Apologies in advance for this very long thread, but as regular readers know, I worry greatly about common misunderstandings of the role of reserve currencies. The author seems to assume that what makes a currency a dominant reserve currency is...
its low frictional trading costs, which is why, he believes, digital currencies, with China in the lead, will dominate international trade.
But while a low frictional trading cost is a necessary condition, it is not nearly sufficient. A quick glance at the role of the...
3/19
US dollar over the past 100 years, the period during which it achieved dominant status, makes this clear: when the world was short of savings relative to its investment needs, during the first fifty years of that period (a period characterized by the global need to...
4/19
rebuild economically from 2 world wars) the US was a permanent net provider of savings to the world.
In the next five decades, however, when the global economy was substantially rebuilt and needed to export excess savings, the US automatically became a permanent net...
5/19
absorber of foreign savings. Of course during this time the US shifted from permanent trade surpluses, when the world needed the US to supply it with food, capital goods and consumer goods, to permanent trade deficits, when the world urgently some place in which to dump...
6/19
excess production of consumer goods.
This was no mere coincidence. To me it suggests three things. First, that reserve currency status is a function of a lot more than low-cost trading. In fact given that the cost is already so low, and seems to be in permanent decline...
7/19
decline anyway, I suspect it doesn't even matter much any more.
What seems to matter a lot more is the willingness of the reserve-currency country to run large imbalances in response not to its own needs but rather to the needs of the rest of the world. As an excellent...
8/19
CFR resource shows, the US typically absorbs 40-50% of global imbalances, and the Anglophone economies — with similar financial markets all of whom, like the US, punch way above their weights as international reserve currencies — collectively...
Given that China's currency (and that of other surplus countries, like Japan) punches so far below it's weight, it is surprising that anyone would argue that there is no relationship between the international status of a currency...
10/19
and its willingness and ability to absorb global imbalances.
Second, the reason these countries are "willing" to accept major reserve-currency status has more to do with ideology than with economic rationality, driven by, and reinforcing, the disproportionate power of...
11/19
the financial sector on domestic decision-making. Like the UK in the 1920s, they are perhaps too willing to sacrifice the needs of the producer side of their economies in order to maintain the overwhelming power of the financial side. The result, as Matthew Klein and I...
12/19
show in our book, is that these reserve-currency countries have constantly to choose between allowing unemployment to rise or allowing debt to rise. They have mostly chosen the latter.
And third, while China has been promising for nearly two decades that its currency will achieve dominant reserve status within five years or so, in fact the RMB is probably the least important of the top ten currencies given China's status as the second largest economy...
14/19
and largest trader in the world, and by relevant standards its role has barely improved in the past decade and may even have declined.
Why? Because for all over-excited talk about achieving major international status, Beijing has always refused to take the economic...
15/19
steps needed to increase its role in absorbing global imbalances.
On the contrary, when Covid-19 created a demand shock in a world already suffering from excess savings and insufficient demand, Beijing had an incredible opportunity to boost the role of the RMB by...
16/19
boosting net domestic demand. Instead it implemented a muscular supply-side response that actually worsened its contribution to global demand imbalances.
In the end I do expect the international status of the US dollar eventually to decline, but not because of the...
17/19
rise of the yen (which, we were told in the 1980s and 1990s, was virtually assured) or of the RMB. Either it will decline because the US decides that it is no longer willing to absorb the huge and rising economic cost of dominant reserve-currency status to its producing...
18/19
sectors and its balance sheet in exchange for the declining geopolitical benefits and to maintain the status and dominance of of its financial sector (which may be the same thing), or it will decline when the cost of maintaining the power of the dollar helps...
19/19
sufficiently undermine the US economy, which has always been the real source of American power. The experience of the UK in the 1920s provides an accelerated vision of how that can happen.
1/2 I did a quick back-of-the-envelope calculation of currency-share to GDP-share of the top ten currencies:
NZD 9.4
HKD 8.9
SFR 6.2
GPB 4.2
Aus dollar 4.4
USD 3.6
Yen 2.9
Can. dollar 2.7
Euro 2.2
RMB 0.3
2/2
There are a lot of problems with this table, not least because it reflects a single point in time, and obviously the smaller the economy, the more likely it is to be an outlier, but it is still interesting.
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1/10
WSJ: "What saves American finance is the dollar’s status as the must-have global asset and trading currency. Both roles face challenges, though, and the more the U.S. exploits foreigners, the higher the risk they look elsewhere."
2/10
While this is widely believed, it isn't true. Foreign capital inflows don't fund fiscal deficits. They fund current account deficits, and they must be matched domestically either by higher US investment, higher US unemployment, or higher US household and fiscal debt.
3/10
For those who understand accounting identities, these are the three main ways foreign inflows can result in wider gap between investment and saving. When there is an increase in net foreign inflows, in other words, one (or some combination) of these must occur.
1/12
Weijian Shan is right: China does need to let the renminbi rise, and substantially. An appreciating currency would "subsidize" imports and "tax" exports – the opposite of what tariffs are supposed to do. Given that households are net importers... ft.com/content/5bb8ed…
2/12
and manufacturers are net exporters, an appreciating currency is effectively an income transfer from manufacturers to households.
This, as former PBoC governor Zhou Xiaochuan explained many years ago, would be a very effective part of the income rebalancing process.
3/12
In fact any policy that correctly rebalances the distribution of income towards more domestic consumption works the same way, raising the household share of GDP – by increasing wages relative to productivity, raising interest rates, expanding social welfare spending, etc.
1/8 Xinhua: "China aims to "achieve a notable increase in household consumption as a share of GDP," and to increase the role of domestic demand as the principal engine of economic growth over the next five years, according to the new MIIT plan". english.news.cn/20251127/5539c…
2/8 But while everyone in government now acknowledges the urgent need to raise the consumption share of GDP, and wants to be seen doing something to achieve the goal, it isn't clear that they know what to do. This new "comprehensive" plan "to improve the alignment of...
3/8 the supply and demand of consumer goods" seems mainly to focus on producing more and better consumer goods, as if the problem in China is that households have plenty of money to spend, and are eager to spend it, but just don't have anything to spend it on.
1/18
Martin Wolf wonders whether the US or China will be the first to abandon its current follies on trade imbalances, but I don't think this is the right way to understand the current "fracturing" of globalization.
via @ft@ftft.com/content/b5157c…
2/18
As I see it, everyone (even Europe, eventually) is relearning what we used to know: a highly globalized trading regime can only work when all major economies choose more or less the same tradeoff between global integration and economic sovereignty.
3/18
That's because economies that exert more control than their trading partners over their external accounts (i.e. choose more economic sovereignty and less global integration) are also able to exert more control over their internal accounts, i.e. they are able to structure...
1/7 Good FT article on declining investment growth in China: "A sharp decline in reported investment in China suggests President Xi Jinping’s campaign against excessive industrial competition may be having an impact on the Chinese economy."
2/7 While some of the decline may reflect “a statistical correction of previously over-reported data”, as Goldman suggests, at least part of it shows that Beijing's battle against involution is working.
3/7 But here's the problem. The massive, post-2022 surge in investment in the industries that later suffered from involution was no accident. It was the engineered response to the collapse in property investment after 2021-22.
1/14
This very good Robin Harding article points out that the purpose of trade should be the exchange of goods, and not the mercantilist accumulation of assets abroad. ft.com/content/f294be…
2/14
However he makes a mistake when he says: "There is nothing that China wants to import, nothing it does not believe it can make better and cheaper, nothing for which it wants to rely on foreigners a single day longer than it has to."
3/14
That is not why China (or any other surplus country) doesn't import nearly as much as it exports. There are always foreign goods that people would like to import, especially from Europe, and in a well-managed global trading system, even in the extremely unlikely case that...