New from Bellingcat - US military personnel responsible for US nuclear weapons in European military bases are inadvertently sharing details about their security protocols and weapons storage online via flashcard apps. bellingcat.com/news/2021/05/2…
Dr Jeffrey Lewis (@ArmsControlWonk),Director of the East Asia Nonproliferation Program at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, said that the findings showed a “flagrant breach” in security practices related to US nuclear weapons stationed in NATO countries.
Some flashcards uncovered during the course of this investigation had been publicly visible online as far back as 2013. Other sets detailed processes that were being learned by users until at least April 2021.
Flashcard sharing apps contain details of nuclear weapon storage at airbases where nuclear weapons are stored, including Volkel airbase in the Netherlands.
Flashcards detailed the number of security cameras & their positions at various bases, information on sensors, unique identifiers of restricted area badges (RAB) for Incirlik, Volkel & Aviano as well as secret duress words & the equipment carried by response forces at the bases.
Two flashcards from the same set contain the squadron name “701 MUNSS”, and a phrase to make someone surrender weapons in Flemish, revealing that the security details in it apply to Kleine Brogel air base, Belgium.
Other, more subtle, details also allowed for verification. For example, the flashcard that mentioned vault 27 at Tango loop, Aviano air base, matches a public US military document that confirms there is a Protected Aircraft Shelter at Aviano air base labelled “t-27”.
One of the most interesting cards in the anonymous sets was the “vault status” flashcard that appears to note which shelters at Volkel contain nuclear weapons.
During our investigation we also discovered this photograph posted on Facebook and geolocated by us to Volkel airbase showing the US 703rd Munitions Support Squadron taking a group photograph with what we believe is a dummy nuclear weapon outside one of the storage shelters (532)
When asked about the photo the US Military did not directly respond, while the Dutch MoD said it was an inert training version. Yet it added that according to the regulations in force at military bases, “this photo should not have been taken, let alone published.”
It's been brought to my attention that there's videos published on social media claiming I've made various statements about the US election, related to election integrity. These are part of a Russian disinformation campaign, and the quotes are fabricated, but it's nice to know the Russians hold the value of my opinions in such high regard.
I've previously discussed other videos in this campaign in the below thread:
🧵 1/7: The European Court of Human Rights has ruled in favor of Russian NGOs and media groups (including @Bellingcat), declaring Russia's "foreign agent" legislation a violation of fundamental human rights. The court found that the law imposes undue restrictions on freedom of expression & association.
2/7: The law requires NGOs & individuals receiving foreign funds to register as “foreign agents,” facing stigma, harsh reporting requirements, and severe penalties. This label implies foreign control—without proof—and misleads the public
3/7: The Court noted that the "foreign agent" label, linked to spies & traitors, damages the reputation of those designated and leads to a chilling effect on civil society and public discourse.
It's currently 9:11am, this post has 3 views, and no retweets or likes on an account with 75 followers. Let's see how long it takes for it to get several hundred retweets, and a few tens of thousands of views.
In the last 15 minutes, that tweet just gained 15.7k views, 187 likes, with no retweets. Two other tweets with similarly fake stores, posted around the same time, with similar profiles, have also suddenly gain a couple of hundred likes and around the same amount of views. This is, in real time, how a Russian disinformation campaign is using Twitter to promote its fake stories.
The thing is, nearly all of this engagement, apart from about 10 views and none of the likes, are entirely inauthentic. This doesn't help them reach genuine audiences, it's just boosting their stats so when they report back to their paymasters they can tell them how many views, likes and retweets they got, but they're all fake. It's effectively the people running these campaigns scamming their paymasters to make them think it's working, when it's not at all.
A new fake Bellingcat story, from a fake video claiming to be from Fox News. What's interesting about this one is I viewed the tweet 10 minutes ago, and it had 5 views, and suddenly it jumped to 12.5k, then 16.2k views in less than 5 minutes, with zero retweets or likes.
To me this suggests there's a bot network being used to boost views of tweets used in this disinformation campaign.
In 90 seconds this tweet just gained 154 retweets, another sign of bot activity.
It's clear this is a coordinated attack from pro-Orban media which they really don't want being noticed outside of Hungary, but what they don't seem to realise is I'm now going to use what they did at every presentation I do on disinformation to audiences across the world.
What's notable is the accusations made against Bellingcat were all taken (uncredited) from an article publishing by MintPress claiming we've loads of intelligence agents working for us, which even the original MintPress article fails to prove.
Which to me just means I get to add a couple more slides to the presentation I'll be doing about this, to audiences made up of exactly the sort of people they didn't want to find out about this.
State actors see alternative media ecosystems as a vehicle for promoting their agendas, and take advantage of that by not just covertly funding them, but also giving them access to their officials and platforming them at places like the UN.
A recent example of that is Jackson Hinkle going to Eastern Ukraine, then getting invited to the UN by Russia to speak at a press conference, and that footage being used by state media as evidence of "experts" rejecting the "mainstream narratives" on Ukraine.
A lack of transparency around the funding of the individuals and websites that are part of these alternative media ecosystems allows for state actors to get away with their covert influence, a clear example of which we've seen over the last 24 hours.