Apologies in advance for this very long thread, but as regular readers know, I worry greatly about common misunderstandings of the role of reserve currencies. The author seems to assume that what makes a currency a dominant reserve currency is...
its low frictional trading costs, which is why, he believes, digital currencies, with China in the lead, will dominate international trade.
But while a low frictional trading cost is a necessary condition, it is not nearly sufficient. A quick glance at the role of the...
3/19
US dollar over the past 100 years, the period during which it achieved dominant status, makes this clear: when the world was short of savings relative to its investment needs, during the first fifty years of that period (a period characterized by the global need to...
4/19
rebuild economically from 2 world wars) the US was a permanent net provider of savings to the world.
In the next five decades, however, when the global economy was substantially rebuilt and needed to export excess savings, the US automatically became a permanent net...
5/19
absorber of foreign savings. Of course during this time the US shifted from permanent trade surpluses, when the world needed the US to supply it with food, capital goods and consumer goods, to permanent trade deficits, when the world urgently some place in which to dump...
6/19
excess production of consumer goods.
This was no mere coincidence. To me it suggests three things. First, that reserve currency status is a function of a lot more than low-cost trading. In fact given that the cost is already so low, and seems to be in permanent decline...
7/19
decline anyway, I suspect it doesn't even matter much any more.
What seems to matter a lot more is the willingness of the reserve-currency country to run large imbalances in response not to its own needs but rather to the needs of the rest of the world. As an excellent...
8/19
CFR resource shows, the US typically absorbs 40-50% of global imbalances, and the Anglophone economies — with similar financial markets all of whom, like the US, punch way above their weights as international reserve currencies — collectively...
Given that China's currency (and that of other surplus countries, like Japan) punches so far below it's weight, it is surprising that anyone would argue that there is no relationship between the international status of a currency...
10/19
and its willingness and ability to absorb global imbalances.
Second, the reason these countries are "willing" to accept major reserve-currency status has more to do with ideology than with economic rationality, driven by, and reinforcing, the disproportionate power of...
11/19
the financial sector on domestic decision-making. Like the UK in the 1920s, they are perhaps too willing to sacrifice the needs of the producer side of their economies in order to maintain the overwhelming power of the financial side. The result, as Matthew Klein and I...
12/19
show in our book, is that these reserve-currency countries have constantly to choose between allowing unemployment to rise or allowing debt to rise. They have mostly chosen the latter.
And third, while China has been promising for nearly two decades that its currency will achieve dominant reserve status within five years or so, in fact the RMB is probably the least important of the top ten currencies given China's status as the second largest economy...
14/19
and largest trader in the world, and by relevant standards its role has barely improved in the past decade and may even have declined.
Why? Because for all over-excited talk about achieving major international status, Beijing has always refused to take the economic...
15/19
steps needed to increase its role in absorbing global imbalances.
On the contrary, when Covid-19 created a demand shock in a world already suffering from excess savings and insufficient demand, Beijing had an incredible opportunity to boost the role of the RMB by...
16/19
boosting net domestic demand. Instead it implemented a muscular supply-side response that actually worsened its contribution to global demand imbalances.
In the end I do expect the international status of the US dollar eventually to decline, but not because of the...
17/19
rise of the yen (which, we were told in the 1980s and 1990s, was virtually assured) or of the RMB. Either it will decline because the US decides that it is no longer willing to absorb the huge and rising economic cost of dominant reserve-currency status to its producing...
18/19
sectors and its balance sheet in exchange for the declining geopolitical benefits and to maintain the status and dominance of of its financial sector (which may be the same thing), or it will decline when the cost of maintaining the power of the dollar helps...
19/19
sufficiently undermine the US economy, which has always been the real source of American power. The experience of the UK in the 1920s provides an accelerated vision of how that can happen.
1/2 I did a quick back-of-the-envelope calculation of currency-share to GDP-share of the top ten currencies:
NZD 9.4
HKD 8.9
SFR 6.2
GPB 4.2
Aus dollar 4.4
USD 3.6
Yen 2.9
Can. dollar 2.7
Euro 2.2
RMB 0.3
2/2
There are a lot of problems with this table, not least because it reflects a single point in time, and obviously the smaller the economy, the more likely it is to be an outlier, but it is still interesting.
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1/6 According to the WSJ, after a few years in which the earnings of the poor rose faster than the earnings of the rich, in 2025 the earnings of the rich have risen faster. In theory this should have resulted in a lower US trade deficit. wsj.com/economy/us-eco…
2/6 That's because the rich consume less of their income than the poor, and so a shift in the relative income share from poor to rich should have reduced overall US consumption and increased overall US savings, which in turn should have reduced the US trade deficit.
3/6 But the US trade deficit continued to expand. This seems pretty strong evidence that the US trade account isn't driven only by domestic conditions, as most mainstream economists assume. What foreigners choose to do matters just as much or even more.
1/6 SCMP: "President Xi Jinping has called for more efforts to develop a unified domestic market, arguing that it will be crucial to helping China secure an edge in international competition and meet its development goals." scmp.com/economy/china-…
2/6 In a hyperglobalized world, a country gets to choose between economic sovereignty and global integration. The more it chooses to integrate into the global trade and capital system, the less control it exerts over its domestic economy.
3/6 The world is probably better off if every country chooses more global integration (i.e. has more open trade and capital accounts and less control over its external imbalances). This maximizes the benefits of international trade.
1/7 In August, both growth in industrial output and growth in retail sales came in well below expectations, with the former up 5.2% and the latter up 3.4% (compared to 5.7% and 3.7%, respectively, in the previous month). english.news.cn/20250915/7a106…
2/7 As always, the key point is that for all the talk of rebalancing, the proxy for output growth continues to outpace the proxy for consumption growth by quite a large margin.
Meaningful rebalancing requires that consumption outpace GDP growth by roughly two percentage points.
3/7 Some analysts argue that the weaker-than-expected growth in industrial output may be evidence that Beijing’s attempt to rein in involution is starting to work. Industrial output growth in July and August came in at the lowest paces in all of 2025.
1/8 Bloomberg: "China urged Mexico to “think twice” before levying tariffs, a warning that could signal Beijing’s willingness to retaliate over a move it sees as giving into demands from the US." bloomberg.com/news/articles/…
2/8 Mexico announced plans earlier this week to impose duties of as much as 50% on cars and other products made by China and several Asian exporters.
These are the kinds of stories I think we'll see more of in the next year or two.
3/8 In the past ten years Chinese exports to Mexico have nearly doubled, and its trade surplus has surged, to $71 billion last year.
This bilateral evolution must be understood as part of a global shift.
1/14
Barry Eichengreen warns, correctly, that "The dollar’s international primacy isn’t eternal. To be sustained, it has to be actively fostered and preserved."
But why sustain the dollar’s international primacy? Is this merely a modern monetary fetish? wsj.com/finance/curren…
2/14
While the primacy of the dollar is certainly good for bankers, financiers, and very wealthy owners of movable capital, what's much less obvious is the extent to which it benefits or harms American workers, manufacturers and middle class households.
3/14
Some analysts will argue that being able to transact in dollars benefits American exporters and importers by reducing currency hedging costs, but the more honest ones will acknowledge that the benefits are tiny, at best, and that their lack doesn't seem to hamper rivals.
1/10
Interesting new IMF paper on the extent of industrial policy subsidies to Chinese manufacturers and SOEs (to the extent information is available) and their impact on productivity. imf.org/en/Publication…
2/10
It measures national-level cash subsidies, tax benefits, subsidized credit, and subsidized land, which collectively amount, it says, to a high 4% of GDP. The authors note that other subsidies exist, including sub-national subsidies, but these are harder to measure.
3/10
I'd include in the latter what is perhaps among the biggest subsidies, which is over-spending on logistical infrastructure. To the extent that these cost more in resources than they create in economic value, they represent a large transfer to the users of the infrastructure.