I read your 2020 annual letter with interest, @chamath. Odd it was published in late May, but we’re all busy. Before commenting on this incredibly bad take of a comparison to Berkshire Hathaway, allow me to help you with some math. First, 1965 to 1974 is TEN years, not nine. 1/
Berkshire did return 12.5% against 1.4% from 1965-1974 but that’s actually ten, not the nine years you reference. Simple mistake, I’m sure. Had you used nine years Berkshire had returned 22.7% annually, quite a bit higher than the 12.5% you errantly show. More on this soon. 2/
Second, for what its worth, the S&P 500 actually returned 18.4% in 2020, not the 17.88% you mentioned twice and were careful to point out included dividends. I’d rather round to the tenths, check my source and be correct than round to the hundredths and be precisely incorrect. 3/
Perhaps you or your auditors used returns without dividends? That wouldn’t work, however, because the dividend yield was greater than 0.52%. Where do your numbers come from? Standard and Poor's provides them for free. 4/
Third, its difficult to know what math you are using here or from where you get your data. 2017 to 2020 is four years and the S&P 500 returned 16.0% over those four years. The five-year return is 15.2%, matching the figure in your table - but that’s five years. 5/
Further, over what period of time does 15.2% compound to a 59% overall gain? Your math makes no sense unless these are not annual periods. 15.2% over four years is 74.9% cumulative and over five years is 101.1%. How do you get to only 59% overall for the index? Weird. Support? 6/
Feel free to use these figures. Over the past five years, according to Standard and Poor’s, the index returned:
2016: 12.0%
2017: 21.8%
2018: (4.4%) - the parentheses reflect a negative
2019: 31.5%
2020: 18.4%
7/
It sure would be great to see how you arrived at 15.2% and 59% for 2017 to 2020. What’s your data source? Do material errors in your calculation for the index imply errors in your calculation of your investment returns? 8/
Also, why do you use Gross IRR’s in presenting your returns and not net or time-weighted returns? IRR is of course dollar weighted, so any increase in flows or assets will potentially overstate returns. If it helps calculating a compound return series can be done as such: 9/
(1 + the percent interest rate)^ time period. A series of returns can be linked as: (1 + the period percent return) + (1 + the period percent return) + etc…Or you can use a financial calculator such as the one below. I happen to have an extra which I'd be happy to send you: 10/
Fourth, it’s very lacking in your presentation and comparison that in an annual letter penned on May 26 seeing no mention made to the performance of each of your SPACs during the first five months of 2021, four of the six of which are substantially negative for the year. 11/
Finally, comparison of your returns for what you call 9 years to Berkshire’s first 9 years is stunningly bewildering (ignoring that the return series for BRK is in reality ten years - see above). How is that even remotely comparable? What's the point? Better than Mr. Buffett? 12/
Did you know that when buying control in 1965, Berkshire was failing in textiles which were ultimately closed in 1985? In fact, 3 of BRK’s first control investments, textiles, Diversified Retailing in '77 and Blue Chip Stamps in '83 were all companies that eventually failed. 13/
It was the diversion of capital to other money-making enterprises that saved BRK and allowed it to become what it is today. That's the brilliance of Mr. Buffett. I hope you continue to present your returns against Berkshire’s early years in each successive year without fail. 14/
Perhaps you cherry picked the most convenient time series for Berkshire, errantly using the 10-year and calling it the 9-year to more favorably suit the comparison? You may have known that the 1973-1974 bear market was vicious? Berkshire declined 2.5% in '73 and 48.7% in '74. 15/
1974 was year TEN under present management's control. At 8 years in, Berkshire had compounded at 26.3% against 7.8% for the index. By year 12, Berkshire’s compound return had recovered to 18.4%, having gained 129.3% in 1976. Pre and post the bear market. Cute using 1974. 16/
By 1981, Berkshire had compounded at 25.1% vs 6.4% for the index, remarkable in that the market put in its secular low at that time. By 1998, Berkshire’s annual gain had averaged 28.9% since 1965 vs 12.2% for the index, more than three decades. Certainly more than nine years. 17/
It’s impressive to see you calculate your 9-year gain at 33.0%. Of course that’s an IRR, highly influenced by the dollars at work at intervals, are gross of fees & not time-weighted. When $BRKA calculates their growth in book value per share, gains over time are AFTER TAXES. 18/
The stock price has closely matched gains in book value per share over time. No idea what you own outside of the SPACs, but I’d be hesitant to calculate a return on incremental rounds of VC financing until cash is ultimately taken out & taxed or the business is IPO’d or sold. 19/
It will be interesting to see how SPACs fare over time for the common shareholder, post wicked dilution and control premiums paid. Like Berkshire, capital allocation skills will be tested when confronted with buying businesses that are disruptive and prove to not disrupt. 20/
Meanwhile, the 11-year for Berkshire gets pulled down to 11.5% at 1976 so you have some cushion when presenting your 10-year return next year! After that the comparison will get way more difficult. It sure will be interesting to see how results fare and capital is allocated. 21/
If you can maintain anywhere near the 19% advantage over the index & allocate your way around the inevitable purchases of terrible businesses then another two decades hence you can crown yourself the new Buffett. In the meantime the comparison is a thoroughbred to a jackass. 22/
Lastly, I’d look into getting somebody to check your math before releasing your annual year-end letter next May. You control a lot of money and surely have resources. The picture of the jet is nice. Perhaps there's room at your shop for a fact checker?
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A $5.8 billion offer is at hand to take Macy's private at ~$21 a share, a 32% premium over Friday's $17.39 close. Bidders call the stock “undervalued,”down from $74 in 2015. The retail graveyard is full of turnarounds. Good luck. How bad is this one? Some stunning statistics: 1/
At the proposed buyout price the $5.8 billion offer values Macy’s at roughly 7x FY 24 profit. The retailer earns an apparent 20% return on $4.1 billion in equity (much less on capital given $5.8 billion in net debt). But how profitable is M really and where have profits gone? 2/
Over the last 25 years Macy’s reported $21 billion in profits. A quarter of those were distributed as dividends. Fully the remaining 75% of profit was spent repurchasing shares. At the $21 buyout offer the stock is no higher than 25 years ago!That’s $15 billion in bad buys. 3/
Berkshire reported 2Q results this morning. As always, there's more under the hood than the reported results. A few thoughts on what is a very mixed bag. BRK is a good proxy for the US economy. The industrial economy is weak, consistent with what other companies are reporting. 1/
For starters, operating income was $10.0 billion for the quarter, up 6.7% over 2Q 22 and up 9.2% for six months. However, properly excluding forex gains on non-US denominated debt, profit rose from $8.3 billion to $9.6 billion in the quarter, up 15.2% and 17.9% for six months. 2/
However, much of the increase came from income on Allegheny's acquired assets in October and from BRK's now 80% investment in Pilot, up from 38.6% (5 months consolidated and 1 month equity method). Higher interest income on a larger cash balance further drove much of the gain. 3/
Ark Invest, the bucket shop EFT promotional “investor,” the one whose founder CEO told a CNBC audience a year ago that ARKK would earn 50% a year (correct if she said minus), is back with its 3rd annual Tesla “research report” with a fresh $2,000 price forecast by 2027. Amen. 1/
That’s a $7 trillion market cap, or a mere 21% of the S&P 500's current cap. MSFT, AAPL, GOOGL, AMZN and META have a combined $7.7 trillion market cap today, up from $6.2 trillion at yearend. From today’s $165 share price, $2,000 in 4.75 years is 69% per year. Makes sense. 2/
Zero mention of expected hyperinflation in the report. Cue the class action lawyers. Cue @SECEnfDirector. The bull case is $2,500 per share, 25% higher than the base case and a market cap of nearly $9 trillion, or 26% of the current S&P and up from 1.5% of the index now. 3/
35 FACTS NOT LIKELY FOUND ON ARKK YET UNRELEASED 12/31/2022 FACTSHEET
1. Loss from 2/12/2021 Peak: -80.1% 2. CNBC Appearances Since 2/12/2021 Peak: 23 3. Cumulative NET Assets Raised Since 10/31/2014 Launch: $17.1 Billion ($14.5B in 2020 and 2021) 4. Assets at 12/31/2022: $6.0B
5. Cumulative Management Fees Earned: $300 Million 6. Market Value at 2/12/2021 Peak: $29 Billion 7. Dollar Loss Since Peak: $23 Billion 8. Annual Return vs S&P 500 Since 10/31/2014 Launch: 5.4% vs 10.3%
9. $ARKK Price 12/31/22: $31.24 10. Date Last $31.24: 08/22/2017 11. AUM at 8/22/17: $450 million ($15m @ 1/1/17) 12. Net Inflows Since 8/22/17: $16.9B (Out of $17.1 Since Inception) 13. Percent of ALL DOLLARS Invested in ARKK Since 10/31/2014 Inception Losing Money: 98%
13a. Yep
Who could forget the C-Suite high jinks when Elon and CFO Zach Kirkhorn invested $1.5 billion in Bitcoin and added the titles "Technoking of Tesla" and "Master of Coin?" Since the March 15, 2021 rebranding, Tesla and Bitcoin are down 48% and 70%, respectively. Great fun.🎄 1/
While the Bitcoin position and the Tesla outside shareholders have suffered mightily, how have the INSIDERS fared? If you guessed considerably better you are correct. Collectively the brass at Tesla appear to have unloaded 126 million Tesla shares for more than $41 billion. 2/
While Elon's sales are the preponderance of that, selling at an average share price of $325 is pretty good when measured against the present $123.15 price. That's a current bid 62% below the average sale. Nearly all shares were gifts from the board, not bought out of pocket. 3/
Unlocking this valuation genius. When offering to buy Twitter on April 14 for $54.20, $44 billion, the 3-mo T-bill yielded 0.77%. Today, at 4.20% (what are the odds), it’s reported Twitter is seeking a new equity “funding round” at the same $44 billion valuation. Fascinating. 1/
Given the purchase closed on October 27, solidly in Q4, curious as well if Twitter will open the interim books to prospective “investors.” As a public company, Twitter naturally wouldn’t publish financials until 12/31. It’s reported the money needs to be raised before yearend. 2/
I’m quite certain prospective investors will want to see the state of revenues. Conventional wisdom here on Twitter believes a massive cut in labor means huge margin expansion. Important when on $5B in revenues and $13B in debt, $1.2B in interest expense exceeds $1B in EBITDA. 3/