The standard Pittsburgh-Pippin reading of Hegel's critique of Kant is actually quite alien to what Hegel actually says about Kant. McDowell and Pippin both claim that Hegel jettisons Kant's pure forms of intuition, because they are held to be "species-specific" constraints. 1/
But there is actually nowhere in Hegel where he "jettisons" Kant's notion of intuitions, or hangs his critique on Kant's claims about intuitions being "our" form of sensibility. In Faith and Knowledge, Hegel actually accepts Kant's basic picture but shows that the faculties 2/
...are unified such that we have knowledge of things as they are. Intuition does not restrict our knowledge to that of "mere" appearance but is rather a necessary constraint on knowledge of what is. So, against Pippin in particular, early Hegel doesn't jettison intuition. 3/
What about "mature" Hegel? In the Encyclopedia Logic, Hegel does not focus on Kant's account of intuition but rather on his account of the *categories*, which Hegel accuses of subjectivism. Hegel's claim is that Kant goes wrong in claiming that the categories hold only for...4/
...appearances, that the categories do not hold for things as they are (so far as we know). At issue is Kant's claim that the categories are *subjective* and that, if applied to things themselves, they will generate the antinomies. This is the true heart of Hegel's critique. 5/
The real issue is that Kant does not pursue a deduction of the categories in their own right and does not ask about their *validity* in themselves - as distinct from the question of their *applicability* to reality. 6/
Hegel rejects the idea of a self-standing reality to which the categories could be "applied." When Kant himself argues that the thing in itself is just the "unmarked" object - the object without the conceptual markers by which we distinguish it - and as such is "empty"...7/
...he's already well on his way to Hegel's point. Precisely as an empty thought, a non-entity, there is no "thing in itself" apart from conceptual determination. The mistake is to think that conceptual determination is a *restriction*. 8/
McDowell's claim that Hegel pictures the intuitions as "species-specific" and as thus disallowing access to things as they are - Hegel's actual point against Kant is far more powerful and works even against the strongest version of Kant's argument. 9/
That is, the strongest version of the Kantian picture would hold that the forms of intuition are not even "notionally separable" from the categories; that the intuitions are not species-specific but necessary constraints on any possible understanding. 10/
Even then, Hegel would still have a point: the question of the categories just is the question of the intelligible structure of reality; the categories must be deduced as the form of any possible world, etc. etc. 11/11

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20 May
Thread. In his late writings, Althusser turns to figures like Lucretius, Machiavelli, Hobbes, Spinoza, and Heidegger to develop a "materialism of the encounter," which is not a further elaboration of Marxism, as he thought, but its most ambitious philosophical betrayal. 1/
That is, Althusser places Lucretius' notion of the atomic "swerve" at the foundation of his "aleatory materialism," in which the "revolutionary conjuncture" is a result of contingent forces that clash together. It is a thoroughly "anti-teleological" vision of historical change.2/
Althusser marshals Heidegger's notion of "thrownness" to his cause, ignoring that, for Heidegger, thrownness is not a self-standing term but is inseparable from *projection*. Thrown-projection is Heidegger's distinctive term for *self-determination*, not passive determination. 3/
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