Protasevich's selfie in an explicitly neo-Nazi brand Sva Stone. It's extremely unlikely that one can wear these T-shirts without being "in".
And my longer commentary on what it all means and whether it changes anything about Protasevich (no) and Belarusian opposition protests (more than you would think).
A pathetic charlatan attempt to refute the face identification on the "Black Sun" magazine cover, even after much better pictures of Protasevich in Azov uniform and other strong evidence appeared today. Ridiculously futile waste of one's own time. euromaidanpress.com/2021/05/26/pro…
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Zelenskyi's approval rating is not the same as the electoral rating. The latter is rather low. The former is much higher than Trump claims, but lower than many claims to counter Trump. Anyway, there are signs that Zelenskyi isn't confident in his support at home. /1
In Ukraine they usually poll about "trust" in politicians or institutions in general or approval of specific policies or decisions. The most recent poll, conducted in early February and published today, showed 57% of trust in Zelenskyi. /2 kiis.com.ua/?lang=ukr&cat=…
In this poll, however, the "hard to say" option was not explicitly offered. In the December survey experiment, when they explicitly offered such an option, a quarter chose to avoid answering, and the level of trust in Zelenskyi dropped to 45%. /3 kiis.com.ua/?lang=ukr&cat=…
Just before Poroshenko was sanctioned by Zelenskyi last week, a plurality of Ukrainians believed that Poroshenko was the leader of the political opposition (24%). /1
Also, his party in the parliament was rated most positively among others. 35% said that it benefits Ukraine, only 19% were positive about Zelenskyi's party work. /2 kiis.com.ua/?lang=ukr&cat=…
Zelenskyi used exactly the same sanctions mechanism decided by a narrow circle of people in the National Security and Defense Council as he had used earlier against the "pro-Russian" opposition, "oligarchs" and alleged mafia. /3
A brilliant article by @rochowanski. The speed with which the discourse on Eastern European "civil societies" is now changing is amazing. From the madness of "listening to the voices" to questioning their representativeness, interests and dependency. /1 jacobin.com/2025/02/wester…
In Ukraine, USAID spent over 6 bln just in 2024. The sheer list of names of their recepient organizations is over 50,000 characters long. As a Ukrainian leftist writer commented: "I'm honestly shocked by the list. It's just EVERYTHING there." /2 epravda.com.ua/rus/finances/k…
According to a systematic survey of Ukrainian media professionals, 59% believe that the USAID suspension will have a "catastrophic impact" on Ukrainian media. Over 50% of media outlets depended on US grants for over 50% of their funding. /3
This is one of the many orthodox Marxist-Leninist groups that boomed in many post-Soviet countries in the last decade as part of the neo-Soviet revival. In Ukraine since 2022, they have mostly taken a revolutionary defeatist position and gone underground. /1
Now they are focusing on resistance to conscription and appealing to draft dodgers and deserters - the issue that has strong support among Ukrainians against the backdrop of growing distrust of the state. /2 aljazeera.com/opinions/2025/…
Part of the evidence posted by the SBU is the book "Left Europe" (2017), which aimed to explain to the Ukrainian broad public the European radical left, its diversity, and that most of them are not "pro-Russian." It was financed by the @RosaluxEuropa. /3
This is a professor from San Diego. He calls me a "charlatan" for writing about Ukraine "from Berlin". A political scientist is unaware that one can work with fieldworkers in Ukraine, commission surveys, analyze statistics, collect open-access data, conduct online interviews /1
I lived, taught, and conducted research almost all my life in Ukraine until just about 5 years ago. I have published a lot, in particular, on ethnonationalism and on post-Soviet hegemony crisis. /2
And since last year we have been collecting data for a new large research project on the consequences of post-Soviet revolutions and wars in four countries including Ukraine and in cooperation with Ukrainian fieldworkers /3
Like five years ago - when there was a window of opportunity to implement the Minsk agreements and we were closer to peace than at any time since 2014 - the literally Orwellian "peace is war" arguments are back on the surface.
Some of the same people who had been shitting all over the public space about such an irrelevant far right were reminding us of the danger that armed radical nationalists posed to the peace process.
The Ukrainian far right and nationalism are like Schrödinger's cat - either barely existing or about to start a civil war on their own.