"One of our country's greatest strengths is our identity as a place where freedom, justice, and opportunity are available to everyone... when we fall short, the world notices." - @SecBlinken tells #ACFrontPage
@SecBlinken on Biden's moves to protect the human rights of LGBTQI people globally on #ACFrontPage:
"We have an obligation, a debt, to help those who helped us," said @SecBlinken on visas for people in Afghanistan who have helped the United States. Check out what else he said on #ACFrontPage:
How is the United States working with other countries to spotlight and advance the rights of LGBTQI people? @SecBlinken outlines how the State Department is integrating this work into their every day on #ACFrontPage:
On authorizing embassies to fly the pride flag: "The strength and the power of our own example... I think sends a usually important message." Plus on #ACFrontPage, @SecBlinken announces the State Department will fly the Progress flag:
Biden just returned from a diplomatic tour which included a meeting with Russian President Putin. Did he bring up the rights of LGBTQI people? Here's what @SecBlinken had to say on #ACFrontPage:
"The effectiveness, the impact, of our foreign policy is directly tied to our strength at home, and the power of our example... is as important as the example of our power" - @SecBlinken on #ACFrontPage:
What can the department do to ensure that the full spectrum of LGBTQI experiences is reflected at the highest levels? @SecBlinken talks representation at #ACFrontPage:
How can the US revitalize efforts to end violence and discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or gender expression and identity across the world? It starts with putting human rights at the center of our foreign policy, says @SecBlinken on #ACFrontPage:
On the ground, the State Department is supporting programs that advance human rights for LGBTQI people, says @SecBlinken on #ACFrontPage: "We've got this effort ongoing in our programs, that are funded one way or another, and in our day-in, day-out diplomacy."
On the ground, the State Department is supporting programs that advance human rights for LGBTQI people, says @SecBlinken on #ACFrontPage: "We've got this effort ongoing in our programs that are funded one way or another and in our day-in, day-out diplomacy."
"We have... an obligation to make sure that we're doing everything we can to advance human rights and democracy more broadly and to support and advance LGBTQ rights more specifically... it's the right thing to do; it's also the smart thing to do." - @SecBlinken on #ACFrontPage
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This is an opportunity to secure a long-term US strategic victory in the region
Trump’s decision to lift US sanctions on Syria is a pivotal shift that could define his legacy in the Middle East. The move signals an opportunity to secure a long-term US victory in Syria by stabilizing the region, countering rivals such as Russia and China, and opening economic opportunities for US businesses.
Trump has long portrayed himself as a dealmaker, and his record on Syria supports that image. Unlike the Obama and Biden administrations, Trump responded decisively to al-Assad’s chemical weapon attacks in 2017 and 2018, launched airstrikes to deter further atrocities, and cooperated with Turkey in 2020 to halt the Assad regime’s and Russia’s assault on Idlib. He also signed the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act, which crippled the Assad regime financially, leading to its fall last December. Now, however, those same sanctions are undermining the prospects of Syria’s new post-Assad regime government, which is attempting to rebuild and distance itself from Iranian and Russian influence.
The current sanctions are weakening a new government that seeks US and Gulf support. If these sanctions were to stay in place, Syria’s economy would remain in free fall, making it increasingly reliant on Russia, China, and Iran. This would open the door to renewed extremism, regional instability, and the resurgence of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS). Lifting sanctions will allow US companies to compete with Chinese firms for contracts in Syria’s expected $400 billion reconstruction effort. It will also enable Trump to leverage Gulf funding, create jobs in both Syria and the United States, and demonstrate Washington’s role as a stabilizing force. A prosperous Syria would reduce refugee flows, weaken Hezbollah and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, and eliminate Syria as a threat to Israel—a country with which the new Syrian leadership seeks peaceful relations.
The new Syrian government is not without flaws, but it has made pragmatic moves. It started reintegrating territories with the Syrian Democratic Forces, cracked down on drug trafficking, made efforts aimed at protecting minorities, and distanced itself from Hezbollah and Iranian forces. These steps show a willingness to cooperate with the West and align with its goal of regional stability. If Trump follows through, he could secure a rare bipartisan win, outmaneuver Russia, and reshape the future of Syria in a way that serves US interests and regional peace.
— @Qidlbi is a senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East Programs where he leads the Council’s work on Syria.
Trump is making a smart gamble
Trump’s announcement that he will provide sanctions relief to Syria is a gamble, but it is the right one. The collapse of the Assad regime, whose brutality, misrule, and collaboration with malevolent regional actors destroyed Syria, has given long-suffering Syrians a chance to build a different future.
The road to recovery will not be an easy one. Many are rightly suspicious of Syria’s new acting president, Ahmed al-Sharaa, and others in his Hayat Tahrir al-Sham movement, due to their violent jihadist past. As one cannot look inside another’s soul, it is unknown if they have truly shed their extremist ideology amid a rebranding since coming to power in December.
What can be judged are actions. So far, al-Sharaa has said and done many of things Western and Arab nations have called for. He is making efforts to be inclusive, including appointing women and minorities into his cabinet. He says strict Sharia law will not be imposed. He has begun negotiations with the Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces on their peaceful integration into Syrian national institutions. He claims to want Syria to pose no threat to any of its neighbors, including Israel, and he wants to keep Iran from re-establishing influence in Syria. He is aligning himself with moderate Arab states and US partners like Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.
These words and actions must be tested and verified over time. But to have any chance to succeed in stabilizing Syria, the new government needs resources to make the economy function. Reconstruction and resettlement of refugees, not to mention restoring services disrupted by years of civil war, will be expensive. Without a significant measure of US sanctions relief, none of this is possible. It would nearly guarantee Syria’s descent back into chaos and provide fertile ground for extremists.
Congress should work with Trump on crafting sanctions relief such that, if necessary, sanctions can be restored. But Trump is right to seize this opportunity.
— @DanielBShapiro is a distinguished fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative. From 2022 to 2023, he was the Director of the N7 Initiative. He has previously served as US deputy assistant secretary of defense for the Middle East and as US ambassador to Israel.
🌟 Tonight in Washington, five exceptional leaders will be honored at the Atlantic Council Distinguished Leadership Awards—known as the “Oscars of Washington.” #DLA2025 #ACAwards
We are dedicated to an alliance of democracies and galvanizing US leadership alongside our partners to advance the broader cause of democracy across the world, says Atlantic Council Board Chairman John F.W. Rogers.
“For more than six decades, Judy’s voice has carried the hopes, dreams, and stories of generations,” says Atlantic Council Executive Vice Chair Adrienne Arsht about #DLA2025 honoree @TheJudyCollins.
Register to watch the broadcast: ➡️ #ACAwards bit.ly/4iYkjJM
Immediately below, the head of the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center explains the scope of the new tariffs.
The United States breaks away from the global trading system it helped create
Ever since Trump’s first election, and especially during his first-term trade war of 2018, a thought has rippled across Washington and capitals across the world: What if the president of the United States doesn’t see the world solely in terms of allies and adversaries, but as countries that run trade deficits with the United States versus countries that run trade surpluses? Watching the president on Wednesday in the Rose Garden hold up a table featuring nearly every country in the world ranked by a calculation whose methodology is seemingly derived from trade imbalances proved that the theory may be, in fact, correct. Why would Japan be tariffed at 24 percent while Iran is at 10 percent? The reason is that these decisions are not based on systems of government, military alliances, or historical relationships. They are based on a new formula—in which trade is a driving principle behind Trump’s engagement with the world.
At this moment, finance and trade ministers are trying to prepare both counterarguments to the White House and retaliation packages if those arguments fail. In two weeks they will come to Washington during the IMF-World Bank Spring Meetings and make their case. Some may be successful. US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent essentially extended a hand to negotiate immediately after the Rose Garden ceremony and surely many will try (especially those among the sixty countries with tariffs higher than 10 percent). But many won’t succeed. In one week’s time the United States will likely have the highest tariff rates it has had in over a century.
The biggest question—and one that is causing such a negative market reaction—is China. The additional tariffs Trump announced on Wednesday, combined with previously announced tariffs on China, means that next week, the tariff rate on China will reach close to 60 percent, and even higher in some sectors. There was a level of tariff China could manage through currency maneuvers, but this goes above and beyond that. And because Southeast Asian countries, including Vietnam, were hit so hard as well, there is no alternative trading partner in the region in the near or medium term. From your Airpods to your Air Jordans, hundreds of products Americans use every day are set to get more expensive.
Perhaps it is because it has been a century since US tariffs have been so high that we in the United States have forgotten the painful costs of protectionism and are willing to risk breaking a flawed system whose problems have been raised by the United States for decades. But make no mistake about the significance of what happened this week: The United States said that the global trading system it helped create no longer works.
— @joshualipsky is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s @ACGeoEcon Center and a former adviser to the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
🇪🇺 EUROPE
Trump’s “liberation day” tariffs will have a dual shock for the European Union (EU)—an economic and a further political one. Economically, the sweeping, across-the-board imposition of a 20 percent “reciprocal” (even though economists agree about the inaccurate framing of this) tariff will impact around two trillion dollars’ worth of US-EU trade in goods and services, wiping out up to 0.3 percent of the eurozone’s gross domestic product (GDP) growth forecasts over the next two years, according to early estimates. Politically, the Trump tariffs add to a growing list of this administration’s policy actions that seem to challenge and undercut the credibility of and trust in the United States as the continent’s oldest ally—from claims on Greenland and challenges to European digital regulations to the questions raised by the temporary freeze of US intelligence and military support for Ukraine. What is more, Washington erecting its highest tariff wall since 1933 risks severely disrupting, if not devastating, the rules-based multilateral trade order that the EU has built its geoeconomic strategy on and modeled itself after in many ways. At the back of European decision makers’ heads will also be the anti-European comments revealed in the Signal-gate chat and the more fundamental question on whether the tariffs present not just a trade but an ideological challenge to the EU.
Unlike during Trump 1.0, this shock effect will be swiftly cast aside for Brussels’ firm response. Europe’s reaction will most likely be two-staged: first, the reinstatement of previously suspended tariffs on steel and aluminum and retaliatory tariffs on sector-specific, politically sensitive US exports. This could include bourbon, jeans, Harley-Davidson motorcycles, soybeans, and peanut butter, amounting up to twenty-eight billion dollars of US exports. Expect movement on these actions by mid-April. Second, by the end of April most likely, the European Commission will respond with another package that may target digital and financial services, an area in which the United States has a trade surplus. If the retaliation hits US tech firms, expect further entrenchment on both sides.
EU cohesion among twenty-seven different member states will be an important factor, as always. Combine the high level and broad scope of the US tariffs with the domestic political dynamics, and the European Commission can probably rely on relatively strong “unity,” balancing demands for more drastic and immediate responses to the “reciprocal tariffs” with more cautious member states’ positions. Notably, even Trump-friendly governments, such as in Rome, oppose the White House’s decision. Among trade policy circles, calls have also been growing to invoke Europe’s anti-coercion instrument, a new policy tool that could give the European Commission sweeping powers to impose regulatory, procurement, investment, and even intellectual property restrictions. However, it seems unlikely that the Commission will resort to this so-called “nuclear option,” and it is unclear whether it would pass a qualified majority of 55 percent of the EU’s twenty-seven member states representing 65 percent of the union’s population.
European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen made clear that the EU will act “from a position of strength,” but it prefers to find a negotiated solution. At the same time, Europe’s strategy will be to diversify its trade and investment relationships around the world while doubling down on integrating and investing in the European Single Market.
Overlooked in the chaos, von der Leyen acknowledged Trump’s concerns about those exploiting the global trading system and nonmarket practices as well as the need to address overcapacities and tackle unfair subsidies and intellectual property theft. It seems like a long shot right now that the United States and the European Union could find an off-ramp from this massive US tariff escalation through joint action on nonmarket economies. But for von der Leyen and the EU, it’s worth a try.
— @JornFleck is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s @ACEurope Center.
— @J_A_Pastorelli is a program assistant at the Europe Center.
Brussels’ response to Trump’s announcement of a 20 percent blanket tariff on the EU—coupled with a 25 percent tariff on steel and aluminum and on autos—has been sharp and clear, but only rhetorical to date. Von der Leyen strongly criticized the imposition of tariffs and pledged that Europe would remain united. She offered negotiations but also made clear that the EU was preparing retaliation. French President Emmanuel Macron has called on EU businesses to stop investing in the United States. Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, often portrayed as an ally of Trump, called the tariffs “wrong” and called for efforts to avoid a trade war. Irish Prime Minister Micheál Martin, said, “We see no justification for this.” Many other European leaders have also criticized the tariffs during this first twenty-four hours—although a few, such as Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán or Slovak President Robert Fico, have remained silent.
But the EU has not yet been specific about how it might retaliate, and there probably will not be much clarity for a week or two. As a first step, the EU is likely to lift the suspension of its earlier retaliatory tariffs on US steel and aluminum. (Legally, the suspension already expired on March 31.) The European Commission has already pledged to add to those retaliatory measures, since the Trump administration increased the duty on aluminum from 10 percent to 25 percent and expanded the scope of products covered. The EU will also consider how to respond to the 25 percent car tariff and the blanket 20 percent tariff on all EU exports to the United States.
The EU could potentially respond using its new anti-coercion instrument, which allows for a broader range of retaliatory measures, including restrictions on intellectual property and procurement. But whatever it chooses to do, the EU process requires consultations between the European Commission and EU member states, and also with stakeholders. Even though this decision will not require unanimity, but rather a qualified majority vote, it is likely to require a week or two for a consensus to develop among the member states on specific actions, and then another week or two to formalize the decision, before it can be implemented.
— @FranBurwell is a distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center.
On Friday, the US Supreme Court will hear arguments over the fate of TikTok.
For more context and to make sense of all the competing arguments, get insights from Atlantic Council experts: atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atla…
The Supreme Court’s decision will shape global tech competition
The United States Supreme Court is set to start 2025 with a blockbuster case on a tight timeline with significant domestic tech and geopolitical ramifications.
The law in question in the case of TikTok v. Garland—the Protecting Americans from Foreign Adversary Controlled Applications Act—was passed by Congress in April 2024 with widespread bipartisan support: a 352–65 vote in the House and 79–18 in the Senate. US President Joe Biden signed the bill into law, giving him the authority to force TikTok’s divestiture from its Chinese parent company or be banned from the United States. The Department of Justice set a deadline of January 19—forcing this dramatic showdown. The Supreme Court will proceed in hearing the case on January 10 despite Trump’s request to delay until after his inauguration and the fact that the high court typically defers to its two co-equal branches of government on matters of national security.
The Atlantic Council previously published an in-depth technical analysis of whether the threats of legal control, data access, algorithmic tampering, or broad influence efforts by the Chinese government are unique or singularly focused on TikTok. The threat of legal control proved to be real and ongoing. The other potential risks remain considerable with loopholes not specific to TikTok, such as the sheer amount of Americans’ data for sale on the open market or the litany of US-owned platforms the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has used to perpetrate influence efforts. Chinese ownership of TikTok is undoubtedly a core strength in its global approach to “discourse power.” The key questions remain whether a Chinese company’s ownership of such a popular social media platform poses unique national security risks to the United States, whether banning such a popular app violates the rights of the company or the app’s US users, and how China may react or force ByteDance to react. Beyond TikTok v. Garland, any outcome will shape global tech competition from the global reach of digital platforms to broader tech governance. If new evidence is surfaced, it will shape both.
— @GrahamBrookie is the vice president of technology programs and founding director of the @DFRLab at the Atlantic Council.
To China, algorithms are a national interest
The TikTok saga highlights Beijing’s strategy of using private companies to exert influence globally, while restricting foreign companies’ operations within China.
Beijing views algorithms as critical tools to exert national power, with Chinese leader Xi Jinping emphasizing the importance of artificial intelligence in military and economic power competition. As TikTok has gained market clout, the Chinese government has taken a more assertive stance on its technologies, especially content recommendation algorithms. Since 2020, China has implemented measures to protect its technological assets, including adding algorithms to the restricted list of technologies from export in August 2020, and passing the “Export Control Law” in October 2020, which governs the sale of these technologies to foreign buyers. China now strongly opposes any forced sale of TikTok, asserting its legal authority to veto such transactions.
Beijing has railed against the United States’ enforcement actions against TikTok, using abusive and inflammatory rhetoric to paint those actions as a violation of international norms. Chinese officials have called these actions “an act of bullying” (Xinhua editorial), “an abuse of national power” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs Spokeswoman Mao Ning), and “hypocritical and double standards” (Xinhua editorial). They have warned of potential consequences for the global economic order.
That is interesting rhetoric given that Beijing would not allow a US or other foreign company to operate similarly in China. China maintains a restrictive environment for foreign media and technology companies, blocking most foreign social media platforms, search engines, and news outlets. When probed about this disparity, a Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson claimed that “China’s policy on overseas social media is completely incomparable to the US’ attitude towards TikTok . . . as long as foreign media companies comply with the requirements of Chinese laws and regulations, all foreign media platforms and news agencies are welcomed.” In reality, these laws give the CCP firm control over data flows and information within its borders.
Beijing’s robust defense of TikTok and its underlying technology underscores China’s growing confidence in its tech sector and its willingness to challenge what it perceives as unfair treatment in the global marketplace.
— Shelly Hahn is the deputy director of the Atlantic Council’s @ACGlobalChina Hub.
What can we expect from a Trump 2.0 foreign policy? In defense and security policy, we can anticipate a return of a “peace through strength” approach. This will mean big investments in US defense capabilities to strengthen deterrence and use force decisively if deterrence fails. Trump will rightly ask allies to contribute more to ensure US alliances in Europe and Asia have the capabilities they need.
In economic policy, we can expect a focus on fair and reciprocal trade, prioritizing addressing China’s unfair trading practices, and an unleashing of the United States’ domestic energy potential. Values will center around an “America first, but not alone” orientation that will ensure that US global engagement benefits the peace, prosperity, and freedom of the American people and, in so doing, the broader free world.
— @MatthewKroenig is vice president and senior director of the Atlantic Council’s @ACScowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.
Global trade
What will the Trump administration do about global trade? This is the thirty-trillion-dollar question. It was what every finance minister and central bank governor at the recent International Monetary Fund-World Bank Annual Meetings wanted to chat about privately. Here’s what we know.
The important question about Trump and trade is: Will he do what he says he will do on tariffs? That answer is more likely yes than no, but it will not happen overnight. Trump’s trade views were shaped in the 1980s during Japan’s rapid economic growth. He views trade in binary terms, with bilateral imbalances the key determinant of whether a policy is succeeding or not. The first step in his trade policy will be, somewhat surprisingly, to try and revise the Phase 1 trade deal with China that he brokered at the end of his first term. The deal was largely judged a failure since China didn’t live up to any of its commitments, but the excuse given is that the pandemic prevented what would have been a successful first step. That’s more likely initially than a 60 percent tariff on Chinese imports.
Once he tries to revive (or, as Trump trade people say, “finally enforce”) the China trade deal, Trump will turn his attention to the European Union. Here there will be a deep divide, and Trump will seek reciprocal tariffs on a range of products—many of which he will be able to impose unilaterally. His blanket tariff promise of 10 percent seems unlikely in the near term, but instead a scattershot of specific tariffs will be a signal to countries—both allies and adversaries—that this is just the beginning. The likely response will be a tit-for-tat escalation that will be inflationary in the United States and for the global economy. While the Trump economic team disputes this, citing the fact that Trump’s first term didn’t produce inflationary results, the size and scale of what is being proposed now is vastly different.
— @joshualipsky is the senior director of the Atlantic Council’s @ACGeoEcon Center and a former adviser to the International Monetary Fund.