Despite Covid Shrewsbury income did not fall in 2019/20 as FA Cup money from Liverpool match helped offset loss of revenue from curtailment of season. #SALOP
Matchday income similar in 19/20 to previous season despite fewer matches played. Broadcast income up 14% due to some streaming income & live matches on TV.
Shrewsbury, like many lower league clubs, very dependent upon matchday ticket sales as teams in League One only get 12% of the EFL broadcast deal and solidarity payments.
Shrewsbury wage bill up 4% although the club did also receive £393k in furlough grants. Shrewsbury paid £78 in wages for every £100 of income. Average weekly wage just under £2k a week. Staff numbers fell from 210 to 167.
Shrewsbury day to day losses actually fell in 2019/20, but unlike the previous season they did not have large player sale profits. #Salop made a loss after player sales for first time since 2015
Shrewsbury show that a club can adopt a long term breakeven model and still compete on the pitch as they have made profits over the years of over £13 million.
Shrewsbury broke even in terms of player trading in 2019/20.
Shrewsbury had no debt and over £3m in the bank at end of 19/20, although did take advantage (rightly) of govt pay delay scheme so owed £1/2m in payroll taxes & VAT.
Bristol City publish 23/24 accounts: 🔑figs:
⚽️Revenue £42.4m ⬆️16% despite only covering 12 months instead of 13 in 22/23
⚽️Wages £34.9m ⬇️3%
⚽️Underlying losses £22.5m ⬇️20%
⚽️Player sale profits £21.7m ⬆️128%
⚽️Player purchases £3.7m
⚽️Player sales £21.7m
⚽️Total losses over the years £224m
⚽️Total Steve Lansdown investment £282.4m
Development at Ashton Gate has been a big driver of ⬆️revenue at Bristol City, with commercial income now 60% of total. This means that City generate more revenue than any other non-parachute payment club. (Most figures are for 2023, except for the clubs that have not published 2024 such as #BCFC, and Reading, who have a rogue owner who thinks the law does not apply to him).
Main costs for clubs are player related. Staff numbers slightly ⬆️but wage bill ⬇️ due to only 12 months period. Average weekly wage of £16K very competitive for a non-parachute team but wages continue to fall as a proportion of income. Other player related cost is amortisation (player transfers spread over contract life) and this is mid table by divisional standards.
Hull City publish 23/24 accounts: 🔑figures
⚽️Revenue £21.2m ⬆️17%
⚽️ Wages £29.6m ⬆️25%
⚽️Average weekly wage £13,700
⚽️Underlying losses £26.4m ⬆️28%
⚽️ Player sale profits £8.3m ⬇️45%
⚽️Player purchases £8.5m
⚽️Player sales £10.4m (plus £30m post season)
⚽️Loans from owner in year £27.9m
Revenue fairly evenly split, rise in year mainly due to better commercial sales and slight rises in matchday and new EFL TV deal. Only a handful of clubs have submitted 23/24 accounts, Reading's owner thinks the laws of the land do not apply to him so has not yet submitted 22/23
Main costs for clubs are player related. Substantial increase in wages and amortisation (player signings spread over contract length) as new owner invested heavily in playing talent resulting in Hull being at top end of non parachute payers.
A history of Premier League transfer spending. First season (1992/93) total spend was £65m and QPR spent just £197k. Newly promoted Blackburn were the biggest spenders due to Jack Walker's investment in the likes of Alan Shearer, Stuart Ripley, Kevin Gallagher & Graham Le Saux.
1993/94 spending up to £78m. Blackburn continue to be the biggest spenders, Champions Manchester United were outspent by...err...Swindon.
First £100m spend season, Everton became the first team to eight figures spent in a season with Ferguson, Samways, Amokachi and Barrett all joining the club on big deals. QPR again smallest spenders. Man City and Chelsea outspent by Wimbledon.
Chelsea FC Holdings submit 22/23 accounts. 🔑 figs
⚽️Revenue £512m ⬆️ 6%
⚽️Wages £404m ⬆️ 18%
⚽️Player costs (wages & amortisation) £119 for every £100 of revenue
⚽️Day to day losses £249m
⚽️Player purchases £745m
⚽️Player sales £203m
⚽️Borrowings in year £428m
Losses ⬆️ from £242m to £249m for day to day running of club but sale of hotel to another part of group, £30m of financial settlements & player sales ⬇️ this to £90m
Chelsea have cash in bank, total losses adding all the years together now £1.135 billion
Whilst #Rovers 🔑 revenue streams, matchday, broadcast & commercial all ⬆️ significantly. However general overheads ⬆️ too which meant no change to op losses. Sale of Armstrong in 21/22 halved losses
Both accounts & audit report reference that there is a material uncertainty over ability of club to trade as a going concern. Should no noted that audit report dated December 2023 & things may have improved since then
Burnley publish 22/23 accounts; 🔑 figs
Revenue £65m ⬇️ 47%
Wages £54m ⬇️ 42%
Loss pre player sales £41m
Player purchases £84m
Player sales £21m
Borrowings £101m
Big change in pre tax profit of £36m in 21/22 to a loss of £36m in 22/23. Mainly due to ⬇️ in revenue following relegation and player sale profits ⬇️ from £54m to £11m.
Burnley still have substantial cash but this due to the Club borrowing substantial amounts during the year as liabilities ⬆️. Burnley still profitable over the years.