When living in Beijing in 2017-2019, I thought that the CCP would probably lose the power soon. I didn't believe it would be swept by a popular revolt, or a military coup. I assumed that once the current generation of Party leaders dies, the Party will degenerate and collapse.
Why did I think so? I hanged out with students of Peking and Tsinghua universities. And noticed that in their view the Party career was not prestigious. Founding a start-up, doing a Phd in Stanford or getting a job in Tencent was cool. Becoming a Party official - not cool at all
This wasn't because of oppositional views - such a stance was purely pragmatic. Around 1980 a talented and ambitious young Chinese hardly had any alternative to a Party career. You could not rise your social status without joining the nomenklatura.
But the economic boom created opportunities more lucrative than the Party career. Top Chinese alumni know that Party officials are poorly compensated. Yes, if you are lucky, by the age of 50 you gonna live well. But why wait if you can join Huawei and live well right now?
Therefore, current rulers of China are people who chose the Party career when there was no alternative to it. At that period, the Party incorporated the most intelligent and ambitious young Chinese. Current rulers are some of the smartest and hardest in their generation.
But the younger generations of Party officials chose the Party career when there were plenty of more lucrative opportunities to it. Most of smarter and more ruthless folk would probably choose the private sector over the Party job.
I extrapolated those tendencies to the future and concluded that there was now a mechanism of negative selection to the top Party jobs. Once the current generation of Chinese leadership is gone their places would be taken by far less capable successors
That's why I believed that a quick collapse of the Party after the death of Xi and his generation is likely. Now I think I was wrong.
The dynamics of career paths among the brightest young people of China are changing quickly. In the late 2010s the number of alumni of Peking University, who would choose a state job increased by more than 1.5 times. Meanwhile the number of those entering the tech sector halved.
Why did it happen? Not so sure. I think one of more important reasons might be that the emigration became less attractive. When I lived in Beijing a lot of the brightest young Chinese wanted to emigrate to the West. Nowadays this idea is far less popular
What does it all imply? First of all, China seems to return back to normality, and by normality I mean its historical tradition. It's cool to take an exam and become a civil servant, while being a merchant or an artisan/engineer - far less prestigious.
Secondly, we should not expect a 'natural' collapse of the Party. If the negative selection to the ruling elite continued, I would say that collapse is likely. However, if China returns back to normality - when the most capable become mandarins - I don't think it gonna happen.
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Wagner march was incredible, unprecedented to the extent most foreigners simply do not understand. Like, yes, Russia had its military coups in the 18th c. But those were the palace coups, all done by the Guards. Purely praetorian business with zero participation of the army.
Yes, there was a Kornilov affair in 1917, but that happened after the coup in capital. In March they overthrew the Tsar, then there was infighting in the capital, including a Bolshevik revolt in July, and only in September part of the army marches to St Petersburg.
Half a year after the coup. Not the same thing
I think the last time anything like that happened was in 1698, when the Musketeers marched on Moscow from the Western border. And then, next time, only in 2023.
(Army leaves the border/battlefield and marches on the capital without a previous praetorian coup in the capital)
As a person from a post-Soviet country, I could not but find the institutions of People’s Republic of China oddly familiar. For every major institution of the Communist Russia, I could find a direct equivalent in Communist China.
With one major exception:
China had no KGB
For a post-Soviet person, that was a shocking realisation. For us, a gigantic, centralised, all-permeating and all powerful state security system appears to be almost a natural phenomenon. The earth. The sky. Force of gravity. KGB
All basic properties of reality we live in
It was hard to come up with any explanation for why the PRC that evolved in a close cooperation with the USSR, that used to be its client state, that emulated its major institutions, failed to copy this seemingly prerequisite (?) institution of state power
Soviet output of armaments was absolutely gargantuan, massive, unbeatable. “Extraordinary by any standard” , it was impossible for any other country to compete with.
From 1975 to 1988, the Soviets produced four times as many ICBMs and SLBMs, twice as many nuclear submarines, five times as many bombers, six times as many SAMs, three times as many tanks and six times as many artillery pieces as the United States.
Impossible to compete with.
Which raises a question:
How could the USSR produce so much?
It is not only that the USSR invested every dime into the military production. It is also that the Soviet industry was designed for the very large volumes of output, and worked the best under these very large volumes
We are releasing our investigation on Roscosmos, covering a nearly exhaustive sample of Russian ICBM producing plants. We have investigated both primary ICBM/SLBM producers in Russia, a major producer of launchers, manufacturers of parts and components.
Each material includes an eclectic collection of sources, ranging from the TV propaganda to public tenders, and from the HR listings to academic dissertations. Combined altogether, they provide a holistic picture of Russian ICBM production base that no single type of source can.
Overall, you can expect tech moguls to have much, much higher level of reasoning abilities compared to the political/administrative class. But this comes at a cost. Their capacities for understanding the Other (masses count as the “Other”) are much poorer.
E.g. Putin is much, much less of an outlier in terms of intelligence compared to Thiel. He is much more average. At the same time, I am positively convinced that Putin understands the masses and works with masses much better.
One problem with that is that too much of the supply chain for drone production is located in China. The thing with drones is that they grew out of toys industry. Cheap plastic & electronic crap that all of a sudden got military significance
That is also the major problem I have with "China supports Russia" argument. China could wreck Ukraine easily, simply obstructing & delaying the drone/drone components shipments. That would be an instant military collapse for Ukraine.
Both Russian and Ukrainian drone industries are totally dependent upon the continuous shipments from China. To a very significant degree, their "production" is assembly from the Chinese components which are non alternative and cannot be substituted with anything else (as cheap).