Just finished reading this book by Allen Parducci. I so loved it that I was sad approaching the end. In my experience it is very rare to find books that are very relevant to both your professional and personal life. I will summarize few takes below 1/n
The core question of the book is whether (and under which circumstances) a happy life is possible. Happiness is defined following utilitarianism as the summation of pleasure of pain over time. Parducci clearly states this definition is descriptive, rather than normative.
Parducci’s original hypothesis was that of an “equal balance”. He report the anecdote of his father explaining that he should not envy richer kids, as they must experience as much disappointment as other kids and are not necessarily happier.
Helson’s adaptation-level theory provided a scientific ground for this. It states that dimensional judgements depend on the difference between the stimulus value and the average (BTW this theory is also at the basis of the reference-point dependence of K&T's prospect theory)
Parducci sought to further test the theory to ultimately apply it to hedonic judgements, but he realized instead that Helson’s theory works well only in special circumstances (when stimuli are normally or uniformly distributed) and fails when stimuli distributions are skewed.
Indeed he finds that dimensional judgements are better explained by a compromise between the range value (the position relative to Smax and Smin) and the frequency value (essentially its normalized rank among all possible stimuli)
A key consequence of the R-F theory is that the average of judgements are no more doomed to strike "an equal balance". According to the R-F theory the average of judgements can be positive or negative as a function of the underlying distribution of the stimuli
Once applied to hedonic judgements, it appears that "happiness is a negatively skewed distribution" of hedonic experiences. The central part of the book is consecrated to showing how 1) apparently sensible choices can make us unhappy and 2) what we can do to tip the balance
Concerning 1: when we reach out for 'more' and we succeed, we experience immediate - reinforcing- satisfaction. However this new experience will extend our range upward, therefore undermining our subjective judgement of lesser results, that we once enjoyed
Concerning 2: letting go very high goals and expectations may counterintuitively tip the balance in favor of greater happiness (see the brillant figure below). Unfortunately it is easer to increase, than decrease, the range of contextual representations
In my opinion the book strikes a rarely achieved perfect balance between hard science, philosophy, phenomenology and real life anecdotes (from a guy who, en passant, co-invented the windsurf 🤯)surfertoday.com/windsurfing/th…
A final special mention for the thought-provoking chapter "utopia destroyed" where the effects of social planning of the US in Micronesia are seen through the critical lens of the R-F theory, highlighting the importance of psychological models of wellbeing for policy making.
If you don't want (or can't: I might have bought the last copy on Amazon: sorry 😬) read the book, I guess this article is a good summary of its main ideas psycnet.apa.org/record/1971-06…
I would like to conclude by mentioning a couple of "modern" development of the R-F theory
Kontek and Lewandowski range-dependent utility:
I wonder how the findings and hypotheses reported in the book relates to @RobbRutledge's recent more research on the determinant of momentary subjective well-being. Can the prediction error term of his equation capture range effects?
In case interested on why I was particularly excited by this book:
- I will present range effects on memory of economic values in this conference. x.com/StePalminteri/…
- We recently published a paper (w/ @sophiebavard) on a pretty much related topic doi.org/10.1126/sciadv…
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Just posted in @PsyArXiv a short where I collected some suggestions concerning "how to prepare a rebuttal letter". Journals do not provide explicit guidance on this and, in my experience as a reviewer and editor, a great diversity exists in their format..
.. however, not all formats are, in my modest and personal opinion, as effective. And by effective here I mean the capacity of delivering all the relevant information (how are you responding to the Reviewer's point) in a clear and efficient manner. I mostly focused on formatting
Tip 0: Before the rebuttal, the cover letter.
I find it extremely helpful when the cover letter mentions, in a narrative manner, the main modifications undertaken during the revision and how they are related to the Reviewers’ main points and the final story of the manuscript
I just finished reading an all-time classic of experiment psychology “Principles of Behavior” by Clark Hull (1943). In the book, the author tries to delineate the first principles of a scientific theory of behaviour, based on a capillary survey of (mainly) animal experiments 1/n
The first chapter presents his epistemological manifesto in favour of a mathematical (logico-deductive) formalization. It reminded me of the preface of “Theory of games" (1944). Back then use of formal approaches to social sciences was presented as a necessary paradigm shift
In chapter II, we dive into the specifics of what an objective theory of behaviour should be. Of prime importance here is the introduction of the notions of intervening variables and observables, which illustrate how the standard narrative about behaviourists is false
I just finished reading this paper by Meehl on appraisal theory selection in Psychology (and beyond). The paper essentially proposes to amend rigid falsificationism (Popper0) in favor of a more flexible approach including a step of “strategic retreat and defense” (Lakatos)
The point here is that when one tests a theory, they never test the Theory "alone", but also a series of ancillary elements (how does the measurement work?) and assumptions (e.g., the ceteribus paribus clause: which is always false in psychology)...
Therefore, an apparent falsification could, in principle derive, from the theory being false OR by any other of the ancillary elements and assumption being false. The question: how do we decide whether or not a “strike is fatal” for a theory? Not an easy question, which…
🚨🥳Very glad to share the publication by @TrendsCognSci of this review paper entitled “The computational roots of positivity and confirmation bias in human reinforcement learning” with my usual partner in scientific crime @mael_lebreton (long) thread 🧵 doi.org/10.1016/j.tics…
In this paper we summarise the evidence allowing answering this fundamental question: do we (reinforcement) learn equally well from positive or negative prediction errors? From outcomes that confirm our current choices?
We started by recognizing that similar biases have already been identified and documented by psychologists and economists in the past in belief updates. However, they are traditionally understood as specific to high-level processing
Just finished reading this old-ish gem by Herbert Simon (1992) that I strongly suggest reading for all interested in the epistemological foundations of behavioural sciences. Many key ideas are extremely clearly and convincingly laid down 1/n
The first great thing to mention about the paper is that even one of the "fathers" of cognitive revolution did not believe that a cognitive revolution ever happened 2/n
I wrote about this topic in another thread about Leahey's great paper (link below). A cognitive "revolution" never happened: let's get over it. 3/n
Just finished reading this that I strongly recommend to anyone interested in history of cognitive science (and more broadly in questions related to the advancement of science) and is curious about what happened during the “cognitive revolutions” 1/n citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/downlo…
The paper starts by (extremely clearly and sharply) reminding the elements of Kuhn’s hypothetical structure of scientific revolutions and illustrate criteria proposed by later scholars to “empirically” (or at least more objectively) assess whether a revolution occurred.
The paper then analyses the historical contexts and records of the behaviouristic and cognitive revolution and provides compelling arguments to the claim that neither period actually witnessed a scientific revolution (according to Kuhnian -or common sense - definition).