believe him. 9/

He seek to blame others, principally the EU, for the emergence of barriers to trade; and to blame businesses for failing to make the necessary preparations. 10/

The real risk is that the border arrangements on the Irish Sea fail, and that the NI Protocol collapses. Some appear to be relishing that prospect. 11/

The consequences for Ireland seem not to concern them - though they should. The lack of concern for UK trade ('global Britain') and the UK's international reputation (eg with the US) I find almost impossible to understand. 12/12

PS - This was from last September (in the midst of the Internal Market Bill furore).

The paras at the end, on the extent of the commitments in the Protocol re GB/NI trade, seem especially relevant now.
ukandeu.ac.uk/internal-marke…

And see this damning appraisal of the Govt’s lack of effort to find workable solutions... amp.theguardian.com/commentisfree/…