The allegations against Australian SASR Victoria Cross recipient Ben Roberts-Smith—of murdering prisoners, desecrating corpses, and all kinds of other stuff—are quite the case study in the dangers of hero-worship of SOF operators theage.com.au/national/burie…
“Roberts-Smith dug a hole in the backyard of his house in the Sunshine Coast hinterland & buried the USB drives inside a pink plastic children’s lunchbox to hide them from both police & military investigations...he placed a rock on top to mark the spot.” theage.com.au/national/burie…
“leaked recordings of [Roberts-Smith] suggest he is confident that he can see off those seeking to hold him accountable. As long as his employer...keeps funding his cause, he says, he will not only win, he will ‘f—ing destroy’ his enemies.” theage.com.au/national/burie…
What goes unexplored in this story is maybe the most important thing about Roberts-Smith—the effect he had on the behavior of the rest of his SASR squadron. The Brereton report found that senior NCOs like him were viewed as “demigods” and role models. theage.com.au/national/burie…
Roberts-Smith was a senior NCO in 2 Squadron, the SASR unit disbanded last year at the recommendation of the Brereton report because it was responsible for the bulk of credible SOTG war crime allegations.
Now that THE HARDEST PLACE is out, I'm going to do a photo thread—there was only room in the book's photo insert for 20ish, but people I interviewed shared hundreds more fantastic ones with me.
"In 2002, we barely had maps," one of the early Rangers in Kunar told me. "We basically had Russian maps."
He wasn't exaggerating. Here's a map used by Marines in the Pech early in the war.
The Soviets got to Kunar in the early weeks after their Christmas 1979 intervention. The main base they set up was on the Asadabad peninsula that now houses the provincial gov't complex & a cricket pitch (viewed here in photos from helicopters posted on Soviet veterans' forums).
Lloyd Austin didn’t impress many of the officers I’ve interviewed who worked for him at MNC-I, USF-I, or CENTCOM. But from Biden team perspective, a guy who, when his recommendations on Iraq troop levels in 2011 were overruled by WH, didn’t make a fuss.
That’s may be an important memory for Biden team members (& Biden!) who remember the Afghan surge debate & who seem to be partly hung up about Flournoy for her handling of uniformed leaders’ recs as USD-P—as when Mullen *did* (as was his right) object internally on same Iraq rec.
For those to whom Austin is a new name: there's detail on his role in 2010-11 Iraq—including working closely with Tony Blinken and Tom Donilon when Biden had the Obama admin Iraq portfolio—in @mgordonwsj's THE ENDGAME, which describes him as "cautious and methodical."
On Nov 12, A Co of the 101st Airborne's 1-327 Infantry had flown into the Watapur valley to search a town militants had been using to attack their COP. Over 3 days they'd been attacked, given chase, and lost 6 soldiers. They couldn't push any further, so Team Darby was called.
For a sense of the terrain: here's (top left) a photo I took from the mouth of the Watapur in 2013, w/ the Gambir area Team Darby was headed to up near the horizon below the .50-cal's muzzle; and three Army photos from another air assault into the Gambir Jungle in 2011.
Team Darby flew in on MH-47s, hiked down to the target area to which SIGINT suggested the enemy force had retreated, and started searching homes. Two small groups of men took off running, and with ISR guiding him, Pape went after them with his squad and a Belgian malinois (Jari).
Staff Sgt. Kevin Pape, a larger-than-life 1/75 Ranger squad leader, was killed 10 years ago this week during Team Darby’s plunge into the Gambir Jungle in pursuit of insurgents who had killed six 1-327 Infantry soldiers during Operation Bulldog Bite
Growing up in Fort Wayne, Indiana, Kevin Pape "was one of those kids that had all the G.I. Joes. He’d make tanks out of cardboard boxes," his late father, Marc, told me a few years ago. As a teenager in the mid '90s he paintballed and was on the track and cross-country teams.
Pape enlisted at 25 in 2005, following a childhood friend into 1st Ranger Battalion. Deploying to Iraq for the first time in 2006, then again and again, he was there for the heyday of the Rangers' Stryker-mounted missions against the forerunners of ISIS in places like Mosul.
“To the average trooper, it said the sergeants were the real power of the SAS...To the junior officers, it said that if you go along with the sergeants, you'll be left alone. If you push back, your life will become a living hell.” On the SASR’s “NCO mafia” abc.net.au/news/2020-11-1…
SASR veteran: “We had some good sergeants and not so good sergeants...The not so good sergeants were the ones who were able to shape and influence and be those cancerous individuals that led [the SAS] down that path." But what about commanders who knew? abc.net.au/news/2020-11-1…
One set of illegal killings “was reported all the way up the special forces chain of command but dismissed....The former SAS patrol commander had one message for me about alleged war crimes. ‘EVERYONE KNEW,’ he wrote.” abc.net.au/news/2020-11-1…
The Afghanistan JSOC task force has been using SIGINT to figure out where the Taliban needs help against ISIS in Kunar, then delivering it via drone strikes, troops involved told me.
“What we’re doing with the strikes against ISIS is helping the Taliban move,” one special operator told me. The Taliban and ISIS are duking it out in the same old terrain—Korengal, Chowkay—where U.S. spent years relying heavily on airpower and artillery. washingtonpost.com/outlook/2020/1…
It’s a way of tipping the scales against ISIS, which the US sees as more dangerous, without having to talk to Taliban. “It’s easy to capture the Taliban’s communications,” said Bill Ostlund. “Why directly coordinate with them when you can do it that way?” washingtonpost.com/outlook/2020/1…