How in the world did we end up with billions of doses of COVID-19 vaccines manufactured by Pfizer/ BioNTech, Moderna, AstraZeneca, and Johnson & Johnson?
Roughly 4 billion doses of COVID-19 vaccines have now been administered worldwide. Most required a two-dose regimen—if that trajectory continued, close to 14 billion shots would be needed to inoculate the global population. 2/
Getting a new vaccine from beginning to end — from concept to delivering shots into the public’s arms — requires five steps associated with five, largely separable, sets of fixed costs. 3/
When you think about vaccines, perhaps Big Pharma comes to mind.
Big, integrated pharmaceutical companies certainly played a role during the pandemic. But Big Pharma was far from the dominant model for how COVID-19 vaccine manufacturing scaled up... 4/
Contract development and manufacturing organizations (CDMOs) could be hired to handle just the production, covering the third or fourth steps of the process of figure 1.
CDMOs like Lonza and Catalent played incredibly important roles in manufacturing during the pandemic... 5/
How exactly did the COVID-19 vaccine manufacturing supply chains of Pfizer/BioNTech, Moderna, AstraZeneca/Oxford, Johnson & Johnson, Novavax and CureVac emerge in 2020 and 2021?
Most started from scratch, long before their vaccines were authorized by regulators... 6/
For Pfizer and BioNTech, production initially took place through a web of existing plants, most of them belonging to Pfizer.
But when demand boomed, they quickly expanded their supply network... 7/
FUN FACT:
In March the Financial Times reported that UK exports of lipid nanoparticles to the Pfizer/BioNTech plants in the EU was the input dependence that kept the European Commission from imposing export restrictions on AstraZeneca vaccines.
The data confirm this... 8/
Moderna took a very different approach from Pfizer and BioNTech to create its manufacturing supply chain.
Unlike those companies, it had to start from scratch, contracting Lonza and other CDMOs to scale up as demand for its vaccine also grew... 9/
FUN FACT:
Data confirm a substantial increase in exports of vaccines from Switzerland to first Spain and then France in 2021, consistent with Moderna’s drug product being exported to those two countries for fill and finish... 10/
AstraZeneca was at the heart of four controversies—each a case study of vaccine manufacturing problems.
AstraZeneca built a very different global supply network from, say, Pfizer.
It coordinated multiple CDMOs, rather than operating as an integrated pharma company... 11/
One AZ controversy involved the Serum Institute of India (SII).
SII curtailed exports to COVAX. Its CEO also accused the US of imposing an “embargo of raw material exports".
Although input shortages likely affected SII, there was never a US export embargo...12/
AstraZeneca’s most public spat was perhaps with the European Union. It was caught in the crossfire of Brexit, the departure of Britain from the European Union that was finally nearing completion after five years of acrimonious, on-and-off negotiations...13/
Johnson & Johnson developed its supply chains through a network of CDMOs, in addition to its Leiden plant.
Despite a seemingly successful supply chain setup, the Johnson & Johnson vaccine ran into challenges, none bigger than the Emergent BioSolutions plant in Baltimore... 14/
Novavax developed a supply chain strategy similar to the AstraZeneca model.
However, despite promising clinical trials, regulators have not yet authorized its vaccine for use.
Was Novavax tying up facilities that could be used for other vaccines...15/
CureVac is a German biotech that developed a promising mRNA COVID-19 candidate similar to BioNTech/Pfizer and Moderna.
But in June, CureVac reported devastating Phase 3 data.
What to do with that supply chain capable of producing 300m doses in 2021 and 1b doses in 2022? ... 16/
Then, there were the policy interventions. Billions of dollars of government support
• US Operation Warp Speed and the Defense Production Act
• United Kingdom
• European Union, Germany, other governments
• CEPI
This is how the global supply chains for 6 different COVID-19 vaccines emerged to quickly scale up production during the pandemic.
But these experiences raise six (6) additional questions... 18/
1) Were at-risk investments sufficiently large, diverse & geographically distributed?
2) Was there excessive concentration of input suppliers & insufficient public investment upstream?
3) In the face of scarcity, were inputs & available capacity reallocated efficiently?
... 19/
4) How did learning by doing arise? Within firms? Across plants? Across firms?
5) How did CDMOs and the modular, fragmented structure of the industry affect scaling up?
6) Did international interdependence prevent worse outcomes from arising?
...20/
That's where we are.
US and EU increasingly administered the mRNA vaccines. Take-up of Johnson & Johnson was much more limited. In the EU, AstraZeneca peaked in mid-April at roughly 22% percent of all doses administered. (The US did not authorize AstraZeneca for use.)
...21/
Elsewhere the story was different:
• India's vaccinations were dominated by SII’s local production of AstraZeneca
• China administered only domestic vaccines from Sinovac & Sinopharm
• Africa administered only about 60m doses, covering about 3% of its population... 22/
As increasingly detailed data emerge, additional research must shed light on two critical questions:
Could more vaccine doses have been manufactured more quickly some other way?
Would alternative policy choices have made a difference? ENDS/
The Inflation Reduction Act went into effect one year ago Wednesday (Aug 16, 2022). In Korea and Europe, anger quickly emerged when it seemed IRA's tax credits for electric vehicles would discriminate against their exports.
Yet US imports of EVs have boomed.
What happened? 1/5
Dec 29, 2022: Treasury clarifies that **leased** EVs qualify for tax credits under a separate (Section 45W) provision of IRA.
Tax credit eligibility under 45W does NOT require the EV be assembled in North America.
So leased EVs imported from Europe or Korea were eligible... 2/5
The result?
Leases as a share of new *S Korean assembled* EVs entering US market:
Dec 2022: 3%
...
Apr 2023: 42%
Leases as a share of new *European assembled* EVs entering US market:
The Inflation Reduction Act provoked a major EU-US spat over subsidies for electric vehicle supply chains. The Biden administration addressed some EU concerns by writing controversial rules to implement the law. So then what happened?
First, some background on electric vehicles (EVs).
US really needs to cut tailpipe emissions to meet Paris climate goals.
US consumers have been slow to switch from internal combustion engine cars to EVs. In 2021, only 5% of new US vehicles were EVs.
China: 16%
EU: 18%
2/
It's not as if American consumers were failing to adopt EVs - and reduce CO2 emissions - because the United States was exporting massive US production to the rest of the world.
No, US electric vehicle EXPORTS lagged China and the EU too.
US exports to China cratered during Trump’s trade war, and American sales of goods and services continue to suffer. Yet, US exports to China somehow reached "record levels" in 2022. Wait, wut?
Most US-China trade war tariffs imposed over 2018-19 remain in place:
- US average tariffs are now 19.3%, covering 66.4% of US imports from China
- Chinese average tariffs on US exports are now 21.2%, covering 58.3% of imports from US
US imports of some Chinese products have tanked. Others are higher than ever. How Trump’s selective use of tariffs continues to matter for the question about US-China decoupling.
US exports increased in 2020–21 relative to the nadir of the 2018–19 trade war. But in the end, China bought none of the additional $200 billion of US goods and services it committed to purchase under Trump's agreement... 2/n