Engaging Strategy Profile picture
Jul 4, 2021 29 tweets 14 min read Read on X
THREAD:

Through the 1970s and early 1980s the Royal Navy extensively retrofitted the Leander class of frigates to carry a range of more modern weapons systems and sensors.

So, what did it cost to convert one of these:
/1
Into one of these?
/2
The answer, it turns out, is an eye-watering amount of money.

Here's a breakdown of the Leander retrofits (Yellow) compared with some other major modifications to ships already in service (Blue) as well as the new build programmes running from 1968-1985. Costs are in 1985 £./3
Immediately you can see that the Leander retrofit program was enormous, over twice the cost of a number of other major retrofit programmes conducted at the time combined, all of which involved significant changes to to large ships, or capital ships./4
These included the modification of the Tiger class gun cruisers to act as helicopter platforms, the modification of HMS Ark Royal (RO8) to operate the new Phantom aircraft, the addition of the Exocet missile system on the County class destroyers & the conversion of HMS Hermes./5
The Leander retrofit program accounted for approximately a quarter of all the money the Royal Navy spent on its surface escorts from 1968-1985. inclusive of increasingly expensive new-builds such as the Type 22 Frigates and Batch 3 Type 42 Destroyers./6
It cost approximately 1/3rd more to retrofit the Leanders than it did to build eighteen new frigates of the Batch 3 'Broad Beamed' Leander and Type 21 Amazon classes./7
So what did all this actually buy the navy in terms of capabilities?

The first eight ships received the Australian Ikara anti-submarine rocket, essentially an early torpedo thrower similar in conception to the American ASROC system./8
Unfortunately the control and computer systems for Ikara were so heavy and bulky that in order to generate the weight and space necessary to carry it the ships had to lose their primary air search radar. And, of course, the missile was fitted in place of the 4.5" gun mount./9
These were, however, the cheapest of the conversions overall. Converted between 1970 and 1978 and costing between £26m and £40m each (1985 prices)./10
Next up were the 7 ships of the 'Batch 2' conversions, which received the Exocet anti-ship missile system in place of the 4.5" gun as well as a quadruple mount for the (notoriously ineffective) Seacat short range anti-aircraft missile system, which was fitted aft./11
These were converted between 1973 and 1982, costing somewhere between £36 and £54m each (1985 prices)./12
Five further ships, Andromeda, Charybdis, Jupiter, Hermione and Scylla were taken in hand between 1978 and 1984 for the most ambitious and costly of all
the conversions, receiving both the Exocet and Seawolf missile systems as well as the its associated Radar: Type 967/968
/13
These conversions in particular were, to put it bluntly, extremely expensive. Costing between £69.5m and £86m (1985 prices), comparable to a brand new Batch 1 or 2 Type 42 Destroyer./14
These retrofits proved so costly in no small part due to the small size of the Leanders, often the need to conduct extensive repairs to their hulls to extend their lives and the limited margins for weight and space./15
The whole Endeavour is, in all honesty, probably rather questionable.

To put this into perspective the Leander retrofit program cost more than every single new-build program run by the Royal Navy from 1968-1985 with the sole exception of the Type 42 Destroyers./16
This does not, by the way, reflect the full cost of retrofitting the Leanders. Not least because they built the large, modern, frigate refit complex in Devonport to conduct them./17
Also because my figures presently exclude the cost of the five Leanders converted to carry the Type 2031Z Towed array sonar between 1981 and 1986, due to my limited access to data on these refits.

(anyone who thinks they can help here, please get in touch!) /18
They also do not include the modification to HMS Juno that removed her weapons and converted her into a navigation training ship between 1981 and 1985. Again, due to a lack of data./19
It is fair to say that these retrofits were extremely expensive in the grand scheme of things for the Royal Navy of the 1970s and early 1980s, but what did all that expense actually buy them?/20
The brutally honest answer is, not a lot. Most of the first two batches of conversions - Ikara and Exocet/Seacat - served for about a decade before being decommissioned. The five most expensive Seawolf/Exocet conversions served ~9 years before sale or scrapping./21
The new capabilities inserted into these ships were, at best, limited and came at the expense of other major items of equipment - not least their 4.5" gun mounts and Type 965 radars. The towed array ships were, reportedly, decent in that role, but also served short lives./22
While many look back at the Leanders fondly, and it is unquestionable that they were useful ships that provided good service, in my view the class massively outlived its usefulness and ultimately proved a millstone about the navy's neck./23
What did it cost in the end?

Equivalent to:
-Twenty Four Hunt class MCMVs
or
-Twenty Type 21 Frigates
or
-Fifteen Batch 1 Type 42 Destroyers
or
-Six to Eight Type 22 Frigates
or
-Three (and a half) Invincible Class Carriers
/24
The simple answer: probably too much.

Despite the nostalgia and the lovely lines of the Leander class, we should probably have progressively retired them through the 1980s.

They were fundamentally too small, too expensive to convert and too limited in what the £ bought us./
Leander wasn't 'the most successful class of RN frigates since WW2', as has been touted for a very long time. A 1960s design that arrived at a point of major transition in warship weapons and sensors and which couldn't accommodate the new equipment without severe compromises./26
Which cost the RN enormously in the paths not taken with such a significant investment through the 1970s and 1980s.

Engaging Strategy, out.

/27

• • •

Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to force a refresh
 

Keep Current with Engaging Strategy

Engaging Strategy Profile picture

Stay in touch and get notified when new unrolls are available from this author!

Read all threads

This Thread may be Removed Anytime!

PDF

Twitter may remove this content at anytime! Save it as PDF for later use!

Try unrolling a thread yourself!

how to unroll video
  1. Follow @ThreadReaderApp to mention us!

  2. From a Twitter thread mention us with a keyword "unroll"
@threadreaderapp unroll

Practice here first or read more on our help page!

More from @EngageStrategy1

Oct 7, 2023
The way that decision-making on HS2 has happened reveals some of the deepest problems with the operation of our democracy.

That the 2021 High Speed Rail Act was simply an enabling instrument and not the legislative allocation of funds and directive to build it means/1 Image
that its cancellation - an enormous decision with vast and far reaching long-term consequences - could be done by executive fiat with zero parliamentary scrutiny or involvement of critical stakeholders across industry and regional government.

This is no way to run a country./2
The fundamental problem squatting at the heart of the British state is its overmighty executive, subject to extremely weak legislative scrutiny, with huge centralised power but having stripped out and privatised much of the expertise and capacity to actually use it./3
Read 7 tweets
Sep 17, 2021
A couple of thoughts on the Australian decision to abandon the Attack-class diesel-electric submarine programme in favor of pursuing a nuclear-powered submarine fleet in co-operation with the USA and UK./1
This decision, which has apparent bi-partisan support within Australia signals the commencement of what will be by far one of the most significant defence-industrial challenges their country has embarked upon in its history./2
When Britain decided to explore nuclear submarine propulsion in the early 1950s competing priorities between its atomic weapons programme, civil nuclear industry and an alternate development path: Hydrogen Peroxide propulsion, ultimately placed them far behind the USA./3
Read 26 tweets
Sep 1, 2021
Starter for ten: the near-constant use of the *very loud* whole ship's broadcast when they're supposedly being trailed by an enemy submarine...
Starter for eleven: an SSBN surfacing to pick anybody up at all. Immediately giving its position away to all and sundry)

(Which sort of invalidates the whole point of the show but 🤷‍♂️)
starter for twelve: the Lt Cdr XO who pretty much out and out states he got the job because he married an Admiral's daughter rather than on merit. Which, for anyone who knows anything about the Submarine Command Course, AKA "the Perisher", is pretty ludicrous.
Read 12 tweets
May 2, 2021
I think i've teased you all enough. So here it is, how the FORTIS '21 (the Royal Navy's name for the deployment of the @HMSQNLZ carrier strike group's deploymenet to the Pacific) compares with similar annual group deployments conducted by the Royal Navy over the last 40 years./1
First of all, here are the four largest peacetime group deployments since 1982:
Argonaut '01 containing a whopping 26 ships of all types conducted in Exercise SAIF SAREEA 2 off Oman.

Aurora '04 visited the USA to develop amphibious skills after the '98 & '03 Defence Reviews./2
Ocean Wave '97 saw the group visit the Pacific & oversaw the ceremonial handover of Hong Kong.

Cougar '11 saw the roll out of the new "Response Force Task Group" concept after the 2010 SDSR, exercised in the Gulf before elements of it took part in the 2011 Libya Intervention./3
Read 21 tweets
Mar 12, 2021
So, it's Friday and the sandcastle guy is gonna talk about aircraft carriers again.

I thought it would be worth it, in the general context of the recent rumors surrounding the QE Programme, the upcoming Defence White Paper and various social media reactions to the above./1 QNLZ, with some jets.
I hope that the last several years spent outlining why these ships, and other aircraft carriers, are the way they have percolated through to my audience.

That said, there are still a great many people who seem convinced that the whole programme is a delusional nonsense./2 These ships are indeed rather big, if anyone hasn't noticed
Clearly, if you've followed me for any length of time then you'll know that I disagree with that view. Having studied the subject for a good while I have come to the conclusion that aircraft carrying warships remain very useful implements for defence and wider UK state policy./3
Read 29 tweets
Jun 28, 2020
Right, it's THREAD time on the Royal Marines' Future Commando Force, amphibious shipping, budgets and options.
I'll preface everything I say here with a couple of caveats. This is very much a 'first contact' impression and some somewhat rough thoughts, I'm not possessed of all the facts & amphibious warfare practitioners within the RN & RM who do have them are free to correct any mistakes
Second, this isn't a forensic analysis of the budget (although direction of travel and some options will be discussed) and as such any proposed structures and concepts may be taken with a grain of salt.
Read 39 tweets

Did Thread Reader help you today?

Support us! We are indie developers!


This site is made by just two indie developers on a laptop doing marketing, support and development! Read more about the story.

Become a Premium Member ($3/month or $30/year) and get exclusive features!

Become Premium

Don't want to be a Premium member but still want to support us?

Make a small donation by buying us coffee ($5) or help with server cost ($10)

Donate via Paypal

Or Donate anonymously using crypto!

Ethereum

0xfe58350B80634f60Fa6Dc149a72b4DFbc17D341E copy

Bitcoin

3ATGMxNzCUFzxpMCHL5sWSt4DVtS8UqXpi copy

Thank you for your support!

Follow Us!

:(