Apologies in advance for this very long thread, but as regular readers know, I worry greatly about common misunderstandings of the role of reserve currencies. The author seems to assume that what makes a currency a dominant reserve currency is...
its low frictional trading costs, which is why, he believes, digital currencies, with China in the lead, will dominate international trade.
But while a low frictional trading cost is a necessary condition, it is not nearly sufficient. A quick glance at the role of the...
3/19
US dollar over the past 100 years, the period during which it achieved dominant status, makes this clear: when the world was short of savings relative to its investment needs, during the first fifty years of that period (a period characterized by the global need to...
4/19
rebuild economically from 2 world wars) the US was a permanent net provider of savings to the world.
In the next five decades, however, when the global economy was substantially rebuilt and needed to export excess savings, the US automatically became a permanent net...
5/19
absorber of foreign savings. Of course during this time the US shifted from permanent trade surpluses, when the world needed the US to supply it with food, capital goods and consumer goods, to permanent trade deficits, when the world urgently some place in which to dump...
6/19
excess production of consumer goods.
This was no mere coincidence. To me it suggests three things. First, that reserve currency status is a function of a lot more than low-cost trading. In fact given that the cost is already so low, and seems to be in permanent decline...
7/19
decline anyway, I suspect it doesn't even matter much any more.
What seems to matter a lot more is the willingness of the reserve-currency country to run large imbalances in response not to its own needs but rather to the needs of the rest of the world. As an excellent...
8/19
CFR resource shows, the US typically absorbs 40-50% of global imbalances, and the Anglophone economies — with similar financial markets all of whom, like the US, punch way above their weights as international reserve currencies — collectively...
Given that China's currency (and that of other surplus countries, like Japan) punches so far below it's weight, it is surprising that anyone would argue that there is no relationship between the international status of a currency...
10/19
and its willingness and ability to absorb global imbalances.
Second, the reason these countries are "willing" to accept major reserve-currency status has more to do with ideology than with economic rationality, driven by, and reinforcing, the disproportionate power of...
11/19
the financial sector on domestic decision-making. Like the UK in the 1920s, they are perhaps too willing to sacrifice the needs of the producer side of their economies in order to maintain the overwhelming power of the financial side. The result, as Matthew Klein and I...
12/19
show in our book, is that these reserve-currency countries have constantly to choose between allowing unemployment to rise or allowing debt to rise. They have mostly chosen the latter.
And third, while China has been promising for nearly two decades that its currency will achieve dominant reserve status within five years or so, in fact the RMB is probably the least important of the top ten currencies given China's status as the second largest economy...
14/19
and largest trader in the world, and by relevant standards its role has barely improved in the past decade and may even have declined.
Why? Because for all over-excited talk about achieving major international status, Beijing has always refused to take the economic...
15/19
steps needed to increase its role in absorbing global imbalances.
On the contrary, when Covid-19 created a demand shock in a world already suffering from excess savings and insufficient demand, Beijing had an incredible opportunity to boost the role of the RMB by...
16/19
boosting net domestic demand. Instead it implemented a muscular supply-side response that actually worsened its contribution to global demand imbalances.
In the end I do expect the international status of the US dollar eventually to decline, but not because of the...
17/19
rise of the yen (which, we were told in the 1980s and 1990s, was virtually assured) or of the RMB. Either it will decline because the US decides that it is no longer willing to absorb the huge and rising economic cost of dominant reserve-currency status to its producing...
18/19
sectors and its balance sheet in exchange for the declining geopolitical benefits and to maintain the status and dominance of of its financial sector (which may be the same thing), or it will decline when the cost of maintaining the power of the dollar helps...
19/19
sufficiently undermine the US economy, which has always been the real source of American power. The experience of the UK in the 1920s provides an accelerated vision of how that can happen.
1/2 I did a quick back-of-the-envelope calculation of currency-share to GDP-share of the top ten currencies:
NZD 9.4
HKD 8.9
SFR 6.2
GPB 4.2
Aus dollar 4.4
USD 3.6
Yen 2.9
Can. dollar 2.7
Euro 2.2
RMB 0.3
2/2
There are a lot of problems with this table, not least because it reflects a single point in time, and obviously the smaller the economy, the more likely it is to be an outlier, but it is still interesting.
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1/8 This is part of a very good Setser thread. In fact many analysts, including in the West, believed that by shifting investment from real estate to manufacturing, China was finally making the long-needed shift from non-productive investment to productive investment.
2/8 I remember that one of them even claimed that because China was finally doing what Michael Pettis had been writing about for years, this should be celebrated as a good thing.
But this argument was always wrong, and for reasons that should have been obvious.
3/8 That's because there is nothing intrinsically productive about investing in manufacturing, nor intrinsically non-productive about investing in real estate. What matters is the extent of demand and the gap between desired investment and actual investment.
1/4 Things may indeed look bad in Europe, but we shouldn't overdo the pessimism. Europe must make a number of important changes, and that has long been understood. The "problem" with Europe may be precisely that is now forced to make these changes.
2/4 As in the 1930s, or the 1970s, the global economy today is going through major shifts, and every country must adjust to these shifts. The good news is that, like every robust democracy, Europe is adjusting, even if that means a breakdown of existing institutions.
3/4 The bad news is that the adjustment period is always painful and dispiriting. During this period, extremists of the left and right often outperform, but it is usually their criticism of the existing institutions that have to be absorbed and mitigated in new institutions.
1/6 This may be a tad optimistic: "Just as a single decisive move can energize a chess game, China's latest initiative to address local government debt risks marks a crucial step in revitalizing the growth prospects."
2/6 The article argues that the debt-relief package announced in November will transform the growth prospects of the economy by allowing local governments the fiscal space "to sustain a steady and robust recovery."
3/6 In fact debt-relief package does two things. First, it shifts hidden debts back onto local-government balance sheets, where they belong, but this shift merely recognizes existing debt. It doesn't reduce it at all. It is true that the cost of servicing this debt will...
1/8 Yicai: "Non-tax income has soared since the start of the year, mainly because local governments made efforts to dispose of idle assets and increase the vitality of resources and assets. However, according to data from...
2/8 some provinces, income from fines and confiscations in these regions also maintained double-digit growth."
This article is interesting for at least two reasons. The first is its reference to "abnormality and law enforcement actions".
3/8 In recent years local governments have tried to make up their funding gaps by imposing penalties and new fees on local businesses (preferably headquartered in other jurisdictions). My friends who own SMEs say that this has become a huge problem for them.
1/7 China Daily says that now that last week's "Central Economic Work Conference identified the 'vigorous promotion of consumption' as the top priority for 2025", Beijing will "roll out an array of targeted measures to...
2/7 boost consumption", mainly, it seems, expanding the scope and coverage of the the "trade-in" programs, in which Chinese households are given subsidies to trade in their home appliances, home furnishings and automobiles for new ones.
3/7 The article claims that the trade-in program led to new sales of RMB 1 trillion this year, but fails to note that nearly all of these new sales came at the expense of other forms of consumption, so that they only increased total consumption by the amount of the subsidies.
1/9 Lizzi Lee notes that requiring technology transfers and local production in exchange for market access is a way to protect strategically important industries.
She's right, but this only addresses one of the two very different trade-related problems.
2/9 The first problem is that in a globalized world, economies with open capital and trade accounts automatically import their industrial policies as the obverse of the industrial policies of their more aggressively interventionist trade partners.
3/9 If one economy subsidizes its EV industry because it believes it to be strategically important, for example, the global expansion in its EV industry will come at the expense of EV production among its trade partners.
In that case the kind of policies Lee proposes make sense.