Apologies in advance for this very long thread, but as regular readers know, I worry greatly about common misunderstandings of the role of reserve currencies. The author seems to assume that what makes a currency a dominant reserve currency is...
its low frictional trading costs, which is why, he believes, digital currencies, with China in the lead, will dominate international trade.
But while a low frictional trading cost is a necessary condition, it is not nearly sufficient. A quick glance at the role of the...
3/19
US dollar over the past 100 years, the period during which it achieved dominant status, makes this clear: when the world was short of savings relative to its investment needs, during the first fifty years of that period (a period characterized by the global need to...
4/19
rebuild economically from 2 world wars) the US was a permanent net provider of savings to the world.
In the next five decades, however, when the global economy was substantially rebuilt and needed to export excess savings, the US automatically became a permanent net...
5/19
absorber of foreign savings. Of course during this time the US shifted from permanent trade surpluses, when the world needed the US to supply it with food, capital goods and consumer goods, to permanent trade deficits, when the world urgently some place in which to dump...
6/19
excess production of consumer goods.
This was no mere coincidence. To me it suggests three things. First, that reserve currency status is a function of a lot more than low-cost trading. In fact given that the cost is already so low, and seems to be in permanent decline...
7/19
decline anyway, I suspect it doesn't even matter much any more.
What seems to matter a lot more is the willingness of the reserve-currency country to run large imbalances in response not to its own needs but rather to the needs of the rest of the world. As an excellent...
8/19
CFR resource shows, the US typically absorbs 40-50% of global imbalances, and the Anglophone economies — with similar financial markets all of whom, like the US, punch way above their weights as international reserve currencies — collectively...
Given that China's currency (and that of other surplus countries, like Japan) punches so far below it's weight, it is surprising that anyone would argue that there is no relationship between the international status of a currency...
10/19
and its willingness and ability to absorb global imbalances.
Second, the reason these countries are "willing" to accept major reserve-currency status has more to do with ideology than with economic rationality, driven by, and reinforcing, the disproportionate power of...
11/19
the financial sector on domestic decision-making. Like the UK in the 1920s, they are perhaps too willing to sacrifice the needs of the producer side of their economies in order to maintain the overwhelming power of the financial side. The result, as Matthew Klein and I...
12/19
show in our book, is that these reserve-currency countries have constantly to choose between allowing unemployment to rise or allowing debt to rise. They have mostly chosen the latter.
And third, while China has been promising for nearly two decades that its currency will achieve dominant reserve status within five years or so, in fact the RMB is probably the least important of the top ten currencies given China's status as the second largest economy...
14/19
and largest trader in the world, and by relevant standards its role has barely improved in the past decade and may even have declined.
Why? Because for all over-excited talk about achieving major international status, Beijing has always refused to take the economic...
15/19
steps needed to increase its role in absorbing global imbalances.
On the contrary, when Covid-19 created a demand shock in a world already suffering from excess savings and insufficient demand, Beijing had an incredible opportunity to boost the role of the RMB by...
16/19
boosting net domestic demand. Instead it implemented a muscular supply-side response that actually worsened its contribution to global demand imbalances.
In the end I do expect the international status of the US dollar eventually to decline, but not because of the...
17/19
rise of the yen (which, we were told in the 1980s and 1990s, was virtually assured) or of the RMB. Either it will decline because the US decides that it is no longer willing to absorb the huge and rising economic cost of dominant reserve-currency status to its producing...
18/19
sectors and its balance sheet in exchange for the declining geopolitical benefits and to maintain the status and dominance of of its financial sector (which may be the same thing), or it will decline when the cost of maintaining the power of the dollar helps...
19/19
sufficiently undermine the US economy, which has always been the real source of American power. The experience of the UK in the 1920s provides an accelerated vision of how that can happen.
1/2 I did a quick back-of-the-envelope calculation of currency-share to GDP-share of the top ten currencies:
NZD 9.4
HKD 8.9
SFR 6.2
GPB 4.2
Aus dollar 4.4
USD 3.6
Yen 2.9
Can. dollar 2.7
Euro 2.2
RMB 0.3
2/2
There are a lot of problems with this table, not least because it reflects a single point in time, and obviously the smaller the economy, the more likely it is to be an outlier, but it is still interesting.
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1/5 It’s hard to know how significant this is, given the uncertainties created by the war, but April numbers were terrible for China. Industrial output grew 4.1% year on year in April, well below expectations. bloomberg.com/news/articles/…
2/5 For the first four months of 2026, industrial output grew 5.6%. Against this, retail sales grew by a measly 1.9% year on year in the first four months of 2026, and by a shocking 0.2% in April.
3/5 Overall consumption growth is almost certainly a little higher, but it is hard to explain such a large gap between production and consumption except if more production is not resulting either in higher wages, higher profits, or stable household confidence.
1/4 NYT: "President Trump departed Beijing on Friday, touting trade deals to sell American-made airplanes, farm goods and other products, the signature outcome of his two-day summit with Xi Jinping, China’s top leader." nytimes.com/2026/05/15/bus…
2/4 This is the kind of thing that confuses far too many policymakers and analysts. China's huge trade surplus is the result of income distribution and transfer policies that force Chinese production to exceed, by a large margin, China's total consumption and investment.
3/4 The US trade deficit is largely driven by the extent to which economies with trade surpluses decide to balance those surpluses by acquiring US assets.
The purchase commitments last week will have no impact on either, and so won't change the imbalances.
1/12
Very good article by Greg Ip. I think the most important point he makes is this one: "The Achilles’ heel of Chinese industrial policy is its cost and waste. China runs bigger budget deficits relative to economic output than the U.S."
@greg_ip wsj.com/world/china/be…
2/12
Most trade and industrial policy consists effectively of transfers from less favored to more favored sectors. In China's case this has meant very large explicit and implicit transfers from the household sector to subsidize infrastructure and manufacturing investment.
3/12
Other countries have followed similar policies, but this was taken to such an extreme in China that one result has been the lowest consumption share of GDP and the highest investment share ever seen in history (no other country even came close).
1/4 According to Reuters, domestic car sales in China were down 21.6% year on year in April, even as car exports surged 80.2%. Everyone knows that domestic demand remains incredibly sluggish in China, but such sharp drops in domestic car... reuters.com/business/autos…
2/4 sales in the past seven months should still seem surprising, until we remember that much of the consumer-voucher programs of earlier years were directed at car purchases. This meant that Chinese households who had planned to buy cars anyway just accelerated their purchases.
3/4 This has important implications. The consumer-voucher programs still get a lot of attention, and do cause a surge in purchases of the targeted goods, but they they mostly accelerate purchases that would have occurred anyway, and have no impact on total consumption.
1/7 Bloomberg: "China pledged to step up efforts to defuse local government debt risk while supporting growth, as the State Council called for stronger policy execution in a challenging global environment." bloomberg.com/news/articles/…
2/7 Every few months for the past 4-5 years we have seen similar promises to get debt under control while maintaining high GDP growth rates, and every time I have the same response: China cannot do both, because the determination to maintain high GDP growth rates is...
3/7 precisely what causes the surge in the country's debt burden. Because it cannot get consumption growth to accelerate without undermining the manufacturing sector, high GDP growth rates mean that the country must maintain high investment growth rates.
1/6 SCMP: "The EU’s top trade official used her departing appearance at the EU Parliament to pour cold water on the prospect of an investment deal with China, hinting that new weapons for dealing with Chinese “macroeconomic imbalances” could be on the way." sc.mp/6ku4s?utm_sour…
2/6 Sabine Weyand said: “I’m not talking about a cyclical imbalance in trade, I’m talking about structural macroeconomic imbalances or what the IMF calls macro-industrial policy, which really suppresses domestic demand and creates durable imbalances in the relationship.”
3/6 It is important to understand why the trade issue will be so difficult to resolve. In my 2013 book I argued that global imbalances had become unsustainable, and if they weren't soon reduced, a resurgence of trade conflict was inevitable.