Alina Chan Profile picture
Jun 12, 2021 45 tweets 15 min read Read on X
Starting my 🧵 discussion of gain-of-function research based on yesterday's twitter survey.

This might be incredibly long so I will be using gifs and graphics to help keep people awake on a Saturday morning.

First things first. I made the survey yesterday morning to get a sense of the public perception of "gain of function" (GOF) research.

This phrase has exploded in the media, even making its way into a congressional hearing.

c-span.org/video/?c496233…
It is clear that the public needs to know what GOF research means.

What does it mean when people say that the US might have funded GOF research at the Wuhan Institute of Virology?
In other words, the survey was not intended to get the specific opinion of experts who have spent the last decade (and more) debating gain of function research of concern (GOFROC) regulation (sorry, @R_H_Ebright).
As a newcomer to this topic, it was a slow process of realizing that my understanding of GOF - even as a scientist - didn't match the federal definition of GOF research of concern (GOFROC).

And that the federal definition of GOFROC leaves a lot of wiggle room for interpretation.
What I can gather, at the most basic level, what the public seems to perceive as GOF is that:

(1) A dangerous human pathogen has been derived.

(2) It was derived via unnatural processes, whether this included any level of genetic engineering or just selection experiments.
However, when we hear scientists throwing the term GOF back and forth, they are (hopefully) referring to the federal definition.

For the purposes of this thread, I'll rely on the most recent 2017 framework.

It's only 5 pages long but can be technical!
phe.gov/s3/dualuse/doc…
In this framework, although the main text doesn't specifically discuss GOF, it is aimed at scoping and guiding "HHS funding decisions on individual proposed research that is reasonably anticipated to create, transfer, or use enhanced [potential pandemic pathogens] PPPs."
What are potential pandemic pathogens (PPPs)?

These were defined to be likely highly transmissible AND likely highly virulent (causing significant disease) in humans.

We will see the use of "likely" come back to bite us later.
But when we talk about GOF, we're not talking about work with natural pathogens, even if they're dangerous PPPs.

We're talking specifically about enhanced PPPs aka PPPs resulting from artificial enhancement of pathogen transmissibility or virulence.
That means that even if someone goes out and collects hundreds of animal or human pathogens and brings them back to the lab, as long as there is no enhancement of the pathogen, it doesn't get covered in the discussion of what is GOF.
Another nuanced consideration is that artificially re-creating viruses found in nature or already infecting human populations is not considered as creating enhanced PPPs.

Eg, if I turn the original SARS2 into the new Delta variant of SARS2 in the lab, this is not considered GOF.
So, based on the federal definition, GOFROC is any research that enhances a pathogen such that it crosses the boundary and results in a PPP with both high transmissibility and high virulence in humans.

No matter how small the nudge.
In contrast, research that does not result in an enhanced PPP that is likely both highly transmissible and virulent in humans does not get classified as GOF(ROC).

Even if it involves copious amounts of genetic engineering.
Based on these visuals, I hope readers can already come to the realization that where that threshold line (shown in green) is drawn separating regular animal/human pathogens from PPPs is incredibly important.

This is where a lot of scientists get into fights with each other.
To make matters more contentious, the framework has this special caveat.

That's right. No matter where the research falls on the chart, if it was a modified PPP from surveillance activities (e.g., virus hunting) or vaccine development, then it isn't counted as an enhanced PPP.
Again, I keep having to say this, I'm not saying that this definition or framework is right or wrong, or that it even matches my perception of what should be considered GOF.

I'm saying it is what it is. If we don't like it, let's change it asap.
I really want to bring this home for the public.

Based on a scientist's individual judgement of what is likely to be a both highly transmissible and highly virulent human pathogen, the bracket of research counted as GOF(ROC) can vary quite a bit.
It's like trying to decide (for the first time) where the end zone in football should be.

And unfortunately, in this case, it's not that easy to draw one straight line down to separate GOF from non-GOF research.

Resulting in scientists basically doing this for years:
The same experiments can be deemed as GOF or non-GOF depending on which scientist you ask and their specific assessment of which pathogens are ***likely*** to be both highly transmissible and highly virulent in humans.
In addition, many have pointed out that the GOF debate distracts from the point that a PPP does not need to be enhanced in order to wreak havoc.

A 100% natural PPP collected and studied in the lab can also escape.

Many lab leaks have been of natural PPPs, not enhanced PPPs.
I hope this primer on GOF was useful. Going to take a short intermission and grab breakfast. I'll be back to discuss the poll results!
Meanwhile, something to ruminate: take a look at the EcoHealth Alliance x Wuhan Institute of Virology research proposal that was funded by the NIH and determine whether or not it is GOF or involved enhanced PPPs according to the 2017 framework:

grantome.com/grant/NIH/R01-…
The reason why I wanted to understand (and reveal) what the public thinks is considered GOF research is because people keep asking about my views on GOF.

I hope, from the primer, that it's clear that the very specific GOF federal definition is not what many people think GOF is.
Navigating GOF questions from journalists is still a minefield.

What if listeners or readers misinterpret that I think a whole bunch of virology should be banned?

Alternatively, what if they misinterpret that I don't think very dangerous GOF research should be banned?
Let's look at the poll results to consider the challenges of answering the question: What is GOF?

The scenario in Q1: intentionally enhancing virus infectivity or virulence is what a lot of people think is GOF, regardless of whether the virus is a PPP.
However, in Q2, once you remove the intent, about half of the people who thought a similar experiment was GOF changed their minds.

Some labs do this: passage natural viruses, trying different host cell types, to find a version they can grow well and study in the lab.
Serially passaging a virus can be reasonably anticipated to confer a GOF in the sense of enhancing its ability to infect and replicate in primate or human cells, for example.

But changing the intent (and toning down the language) made a large % of people change their minds.
The poll also revealed that the public, due to no fault of their own, is not well-informed about practices and experiments necessary for basic virology.

About 1/3 people think engineering cells to grow viruses is GOF. And about 1/8 people don't know.
Engineering cells to grow viruses can actually prevent against risky pathogen research.

For example, as opposed to serial passaging a virus until you get one that grows well on human cells, you've created a permissive host cell that doesn't select for new infection abilities.
Q4 also revealed a similar issue. That 1/5 people think creating animal models of human disease is GOF, and another 1/10 don't know.
The real problem is, I think, a lack of science communication surrounding what virologists have to do in the lab in order to understand how pathogens make us ill and how we can develop treatments against these infections:

The next pair of questions reflects a different issue in the GOF debate. What if, instead of doing GOF on actual viruses, I do it on a pseudotyped virus or a protein.

In other words, I obtain knowledge of how a virus can escape from vaccines, without creating the escape virus.
The majority (52%) of participants agreed that doing the experiment with the virus itself, creating potential escape variants, is GOF.

But if the experiment doesn't create these escape viruses, only 19% of participants still think it is GOF. In fact, 61% said it is not GOF.
But there are some scientists who even warn against the experiments not using live virus, because they fear that nefarious boffins will take this knowledge and do actual GOF work on pathogens - creating variants that escape vaccines and drugs.
That leads us to the next 2 questions: what if a feature is engineered into a virus based on knowledge that it will likely result in GOF?

Vast majority (92%) say this is GOF. But if you don't use live virus then 43% say it is not GOF.
The difficulty of calling GOF gets worse when you think about just switching parts between known human pathogens, instead of directly engineering in known GOF features.
And I thought it would've been worse still if you don't even know if the viruses you're working with are capable of infecting humans.

Surprisingly, the % of people who said this is GOF went up from 57 to 71%!
Thankfully, it went back down in the next question where both viruses being mixed-&-matched have not been shown to cause human disease.

45% people said this is not GOF.
I thought this next question would've resulted in more "I don't know"s.

Unfortunately, there are quite a few types of experiments that, regardless of intent, result in co-infection of cells or animals with multiple viruses.
For example, something as simple as inoculating an animal or cell culture with a sample from bat butts in an attempt to isolate novel viruses could result in multiple viruses infecting the same host.
Almost at the end!
This pair of questions again reveals that changing the intent of the experiment can change what people perceive as GOF.

Even though the experiment stays the same.
Even though the pathogen is not even enhanced.
I wrote this last question to stimulate some thought that viruses can be broken down into different functional parts.

Scientists can take these different parts and use them for good and/or for evil. It's not always clear cut even if it involves the same part being adapted.
Again, the poll is just for fun. Please relax, everyone, you're not being judged or graded. I can't see who answered which question and how.

If someone wants to make this a real public poll, it looks like there are a lot of people with useful feedback in these threads ;)
The point of the poll also isn't to mock the public. Like I said, even scientists have a hard time agreeing on what is GOF. Many don't agree with the federal definition+framework or how it is implemented.

Best thing you can do is ask each person: what do you think is GOF?

• • •

Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to force a refresh
 

Keep Current with Alina Chan

Alina Chan Profile picture

Stay in touch and get notified when new unrolls are available from this author!

Read all threads

This Thread may be Removed Anytime!

PDF

Twitter may remove this content at anytime! Save it as PDF for later use!

Try unrolling a thread yourself!

how to unroll video
  1. Follow @ThreadReaderApp to mention us!

  2. From a Twitter thread mention us with a keyword "unroll"
@threadreaderapp unroll

Practice here first or read more on our help page!

More from @Ayjchan

Apr 10
Regarding the possibility that Covid may have spread at the Oct 2019 Wuhan military games, my main question is why noone across multiple countries had the presence of mind to collect & store samples from patients till tests were available.

There should be changes going forward.
According to Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness: "Service members were not tested... as testing was not available at this early stage of the pandemic."
freebeacon.com/wp-content/upl…
"athletes noticed that something was amiss in the city of Wuhan.. described it as a “ghost town.”"

"athletes from several countries.. claimed publicly they had contracted what they believed to be covid.. based on their symptoms and how their illnesses spread to their loved ones"
washingtonpost.com/opinions/2021/…
Read 13 tweets
Mar 13
I encourage experts who have insisted on a natural origin of Covid-19 to gracefully change their public stance instead of doubling down on the threadbare evidence for the wet market hypothesis.

You could acknowledge that you initially trusted your colleagues in China/US to tell the truth. But time and time again over the past 5 years, it has been shown that they withheld critical evidence from you and the public:
1⃣The 2018 Defuse proposal
2⃣Low biosafety standards for experiments where live viruses are produced and used in human cell infection studies
3⃣Risky pathogen experiments and surprising gain of function
4⃣Missing pathogen sample database, viruses discovered after 2015 largely not shared with US collaborators
5⃣Closest virus relative that we know of was collected from a mine where people died from suspected SARS-like virus infection

The studies published last month where Wuhan scientists experimented with potentially dangerous pathogens at low biosafety opened your eyes to the level of reckless ambition in their research.

Given these betrayals, it is fully within reason to retract your trust and re-evaluate all the available evidence. Those of you who have access to intelligence could say that the non-public evidence has cast a new light on the public evidence and strengthens the case for a lab origin of Covid-19.

This is better than continuing to argue that you somehow know all the viruses in the Wuhan lab's collection and somehow know they didn't follow through on their 2018 plans to put furin cleavage sites into SARS-like viruses and study these at low biosafety exactly like they said they would.
For those experts who haven't even looked at the Defuse proposal and its drafts, the Wuhan-US scientists clearly said they were interested in furin cleavage sites at the spike S1/S2 junction, and would insert these into novel SARS-like viruses in the lab (not closely related to the 2003 SARS virus as that would be dangerous). They would test the ability of these SARS-like viruses with inserted cleavage sites to infect human cells and cause pathogenesis in vivo.

The Wuhan lab was regularly synthesizing novel coronavirus genomes without leaving any sign of lab manipulation. They used a protocol with trypsin-supplemented media to retain cleavage sites in the viruses. They did much of the work, including infection experiments in human cells, at BSL-2. Their US collaborator Ralph Baric has repeatedly criticized them for doing the work at low biosafety.

h/t @emilyakopp for FOIA'ing the Defuse proposal drafts.Image
Image
Some virologists may argue that the furin cleavage site in SARS-CoV-2 doesn't look canonical. You should read the citation in the Defuse draft for the computational model used to predict furin cleavage sites. The paper says it doesn't rely on the canonical motif and instead looks at a 20-residue sequence to make its predictions. The PRRAR motif exists in a feline coronavirus, MERS has a PRXXR S1/S2 furin cleavage site, and the RRXR motif is a functional furin cleavage site in numerous other proteins.
Read 13 tweets
Mar 12
According to Zeit Online, German Chancellery consulted with US Director of National Intelligence in 2023, who said there was nothing to the lab leak hypothesis.

They doubted "Eierköpfe" (egghead) scientists in intelligence knew better than leading virologists around the world.
In the US, something similar was happening where scientists in intelligence agencies also assessed a likely lab origin of Covid but were sidelined.

"The dominant view within the intelligence community was clear when... the director of national intelligence, and a couple of her senior analysts, briefed Biden... concluded with “low confidence” that Covid-19 had emerged when the virus leapt from an animal to a human."
wsj.com/politics/natio…
In both cases, government leaders favored the opinions of leading virologists over the scientists working in intelligence. Even though some of the leading virologists were public advocates and funders of "gain-of-function" research of concern with pathogens.
Read 4 tweets
Mar 12
German intelligence now assesses a 80-95% likelihood of a lab origin of Covid-19. Image
Image
Read 4 tweets
Mar 9
I am not 100% convinced Covid came from a lab. I still think there is a small chance the virus emerged in Wuhan without the help of research activities. However, this would mean:

1⃣ The Wuhan-US scientists' entire framework about the spillover risks of SARS-like viruses, building on research and data collected over more than a decade, was incorrect.

2⃣ A highly transmissible, super stealthy virus well adapted for causing uncontrollable outbreaks in multiple animal species left zero trace of its origin in the wildlife or fur farms of China/SE Asia after emerging in only Wuhan out of 1000s of other populous cities.

3⃣ Out of all possible viruses to cause a pandemic and all times for a pandemic to occur, it was an unprecedented SARS-like virus with a novel furin cleavage site, matching the description of a 2018 US-Wuhan research proposal, emerging in Wuhan where scientists worked with such viruses at low biosafety, less than 2 years after said proposal was drafted.

It's not impossible that leading experts were completely mistaken about the exceedingly low odds of such viruses emerging in Wuhan.

It's not impossible that, in 2019, nature churned out a virus matching the scientists' 2018 research plans and that virus emerged in only Wuhan of all places.

But you'd have to be very motivated to believe Covid-19 emerged naturally.
We are unlikely to reach 100% certainty unless a whistleblower appears or the Chinese authorities one day assess that it is in their interest to share the truth.

I am still hopeful that this will happen one day. I believe in human courage.
Before that day, there are several routes of investigation that remain to be explored by the US gov.

Conducting a rigorous, credible investigation of Covid origins can unearth more key evidence while also informing the implementation of new measures to prevent lab pandemics.
Read 5 tweets
Mar 8
Top journals have the power to set global biosafety standards.

It's a problem that they do not see this as their moral responsibility. By publishing & celebrating risky research done at questionable biosafety, they incentivize the 'work fast break things' model of research.
I've given up on journals taking the initiative to be responsible members of the scientific community.

It is up to the U.S. government to tell them to behave responsibly or do business elsewhere.
I would love to be corrected if any top journal can show us that fostering a culture of accountability, scientific integrity, and 'do no harm' is one of their measurable goals as an organization & a strict criteria for decision-making regarding what research/groups to publish.
Read 6 tweets

Did Thread Reader help you today?

Support us! We are indie developers!


This site is made by just two indie developers on a laptop doing marketing, support and development! Read more about the story.

Become a Premium Member ($3/month or $30/year) and get exclusive features!

Become Premium

Don't want to be a Premium member but still want to support us?

Make a small donation by buying us coffee ($5) or help with server cost ($10)

Donate via Paypal

Or Donate anonymously using crypto!

Ethereum

0xfe58350B80634f60Fa6Dc149a72b4DFbc17D341E copy

Bitcoin

3ATGMxNzCUFzxpMCHL5sWSt4DVtS8UqXpi copy

Thank you for your support!

Follow Us!

:(