This is an essay about online politics by Wang Taotao 王陶陶. He says, basically: ideological confrontation with the West has sped up the decline of Chinese liberalism, and a generation born decades on from Reform and Opening are unenthusiastic about the market economy.
Identified with openness to the West, liberalism is untenable in an age of conflict with the United States. He compares the decline of liberalism to the decline of pan-Asianism in the '30s and the shock delivered to pro-Soviet intellectuals in the wake of the Sino-Soviet split.
The second factor is a generational split: people born in the '60s, '70s, even to some extent the '80s were beneficiaries of Reform and Opening, when a college degree was a ticket to the good life. This is no longer the case. There is increasing skepticism of the market economy.
"A new generation, rather than enjoying economic freedom and rights, feels 'oppressed' by the market economy." What follows is a discussion of the housing market and working conditions for educated young people. Work yourself to death and you still can't make it.
Since Wang Taotao's analysis is supposedly from a public security perspective, he gives us the negative example of Kita Ikki 北一輝: a man that grew up in an age of prosperity, but who rejected liberalism to become an architect of Japanese fascism. An interesting example.
He identifies a few turning points in online public opinion, the first of which being the rise of demotivational thinking 颓废思想 in 2016-2017. Basically, all the slacker memes and talk of involution 内卷, acknowledgement of how everything is pointless...
He also identifies a trend of hatred of the wealthy elite. There are examples. I'm skipping them. He says this is not a political reaction, but an expression of economic dissatisfaction. I don't understand his argument or the dates he's chosen. But there it is.
He gets back on track: the party-state and a young generation not invited to partake in the prosperity monopolized by the last generation have formed a pact that has wiped out a liberal tendency (in online public opinion, at least, since that's the focus here).
The problem, though, is even if the advocates of liberalism are silenced, an illiberal party-state is still guaranteeing market competition and bourgeois property rights. That's how you get to Kita Ikki attacking the capitalists under the royalist, nationalist banner.
Again, analyzing this from a question of national security, he suggests that the natural outcome of external deterioration and illiberal public discourse might be a young generation calling for leaders to discipline the propertied class and ensure order.
I would say that he's calling for the leadership to get there first—keep the liberals silent, discipline the wealthy, deliver benefits to a young generation shut out of luxury that's seemingly omnipresent but unattainable, and ensure order—but I couldn't say for sure.
Coming across Chinese prison fetish videos through social media posts claiming them to be legitimate documentary footage, I scanned through them one night, and contemplated spinning out a thousand words about fetishism of the power of the state itself. Maybe it's there.
They are stranger than I expected. I'm not sure "fetish video" is correct. Most, despite featuring shackles and confinement, don't linger on that aspect, or at least fail, as far as I can tell, to eroticize it. They are heavy on plots intended to produce emotional responses.
They seem, going mostly off my imagination of the latter, closer to morally heavy-handed local state media productions than bondage videos. The episode clipped below is about a city mayor handed the death sentence. She is saved from execution. It is more emotional than erotic.
This is an old piece of industrial boosterism from Wang Xiaodong 王小东, who is identified with what has been called the Industrial Party 工业党. What he advocates is development at any cost, with state resources and direction leading high-tech industrialization. The essay,… twitter.com/i/web/status/1…
Competitiveness in an industrial age relies on these factors: making things that others cannot, making things better, and making things cheaper. To do those things relies on skilled technicians, scientists, and workers. China has a good supply of all of them. There are many… twitter.com/i/web/status/1…
The next section speaks directly to the split between the Industrial Party and what Wang Xiaodong calls the Sentimental Party, which embraces both the left and right. Although he didn't coin these terms, this essay popularized them.
A 2021 survey in Taiwan found the majority of respondents believed that the Japan Self-Defense Forces would be deployed to save them from the People's Liberation Army. It's possible. However, in this poll, only eleven percent of Japanese respondents agreed with the idea.
Fifty-six percent suggested that logistical support should be the extent of SDF aid. Twenty-seven percent said it would be wrong to work with the American military. Seventy percent suggested that the solution to the Taiwan issue was deepening relations with China.
This reflects thoroughgoing pacifism, I believe, but also fear of breaking with the status quo, perhaps skepticism of American-led foreign policy, and recognition that there's not much in it for the Japanese. Intervention would certainly be a disaster.
On the subsistence of the Japanese on apples, North America is not the right comparison. China loves fruit. These markets are nowhere to be found in Japan. No ladies selling mulberries or rambutan on the street, trucks loaded with pineapple (stuck on a nail, skinned, and bagged).
Look at those peaches! The consumption numbers bear out the conclusion. But, again, China is a continental agricultural superpower. You can't compare it to a temperate, mountainous island chain. That's the final answer: this is life on a string of islands in the North Pacific.
I will attach here another note about dietary conservatism, China vs. Japan. I'm not sure "Westernization" can be quantified, so let's adapt the last term to "dietary diversity." The import supermarket does not exist in Japan (Seijo Ishi doesn't count and Nissin is unique). China… twitter.com/i/web/status/1…
I was distracted from my research into the 1995 Ministry of Public Security Notice on Rectification of Drug Rehabilitation Facilities and Kunming heroin markets when this somehow came up in the results: local state monopoly on prostitution, Kunming, 1912-1949.
The system was early on attacked by Confucian societies, merchants, residents, and patriotic women's groups, who demanded that women in the quarter be denied certain hairstyles, as well as unbound feet (they didn't want their daughters mistaken for working girls).
It closed down but eventually re-opened, with more stringent regulation and advanced bureaucratization. State employees administered the brothels. Revenues funded the city. It began to decline in the 1940s when coastal refugees demanded more choice in commercial sex.
Tonight, I enjoyed reading Lin Chengxiang's thesis, "An Epic Poet in the Information Age: Revisiting Haizi at the Intersection of Literature and Science in Postsocialist China." When writing about legal systems engineering and Qian Xuesen, I had not realized he was a key thinker.
Lin lays out Haizi's engagement with Jin Guantao, Alvin Toffler, Hegel, and posthumanism in his academic work, as well as his epic poems. Like Qian, Haizi was interested also in the possibility of qigong and somatic science as more than a metaphor for information theory.
All of this locates Haizi more accurately in the intellectual context of the time. His poetry was informed by currents—cybernetics-enabled interventions in national cultural fever, and qigong-infused takes on three theories fever—that are particularly interesting to me.