Protasevich's selfie in an explicitly neo-Nazi brand Sva Stone. It's extremely unlikely that one can wear these T-shirts without being "in".
And my longer commentary on what it all means and whether it changes anything about Protasevich (no) and Belarusian opposition protests (more than you would think).
A pathetic charlatan attempt to refute the face identification on the "Black Sun" magazine cover, even after much better pictures of Protasevich in Azov uniform and other strong evidence appeared today. Ridiculously futile waste of one's own time. euromaidanpress.com/2021/05/26/pro…
• • •
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to
force a refresh
Like five years ago - when there was a window of opportunity to implement the Minsk agreements and we were closer to peace than at any time since 2014 - the literally Orwellian "peace is war" arguments are back on the surface.
Some of the same people who had been shitting all over the public space about such an irrelevant far right were reminding us of the danger that armed radical nationalists posed to the peace process.
The Ukrainian far right and nationalism are like Schrödinger's cat - either barely existing or about to start a civil war on their own.
There are several typical arguments to deny ethnonationalist assimilationist policies in Ukraine: 1. Sheer denial 2. Justification 3. Downplaying.
They all share a major blindspot.
A thread inspired by this new bill and Marta's comments.
1. Sheer denial
Last year I told an academic superstar that there are almost no schools left in Ukraine that teach Russian even as an elective, even in the overwhelmingly Russian-speaking cities like Odessa. She said to my face, "That can't be true!"
The basis of her claim: she has visited Ukraine twice, has a project with a Ukrainian university and is involved in one of the "Ukraine solidarity" initiatives. She is not an expert on the region, nor does she speak Ukrainian or Russian.
A very well researched article by @scharap and @DrRadchenko on the Istanbul talks based on previously unpublished drafts of the peace agreement. It argues against a number of myths and misconceptions about why the talks failed and also why the war started. foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/talks-…
In particular, they argue against the explanation that the talks failed because it was allegedly impossible to reach an agreement in Russia after the discovery of the war crimes in Bucha.
Unfortunately, the authors did not mention that the most systematic evidence we have shows that the public opinion in Ukraine was favorable to the negotiations with Russia to end the war even after Bucha
I have been working on the essay for about half a year, and it grew out of reflection and accumulated irritation about how Ukraine and Ukrainians have been represented in many public events. However, there was actually a specific trigger. newleftreview.org/issues/ii138/a…
Another event with all Ukrainian speakers, all but one from Western Ukraine, half from exactly the same region in Galicia, all graduates of the same small university, all knew each other personally and had worked together for decades. Of course, it was called "Ukrainian voices".
Of course, I said that I would not participate in this exoticizing ghetto, which represents no "voice" in Ukraine, but only a tiny fraction of a narrow elite layer. The way of presenting Ukraine internationally, talking about it and studying it should be completely different.
10 ys ago, some Euromaidan protesters made this leaflet to appeal to the top-down organized Anti-Maidan:
"Maidan does NOT stand for NATO, the US or Europe. We are NOT for Bandera, Shukhevych, Tymoshenko, Klychko, Poroshenko or Yatseniuk.
We are just tired of living in shit."
And then there is a list of many social inequality and corruption issues that have been unresolved so far.
If one needs a single illustration of what a maidan revolution is, and how contemporary protests achieve nothing they were really for, and bring with them everything they were NOT for, and so many other much worse things, this is it. ponarseurasia.org/how-maidan-rev…
"The number of Russian millionaires also rose by about 56,000 to 408,000 in 2022, while the number of ultra-high-net-worth individuals — people worth over $50 million — jumped by nearly 4,500." businessinsider.in/policy/economy…