Protasevich's selfie in an explicitly neo-Nazi brand Sva Stone. It's extremely unlikely that one can wear these T-shirts without being "in".
And my longer commentary on what it all means and whether it changes anything about Protasevich (no) and Belarusian opposition protests (more than you would think).
A pathetic charlatan attempt to refute the face identification on the "Black Sun" magazine cover, even after much better pictures of Protasevich in Azov uniform and other strong evidence appeared today. Ridiculously futile waste of one's own time. euromaidanpress.com/2021/05/26/pro…
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Ukrainian media started smearing the signatories of our letter in defense of @HavryshkoMarta, including some of the world-known scholars of Ukrainian history, nationalism, and Holocaust. /1
This article labels @HimkaJohn one of the most prominent Ukrainian-Canadian historians, a "Ukrainophobe" and slanders Grzegorz Rossolinski-Liebe, the author of the best and only biography of Stepan Bandera, as a "supporter of radical right-wing views." /2 zahid.espreso.tv/suspilstvo-zak…
Also targeted Holocaust researchers Omer Bartov, Doris Bergen, Amos Goldberg. Besides, Ukrainian-Canadian political scientist @I_Katchanovski, French economist Jacques Sapire @russeurope, historian @TarikCyrilAmar, "far-left" journalist @aaronmate and others. /3
The argument that post-Soviet countries have been showing the West its future, rather than failing to catch up with the "civilized" and "developed" world, has a history. As the argument gains more appeal, it may be worth exploring its origins sometime. /1
I first encountered this argument from Alexander Bikbov, a Russian critical sociologist, in the context of his analysis of changes to Russian higher education. /2
The post-Soviet education system was expected to "catch up" with Western universities through the Bologna Process. However, in reality, it has surpassed the neoliberalization of Western universities in terms of commercialization, formalization, and loss of substance. /3
Ukraine had a chance to claim the legacy of WWII and the defeat of fascism. The Ukrainian front was pivotal, its losses immense. In 2022–23, battlefield outcomes were uncertain, but Ukraine clearly enjoyed stronger global sympathy. By 2025, even the symbolic war is lost.
Historical parallels in the Russia-Ukraine war were always superficial but easy to draw. Ukraine failed to craft a universally appealing narrative. By 2025, key Global South leaders visit Moscow, wear symbols banned in Ukraine, and honor Russian veterans fighting in Ukraine.
This symbolic failure reflects more than military defeats or the broader crisis of Western hegemony. It stems from Ukraine’s erasure of the legacy of Soviet Ukraine and its decisive role in defeating fascism. The erasure was not accidental—it was intentional.
Zelenskyi's approval rating is not the same as the electoral rating. The latter is rather low. The former is much higher than Trump claims, but lower than many claims to counter Trump. Anyway, there are signs that Zelenskyi isn't confident in his support at home. /1
In Ukraine they usually poll about "trust" in politicians or institutions in general or approval of specific policies or decisions. The most recent poll, conducted in early February and published today, showed 57% of trust in Zelenskyi. /2 kiis.com.ua/?lang=ukr&cat=…
In this poll, however, the "hard to say" option was not explicitly offered. In the December survey experiment, when they explicitly offered such an option, a quarter chose to avoid answering, and the level of trust in Zelenskyi dropped to 45%. /3 kiis.com.ua/?lang=ukr&cat=…
Just before Poroshenko was sanctioned by Zelenskyi last week, a plurality of Ukrainians believed that Poroshenko was the leader of the political opposition (24%). /1
Also, his party in the parliament was rated most positively among others. 35% said that it benefits Ukraine, only 19% were positive about Zelenskyi's party work. /2 kiis.com.ua/?lang=ukr&cat=…
Zelenskyi used exactly the same sanctions mechanism decided by a narrow circle of people in the National Security and Defense Council as he had used earlier against the "pro-Russian" opposition, "oligarchs" and alleged mafia. /3
A brilliant article by @rochowanski. The speed with which the discourse on Eastern European "civil societies" is now changing is amazing. From the madness of "listening to the voices" to questioning their representativeness, interests and dependency. /1 jacobin.com/2025/02/wester…
In Ukraine, USAID spent over 6 bln just in 2024. The sheer list of names of their recepient organizations is over 50,000 characters long. As a Ukrainian leftist writer commented: "I'm honestly shocked by the list. It's just EVERYTHING there." /2 epravda.com.ua/rus/finances/k…
According to a systematic survey of Ukrainian media professionals, 59% believe that the USAID suspension will have a "catastrophic impact" on Ukrainian media. Over 50% of media outlets depended on US grants for over 50% of their funding. /3