1/ In winter 1971-2, Beijing consumers complained about fish from Guanting Reservoir, in the capital's NW, having foul smells. Some suffered from food poisoning. The reason was industrial waste polluting the water.
A short thread on rudimentary environmentalism in Maoist China
2/ The news alarmed Premier Zhou Enlai, who immediately set up a "Leading Group" for the protection of Guanting Reservoir's water source. Its head was Wan Li, who had just been released from a gulag. 1972 saw also Nixon's visit and China was trying to re-internationalise.
3/ In June 1972 China sent a delegation to the UN Conference on the Environment held in Stockholm, led by Tang Ke, Deputy Minister for Fuel & Chemical Industries. The report he compiled after returning was that China's environmental problems were no less severe than the west.
4/ Zhou Enlai decided that the problem could no longer wait, and after deliberations, convened a Nationwide Environmental Protection Conference, held on 5-20 August 1973, and hosted by the State Planning Commission under Yu Qiuli. It was attended by 300 people.
5/ This thread is made possible by an internal circular of the speeches made by V-Premier Li Xiannian, Hua Guofeng and State Planning Commissioner Yu Qiuli, who had been directing the proto-wartime economy during the Cult Rev, successfully producing hydrogen bombs and satellites.
6/ In Li Xiannian's speech, politics came first. He blamed the Liu-Deng "Capitalist Roaders" for having paid no attention to the environmental problem due to their emphasis on profit incentives, and argued that Maoism with its emphasis on the people was environmentally friendly.
7/ Li Xiannian also emphasised that in fact Mao and Zhou had been talking about the pollution problem for years. Industrial pollution that harms the peasants and fishermen could seriously affect the "worker-peasant alliance" which was the revolutionary bedrock of the PRC.
8/ Li attacked cadres on various levels for their excuses for not tackling pollution, including that they are too busy. They care not about the health of the people, said Li. "Some say one must take a shit after eating rice. Well you can't take a shit anywhere you like can you?"
9/ In a spirit consistent with the Three-anti Five-anti campaign of 1952-3, Li attacked the problem of waste. Refusal to learn how to "comprehensively utilise" resources including recycling industrial waste, he said, was precisely that - and some cadres are unmoved by wastage.
10/ Li quoted examples where fish in Songhua River in Manchuria and the Yangtze, as well as crabs in Yangcheng Lake have all been depleted due to pollution. Rice is also affected. Cows eating polluted grass have had swelling in their mouths. Some youngsters' hair has grown silver
11/ Li cited examples of good "comprehensive use" of industrial waste. A paper mill in Jilin Province has recycled 20,000 tons of caustic soda in a year, at a time when HNO₃/H₂SO₄/HCl/NaOH/Na2CO3 were all in short supply. It created 14,000,000 yuan of revenue for the state.
12/ Hua Guofeng's speech concerned the country's rapid industrialisation drive despite the Cultural Revolution, and possibly foresaw the worsening of environmental problems with the "4-3 Scheme" of Jan 1973, which involved using 430 million USD to buy western industrial equipment
13/ Hua was evidently aware of pollution problems in other countries when he cited water pollution in Japan, and warned that the US would shift its pollution problems (especially chemical) onto other countries. Strangely he said this had been shifted onto the Soviet camp.
14/ A metaphor used by both Li and Hua was the "sesame" and "watermelon". They both attacked cadres for seeing recycling industrial waste as a distraction as as "picking up sesames", not knowing that it would be a vast economic resource - indeed a watermelon.
15/ Hua argued for legislation on pollution. He also attacked the profit-motives of some polluting industries which used to compensate peasants, but now charge users of their chemical waste a high price once they found that it was lucrative. This he thought would be an impediment
16/ Yu Qiuli's speech was the least colourful. He thought that leadership was central to any improvement. New plants would need to be designed according to be more environmentally-friendly and to "comprehensively utilise" resources. For this, popular supervision must be empowered
17/ Communists are "the most serious", said Yu. Our socialist industries are developed not for profit, but as a service to the nation and to the people of the world. The three kinds of waste - gases, liquids and solids - "can be turned into treasures".
18/ It is evident from the mentality of the conference that recycling industrial waste was seen in the light of a wartime scarcity economy, when the country had a relatively weak chemical industry, much as scrap metal would have been used during wartime Britain and Japan.
19/ Many shocking revelations were made during this packed Conference. The "Regulations on Protecting and Improving the Environment Trial Bill" was passed. It was decided that total rational planning and hands-on communal involvement would be vital to "turning harm into benefit"
20/ The Guanting fish problem was resolved by 1975. But a decade would elapse before the 2nd Nationwide Conference in 1983. By then, China had decided on rapid, profit-led growth, and its environmentalism would henceforth follow a chequered path. Guanting is again a problem today
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1/ Agricultural collectivization in E Asia is usually assumed to be a disaster specific to post-WW2 socialist regimes, leading to catastrophes such as the Ppl’s Communes and the Great Leap Fwd.
But what if it had much deeper historical roots going back to the late 19th Century?
2/ I argue here that collectivisation had its roots in fact in social reformist urges of the pre-WWI and interwar period. The fruits of these experiments were appropriated by the State Monopoly Capitalist, managerialist and total war ambitions of both Imperial Japan and KMT China
3/ Collectivisation contributed to the planification of an otherwise unpredictable agricultural economy. It became a pillar of the “1940 System” that lie at the basis of the so-called “East Asian Model”. It was also a rare scenario where CN and JP developments were reciprocal.
1/ In 1895-1945, Manchuria was the Balkans of the east. There in 1931 Japan created the Manchukuo state, the fastest growing economy in Asia until 1945.
This is a story about how rival post-war KMT/CCP planners were "together in electric dreams" to rebuild the devastated region.
2/ Manchukuo, being a single-party state under the Concordia Association whose cadres wore Concordia Suits; with total collectivised agriculture and industrial development guided by Five-Year Plans, was probably the most successful Soviet-styled state outside the USSR before 1945
3/ Even before Manchukuo, warlord Zhang Zuolin who controlled the region and briefly the Peking govt, had championed State Socialism. Under his son Zhang Xueliang, Manchuria embarked on an aggressive railway construction policy which irritated Japan.
1/ This is the strange story of a Republican Chinese warlord who revived the fortunes of his province and almost managed to implement socialism, complete with a Ten-Year Plan. It is a story of ambition and treachery.
This is the story of Yan Xishan, Governor of Shanxi (1911-49)
2/ This mid-western province today is mainly known for its collieries. Back in the Qing Dynasty however, it was the centre of indigenous finance in China, with a network of banks (yinhao) that had branches in SF, Tokyo & Singapore, financing trade that went all the way to Russia.
3/ Yan Xishan, born in 1883 in an ailing merchant family running a small yinhao, was barred from entering the civil service examinations but learnt how to do business early on. In 1901 he entered a military school and was trained at the Imperial Japanese Army Academy in 1904-09.
1/ Last month saw the 74th anniversary of the Feb 28th Incident of 1947, a watershed in Taiwanese history. It has usually been described in terms of identity politics, as a localist uprising against mainland Chinese misrule. Whilst this was one element, economics played a part.
2/ Chen Yi, Taiwan Chief Executive in 1945-7, oversaw a corrupt govt, yet was himself an exceptional case in the KMT - with a modernist mindset and State Socialist leftwing inclinations, and belonged to the global phenomenon of "reform/renovationist technocrats" (kakushin kanryo)
3/ Chen Yi's real sin was attempting a planned economy in Taiwan. Since its roots in Henri de St. Simon and Friedrich List, economic planning has always had an inherent inclination towards "high modernism" - top-down imposition of policies whilst idealising ground-level realities
1/ As 2020 draws to an end, and a new international balance of power might be on the horizon, it is worthwhile to revisit China's much-hated "Anfu Regime" toppled in 1920, the year when the Marxism Research Group, one precursor to the CCP, was founded.
The State Council, Peking
2/ President Yuan Shikai had tried to make himself Emperor in 1915. This failed, and he died in 1916. Parliament, restored by Premier Duan Qirui, was gridlocked, for both the Nationalist (KMT) and Progressive Parties had splintered. China was divided between military strongmen.
3/ Duan was no ordinary warlord, having studied artillery at the Berlin War College, interned at Krupp, held meetings with other radical soldiers reminiscent of the 1921 Japanese Control Faction "Baden-Baden Conference" and quoted the laws of physics in his parliamentary speeches
Who said the Chinese Anfu Club Regime and Duan Qirui had no economic thinking?
Club Council, 1918 - State demonstrative factories like Meiji Japan, experimental farms, subsidies to private startups, Listian tariffs, export bans on ess. goods, even inspections on unsanitary food
On Feb 26, 1920 China announced the establishment of an "Economic General Staff" - the Economic Investigation Bureau based on the Postwar Econ. Investigat'n Commission.
PM would be Bureau President and Deputy Presidents Sun Baoqi and Wang Naibin were both experienced technocrats
The Bureau's councillors included Kong Xiangke, a Versailles representative who died of overwork on the post; Huang Xuwan was an expert on tariffs and economic historian; Xiao Fangjun, a doctor who treated Sun Yat-sen and Liang Qichao, and a Zhang Wu who had his PhD from Berlin