COVID-19 meant devastating shortages of personal protective equipment (PPE), like masks, gowns and gloves. What happened to trade, the unprecedented trade and industrial policy to emerge, as well as lessons learned for future preparedness.
When COVID-19 struck China first (in Wuhan, Hubei province), China's immediate demand for PPE took a lot off of global markets.
Take hospital masks and protective garments.
International markets at the time worked as expected: China imported more, and exported less... 4/
COVID-19 was a PERFECT STORM of events for some pieces of PPE.
The pandemic arose in Hubei, the largest exporting PROVINCE, in the largest exporting COUNTRY, of the protective garments to be needed globally by hospital workers.
Including in the EU and the United States... 5/
Now, by April, China's PPE exports resumed and then took off.... 6/
Realistically, from April through the rest of 2020, China's PPE exports to the world were amazing.
In volume terms, China's PPE exports were enormous, likely saving thousands and thousands of American lives
(The massive price increase shows scarcity still a problem... 7/)
March and April were the beginnings of EXTRAORDINARY trade and industrial policy.
Start in March with the European Union. PPE shortages led it to impose export controls... 8/
PPE shortages in the United States resulted in the April 2020 invocation of the Defense Production Act (DPA).
Part I: US directs 3M to ship more N-95 respirators to the US from its plants in China (Shanghai)... 9/
PPE shortages in the United States resulted in April 2020 invocation of the Defense Production Act.
Part II: US uses DPA to impose export controls on masks, respirators and gloves. INITIALLY, the limits applied to exports going to Canada and Mexico, before being revised... 10/
PPE shortages led to INDUSTRIAL POLICY.
Department of Defense made $1.2 billion of subsidies over the next year to directly expand domestic PPE production capacity for masks, respirators, gowns, gloves, and key inputs along the US supply chain.
AMAZING! 11/
My takeaways:
In the face of a global pandemic that created a surge in demand for PPE, an optimal policy mix for a major industrial economy should have involved three (3) components... 12/
(1) Incentivize domestic industry to quickly add capacity and surge production.
COVID-19: WHAT TOOK SO LONG?
The US did this, but for most products expansion subsidies did not start until second half of 2020.
What supply chain information is needed to do better?
13/
(2) For the period in which surge capacity is not yet available, rely on stockpiled PPE...
TO DO:
a) Determine socially optimal stockpile SIZE
b) Regulators ensure hospitals, distributors, and states—in addition to the federal government—MAINTAIN inventory of that size
14/
(3) For the period in which surge capacity is not yet available, rely on IMPORTS...
TO DO:
US and partners must have a more diversified portfolio of foreign production for PPE.
Trade can be a tool for preparedness only if there is trust between the importer and exporter
15/
How COVID-19 medical supply shortages led to extraordinary trade and industrial policy
Lots of lessons to be learned to help us do better next time.
The Inflation Reduction Act went into effect one year ago Wednesday (Aug 16, 2022). In Korea and Europe, anger quickly emerged when it seemed IRA's tax credits for electric vehicles would discriminate against their exports.
Yet US imports of EVs have boomed.
What happened? 1/5
Dec 29, 2022: Treasury clarifies that **leased** EVs qualify for tax credits under a separate (Section 45W) provision of IRA.
Tax credit eligibility under 45W does NOT require the EV be assembled in North America.
So leased EVs imported from Europe or Korea were eligible... 2/5
The result?
Leases as a share of new *S Korean assembled* EVs entering US market:
Dec 2022: 3%
...
Apr 2023: 42%
Leases as a share of new *European assembled* EVs entering US market:
The Inflation Reduction Act provoked a major EU-US spat over subsidies for electric vehicle supply chains. The Biden administration addressed some EU concerns by writing controversial rules to implement the law. So then what happened?
First, some background on electric vehicles (EVs).
US really needs to cut tailpipe emissions to meet Paris climate goals.
US consumers have been slow to switch from internal combustion engine cars to EVs. In 2021, only 5% of new US vehicles were EVs.
China: 16%
EU: 18%
2/
It's not as if American consumers were failing to adopt EVs - and reduce CO2 emissions - because the United States was exporting massive US production to the rest of the world.
No, US electric vehicle EXPORTS lagged China and the EU too.
US exports to China cratered during Trump’s trade war, and American sales of goods and services continue to suffer. Yet, US exports to China somehow reached "record levels" in 2022. Wait, wut?
Most US-China trade war tariffs imposed over 2018-19 remain in place:
- US average tariffs are now 19.3%, covering 66.4% of US imports from China
- Chinese average tariffs on US exports are now 21.2%, covering 58.3% of imports from US
US imports of some Chinese products have tanked. Others are higher than ever. How Trump’s selective use of tariffs continues to matter for the question about US-China decoupling.
US exports increased in 2020–21 relative to the nadir of the 2018–19 trade war. But in the end, China bought none of the additional $200 billion of US goods and services it committed to purchase under Trump's agreement... 2/n