It provided an excellent historical overview of efforts in AI, & why the current advances we have been witnessing are not really are impressive as they may seem on the surface
I found the paper to be very approachable & would recommend it even to those who aren't steeped in AI.
There may be some confirmation bias here, as I've written before about the fallacy of focusing on system accuracy and veneration of deep learning: urvin.ai/when-artificia…
Deep learning has become the bedrock of AI, & frankly has become the hammer that makes most AI scientists think each problem is a nail. As Mitchell points out, this is problematic because deep learning is a limited and brittle technique that has difficulty adapting to real world.
These systems are insecure as well, an area not enough people are focused on (and that I'll have something to say about in the near future). We also don't really understand how deep learning arrives at the answers that it does, so can't be sure it actually understands problems.
The way she describes the fallacies that we have in our conceptualization of AI is fantastic and really resonated with how I see the world of AI too. The first fallacy is that "narrow intelligence is on a continuum with general intelligence."
The second fallacy seemed very prescient to me.
"Easy things are easy and hard things are hard"
You see this everywhere - the first 80% of a problem could be very easy to solve, but if you can't solve the last 20% the solution isn't viable - and the effort isn't linear.
Fallacy 3 is the real indictment of deep learning. It strikes at the heart of its problems. We can't really mimic the brain, but we try. It also alludes to the conflict-of-interest where cloud co's push DL hard, because they're trying to sell compute resources.
It's also primarily these same players who are designing the benchmarks, so it's little surprise that the models continue to improve on benchmarks that end up being extremely superficial. They don't test or demonstrate real understanding.
The final fallacy was new to me - the idea that "intelligence is all in the brain." Can we possibly build an intelligent system with only the neural component, while neglecting everything else that lets humans think and reason?
Finally, the summary of AI as modern alchemy. It's kind of perfect, especially where deep learning is concerned. The field of AI resembles alchemy more than science at the moment, and it's a problem in so many ways - not just a hindrance to AGI.
tldr; We've got a long way to go in AI, and many advances that look really impressive may be little more than systems that have figured out how to look impressive.
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Today @GaryGensler will be testifying before the Senate Banking Committee at 10am ET. You can watch the livestream here:
His written testimony is here:
The testimony is written at a very high level, but gives a good overview of the full scope of the SEC's activities and current agenda. I'd encourage everyone to take a look - and importantly the equity market structure reforms that we care so much about are the first agenda items addressed.banking.senate.gov/hearings/09/06… banking.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/…
@GaryGensler First question from Sen Crapo is about MMTLP - he is asking whether the SEC is reviewing the trading halt, and whether the SEC will release the results of the investigation.
Gensler answers that FINRA rules govern this issue, and that the SEC was not involved.
@GaryGensler Crapo asks whether MMTLP situation has been analyzed for naked shorting, fraud or wrongdoing. Will blue sheets be released or a share count?
Gensler: We cannot comment on ongoing investigations. I will follow-up with staff about these data requests.
This is my shocked face. We said exactly this to the SEC in our June meeting, because it was admitted by a big wholesaler on CNBC.
So... maybe... I dunno... eliminate rebates and PFOF?
Turns out, when wholesalers execute orders at a price worse than the midpoint, 75% of the time there's midpoint liquidity on-exchange. Now start routing orders there and reduce adverse selection, and that number will go up significantly.
Big changes to Rule 605 will provide far more transparency on execution quality by broker and market center. This update is first in over 20 years and long overdue.
First - it's extended to brokers with > 100k customer accounts (retail brokers).
Second, 605 reports will be dis-aggregated to produce separate reports for various types of orders, such as retail, institutional, retail auctions, and odd lots.
Third, standardized human readable summary reports will be required - excellent addition.
🧵A high-level thread with our initial view of the proposed rules, which are split into four proposals.
1. Changes to Rule 605 that will modernize execution quality disclosures and extend those disclosures to retail brokers.
This means brokers will finally have to publish standardized execution quality metrics that we can use to compare how good of a job they’re doing at executing orders, and what kind of execution quality they’re getting from their counterparties.
Today the SEC proposed the most significant changes to US market structure since Regulation NMS was passed, in 2005. These proposals incorporate many of the ideas that we - #WeTheInvestors - presented to the SEC earlier and repeatedly this year.
#WeTheInvestors have had a significant impact on the SEC’s actions - through our dialogue, our proposals, and our presence. These rule proposals are the culmination of those efforts.
But these proposals are only the beginning. Over the coming weeks, We The Investors plans to take seven action steps: 1. Read more than 1,600 pages of rule proposals. Yikes!
It's going to be quite a day today! SDNY will unseal their indictment and the FTX hearing in the House will be even more interesting now. SEC has also charged SBF with securities law violations, complaint here: sec.gov/litigation/com…
The SEC complaint doesn't tell us much we didn't already know, but really lays it out simply. He diverted customer funds, Alameda had unlimited credit lines against customer funds and when Alameda couldn't satisfy their loans they raided more customer funds.
Nice use of scare quotes there SEC - it's not a loan if you have no intention of paying it back. Now, the ponzi scheme part of all of this is that maybe he thought he could pay it back with more customer funds, but doesn't much matter. Lotta fraud here, everywhere you look.