Tarun Chitra Profile picture
Jul 22, 2021 13 tweets 7 min read Read on X
⚠️ It’s 📰💧 time of the month again 🚨

Don’t want to read 100s of pages of CFMM literature? 

You’re in luck! We review the known theory of CFMMs (plus some new goodies!) for an upcoming *textbook* chapter on crypto + DeFi w/ two new authors:

(Paper: stanford.edu/~guillean/pape…)
First: Who are they?

Stephen Boyd is a renowned @Stanford researcher known for his oft cited textbook, multitude of INFORMS/IEEE awards, and advising BlackRock on convex analysis for manage trillions of dollars

He’s also @guilleangeris’s PhD advisor!

en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stephen_P…
. @akshaykagarwal just defended his PhD under Boyd and is known for his work on visualizations of embeddings via his open-source package PyMDE (minimal distortion embedding)

He’s also a core developer of cvxpy (quant traders ♥️ him) and previously worked on TensorFlow 2
Unlike our other papers, which assume knowledge of crypto, DeFi, + convex analysis, this book chapter is pedagogical + from first principles 

Goal: Quant-y undergrads who know Multivariable Calc and Linear Algebra (with proofs, like Lang) *should* be able to pick up CFMM theory
We also show a few new nifty features of CFMMs

1/ Simplified proofs

a. Round-trip trades always lose (path deficiency)
b. Liquidity Provider (LP) share value ∝ ∇ϕ(R)’R [= ϕ(R) for 1-homogeneous functions; surprisingly simple!]
c. Input + output portfolios disjoint
2/ Explicit formulas for add/remove liquidity

Previous papers assumed reserves were constant

We provide a connection between the trading function gradient and the change to liquidity ▶️ helps improve concentrated liquidity formulas (e.g. @Uniswap V3)

e.g. result below:
3/ Exchange Functions

Our curvature paper only showed properties of liquidity (e.g. curvature at fixed reserve) are too state dependent

We elucidate some properties of changes to liquidity via _exchange functions_ which turn out to be concave/convex (*w/o* metric properties)
Their metric properties, which do depend on a particular parametrization and reserve, are shown to be easily computed numerically

This, again, is very useful for measuring impact to concentrated liquidity (e.g. you can extend by linearity exchange functions to piecewise convex)
Finally, exchange functions generalize the invariant calculation done by @CurveFinance to general CFMM curves

There's a simple Newton iteration (gradient descent) for computing trade size from exch. functions

[Remember when @samczsun found a bug in curve's Newton iteration?]
4/ Expected Utility Portfolio

We provide some LP strategies for different utility functions

If we view an LP’s contribution to a CFMM pool as a portfolio allocation, we explicitly find both linear and Markowitz convex programs for how to optimize LP allocation
These are *easily* solved on a laptop and we numerically show how LP allocations change as a function of risk-aversion (cvxpy code included!)

This should hopefully lead to more principled LP allocation (e.g. useful for @CharmFinance, @mellowprotocol, @sommfinance)
We hope that a clean presentation of these results can make the field more assessable to folks in theoretical CS, ML, statistics, and other quantitative fields

But what’s next? You’ll have to wait until next month ✌🏾

Paper: stanford.edu/~guillean/pape…
Oops wrong tag: I meant @akshaykagrawal 🙈🙈🙈

• • •

Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to force a refresh
 

Keep Current with Tarun Chitra

Tarun Chitra Profile picture

Stay in touch and get notified when new unrolls are available from this author!

Read all threads

This Thread may be Removed Anytime!

PDF

Twitter may remove this content at anytime! Save it as PDF for later use!

Try unrolling a thread yourself!

how to unroll video
  1. Follow @ThreadReaderApp to mention us!

  2. From a Twitter thread mention us with a keyword "unroll"
@threadreaderapp unroll

Practice here first or read more on our help page!

More from @tarunchitra

Feb 12
⚠️ New week, New Paper

Q: What was the best way to profit market volatility in DeFi over the last year?

A: @JupiterExchange's JLP pool

How does this pool work? Is this yield real? Is it safe?

@theo_diamandis, @RiskRinger, @perpsjesus, @ns_gauntlet, and I explain! Image
@weremeow @sssionggg Paper: arxiv.org/abs/2502.06028
Our journey begins by zooming out and asking, "why are centralized perpetuals exchanges so much more successful than decentralized ones?"

One aspect overlooked by 2020s era perps protocols is that centralized exchanges offer lending facilities to market makers and large traders Image
Read 30 tweets
Oct 30, 2024
TL: Financial nihilism 🌕
Me: Financial optimism ☀️

On-chain DeFi intrinsically embeds collateral reqs — TradFi often misprices collateralized credit risk due to transparency

Pitch to (mid) economists: If crypto works… who fucking needs Basel III vs. a validated state root?
The idea that on-chain finance needs undercollateralized lending has been an analogy searching for a solution

DeFi is most successful when you have assets where *verifiable* guarantees on collateral are paramount to position value

But: undercollateralized == not verifiable
Why is this?

Dumb answer: Being undercollateralized opens the can of worms of the binomial American option model: a protocol has to figure out a stopping time for when you’re “too” undercollateralized and need to exit the market — MEV ruins this!

So is on-chain finance over?
Read 16 tweets
Aug 6, 2024
Are Liquid Restaking Tokens (LRTs) essential to restaking security and even risk mitigation, vs. being a source of systemic risk?

Surprisingly, yes! New paper w/ @malleshpai shows that smart allocation to AVSs is crucial for security against cascading failures Image
@ether_fi @RenzoProtocol @swellnetworkio @puffer_finance @KelpDAO @Eigenpiexyz_io First: What does this have to do with LRTs? They are the largest allocators + should be 'smart money' (due to economies of scale), with outsized impact on restaking security (see, e.g., )

We *quantify* when LRTs have a positive impact on securityethresear.ch/t/the-risks-of…
Our paper builds off of the excellent work of @tim_roughgarden & Naveen that formulates cascade risk in combinatorial terms and argues that overcollateralization is needed for security — but we arrived at this via a circuitous path

First: Storytime 📗

Read 20 tweets
Jul 26, 2024
Repeated arguments over economic security + issuance are a reminder Proof of Stake's threat model is completely and utterly broken — BFT models assume the worst economic attack is a double spend

Doesn't make sense when:

stablecoin supply + non staked TVL in DeFi > ETH staked
2024: We should analyze principal-agent relationships vs. reducing everything to double spends

P-A model?
1. Users (principals)
2. Validators (agents)
3. Attackers (malicious agents)

Compute max profit for each principal-agent interaction (e.g. DS, oracle manipulation, etc.)
Example: Consider a rollup with a canonical bridge; there are many P-A interactions/attacks with different max profits:
1. DA layer down 💰💰💰💰
2. Sequencer censors execution 💰💰💰
3. Sequencer delays execution 💰💰
4. Sequencer sandwiches you / 'cheap' MEV attacks 💰
Read 13 tweets
Mar 6, 2024
Three items are behind a wall and a solver is going to get one of them for you

Do you get a goat or a car, anon?

@malleshpai, @ks_kulk, @theo_diamandis and I show you that if solvers have to do more work to deliver the item to you, they're not going to show up to the auction https://arxiv.org/abs/2403.02525
There’s been a lot of talk about `intents’. What are they?

Simply put: they're markets for transaction execution where third parties called solvers compete to satisfy user orders (and any constraints those orders come with)

Question: What are the principal-agent problems here? Image
tl;dr: We find broad conditions for oligopoly in intent markets

What is oligopoly here?
1. Fewer bidders, k, than the maximum possible, n, participate (i.e. k/n → 0 as n → ∞ or k=o(n))
2. Users get *worse* prices even though the number of (potential) solvers increases! Image
Read 20 tweets
Jan 16, 2023
While @artgobblers isn't exactly my cup of tea, the novel NFT auction mechanism ford is cool from an auction theory perspective— but is it incentive compatible (IC) for both buyers and sellers?

tl;dr: It is *not* IC but can be modified to be IC!

people.eecs.berkeley.edu/~ksk/files/GDA…
Quick recap: A gradual dutch auction (GDA) is a sequence of n auctions whose initial prices a_1 < ... < a_n are increasing but where the price of an auction decays as a_i * p(t) where p is non-increasing (e.g. p(t) = exp(-t) in the original paper)

paradigm.xyz/2022/04/gda
Why would you use such an auction? If you have a series of NFT auctions (e.g. an edition, a daily @nounsdao auction, etc.), you want to incentivize users to pick bundles (e.g. any subset of items to buy) without forcing all of the supply on the market (reducing auction revenue)
Read 27 tweets

Did Thread Reader help you today?

Support us! We are indie developers!


This site is made by just two indie developers on a laptop doing marketing, support and development! Read more about the story.

Become a Premium Member ($3/month or $30/year) and get exclusive features!

Become Premium

Don't want to be a Premium member but still want to support us?

Make a small donation by buying us coffee ($5) or help with server cost ($10)

Donate via Paypal

Or Donate anonymously using crypto!

Ethereum

0xfe58350B80634f60Fa6Dc149a72b4DFbc17D341E copy

Bitcoin

3ATGMxNzCUFzxpMCHL5sWSt4DVtS8UqXpi copy

Thank you for your support!

Follow Us!

:(