A provocative question in this book by @STS_News: Why doesn't the USA regulate car safety like emissions?
"How would automakers transform their products if we mandated that they reduce the number of automotive fatalities in new cars by, say, 40% within 10 years?"
A thread 🧵:
For a century, automobile safety has largely focused on 1) driver education and 2) voluntary agreements by automakers to build safer cars.
Both those approaches are flawed.
Here's future Sen. Daniel P. Moynihan critiquing safety education in 1959:
It "shifts public attention from factors like auto design, which we can reasonably hope to control, to factors such as the temperament and behavior of 80M drivers, who [will ignore] a bunch of slogans."
Left to their own devices, carmakers shrug off safety. An academic observer in the 1960s:
"Unless there is an element of compulsion or the threat of it, manufacturers do not appear to have introduced [safety] features as standard EQ, which would...increase production costs."
But the federal gov can force automakers' hand.
Mandates for safety tech-- like airbags or ADAS-- can prevent carmakers from offering them only to those buying high-end vehicles.
After all, why should only the affluent be able to "afford" a safe car?
Notably, the feds have been far more successful spurring innovation reducing tailpipe emissions than improving safety.
The tight regs of the 1970 Clean Air Act were "technology forcing," pushing automakers to find new solutions.
Why can't we do that with auto safety?
Something has to change w/regard to American auto safety, because the status quo isn't working.
Last year over 38,600 people were killed on American roads and streets-- the most in 13 years. (And please don't tell me AVs will fix this if we simply wait.) usnews.com/news/health-ne…
Vinsel's publisher claims this book is the first systematic history of US auto regulations (seems right).
My takeaway: Carmakers have repeatedly failed to address problems related to safety and pollution on their own.
Either regulators intervene, or the issues persist.
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Fifty years ago, William Whyte studied how New Yorkers schmoozed, sat, and relaxed the small open spaces available to them. This 1980 treasure was the result.
Join me as I share a few timeless lessons. 🧵
A key urbanist insight: “Supply creates demand.”
Comfortable urban spaces attract people happy to find a place to chat, eat, or read.
It's also the core idea behind induced demand, which explains why highway widening is futile (and why good bike lanes create more riders).
Whyte and his team meticulously gathered data about how people used plazas, sidewalks, and ledges, sharing metrics about everything from the optimal bench depth to the natural distribution of people sitting.
Here’s a table of people using the Seagram Building's plaza.
Oversized SUVs and trucks kill people in crashes, catalyze climate change, and widen inequality. And the problem is getting worse.
A 🧵 about my deep dive on car bloat, in @Slate
@Slate “Car bloat” describes the shift in new car sales toward increasingly massive SUVs and trucks.
In 1977, SUVs and trucks comprised 23% of US car sales. Now they are over 80% -- and individual models keep adding weight and height.
@Slate The SUV trend began in the 1970s, when the American Motors Corp repositioned the military Jeep for the mass market.
AMC hyped features like 4-wheel drive that were largely useless in the suburbs, but its pitch worked. The Jeep was a hit, and other carmakers followed suit.
It's involved in 12k+ crash deaths per year in the US, around 1/3 of all fatalities. Many involve truly reckless speeding, with drivers going 20+ mph over the limit.