some proposed alternatives, such as Bloomberg's BSBY index, attempt to fix this gap by fitting a curve to realized deposit, commercial paper, CD, and bank bond rates to provide term structure while also avoiding the manipulation risk of a Libor survey...
however regulators have recently come out against such alternatives, claiming they do not eliminate the manipulation risk in the low volume of transactions underlying the index
the officially-endorsed solution is to create Term SOFR rates instead...
the NY Fed earlier this year selected CME to administer these Term SOFR benchmarks, provided trading volume in CME SOFR futures and linked products reaches desired levels
the Term SOFR rates are to be calculated based on active 1m and 3m SOFR futures...
there are a few technical differences between these two products
the 1m futures price inversely to the arithmetic mean of daily SOFR rates over the contract month
while the 3m futures roll on a quarterly IMM date schedule and price inversely to the compounded rate...
in CME's methodology, the futures data from 3 nearest 3m and 7 nearest 1m contracts is used to calculate implied future SOFR rates over the contract terms
then a step function with breaks at FOMC dates is fitted to model the path of realized SOFR...
in this work the researchers found that implied rates from interest rate futures closely tracked the realized forward overnight rates underlying the contracts, which CME uses to justify the value of a Term SOFR benchmark...
that's all for now, thanks for reading if you made it to the end and hope people find some of the linked material informative... cheers! 👍💯
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quick note on what’s going on at the Swiss National Bank
first, the SNB has slightly unusual rates policy vs other central banks… they have 2 different interest rates on CHF reserves: banks earn the threshold rate up to a limit and then the excess rate on everything above limit
up to late-Sept, the spread between these rates was 25bps, but with the SNB hike last month it has widened to 50bps
since banks are now effectively being penalized more for excess CHF reserves, this creates a pressure on them to get their reserve levels below threshold…
a natural way to do this is to use the SNB reverse repo facilities or do a FX swap for another currency and we’ve definitely seen both get some activity
the move in USDCHF basis is mainly due to this (not USD stress) but there is a limit to how much CHF that market can absorb…
some interesting dispersion in 3 month rates going on right now:
looking at OIS the expected overnight rate compounds to about 1% over the next 3 months... but UST bills are trading about 20bp below that, and 3m Libor about 15-20bps higher
so why the wide range? let's see... 👀
starting on the bills side, we know that 3m bills compete with RRPs, bank deposits, and even shorter govt paper as cash equivs
with RRP and <1m bills around 30bps, investors willing to accept 3m duration can earn an extra 50bp by going to 3m bills... dragging yields down vs OIS
this effect in bills is compounded by the fact that issuance has been low, and cash earning less than 80bps in overnight markets or bank deposits is plentiful
should Treasury issue more bills, or Fed reinvest fewer maturing during QT... the spread to OIS would likely compress
recently we have seen some stress in funding, shown here at the 3m point as a continued rise in credit sensitive rates such as Libor & commercial paper relative to risk-free alternatives such as T-bills & UST repo...
market measures of near-term stress, such as the March FRA-OIS and spread between SOFR and ED futures shown here have widened significantly, especially since March 3...
in the broader historical context of spot Libor spreads vs OIS or T-Bills we are still at fairly moderate levels (on par with normal year-end funding tightness, not a crisis) but some funding premium is definitely noticeable...
why are the Federal Home Loan Banks shrinking and is it a problem for the money markets? 🤔
since the recent peak in Q1 2020, total assets of the FHLBs have fallen by ~40%… let’s look at why this is happening and what the effects are!
to start, the main role of the FHLBs as govt-sponsored banks is to provide flexible funding to member institutions against various types of mortgage-related collateral
these loans are called FHLB advances and are used by many banks and insurers to fund mortgage holdings…
this is reflected on the combined balance sheet of the FHLB system, where the main assets beside cash and HQLA securities are advances
on the liabilities side, the FHLBs do take some deposits but mainly fund their balance sheet thru the issuance of US Agency debt…