The 2nd 🇩🇪 TV debate (of 3) is about to start. Backdrop: SPD lead under Scholz has stabilised; CDU/CSU fightback under Laschet is running out of time; Greens under Baerbock haven't broken through.
Opening question begins with coalition options. Laschet barrels in with his favourite talking point (that Scholz would bring the socialist Left party into power). Baerbock gives nuanced reply on similarities (social justice policies) and differences (foreign policy) with Left.
Scholz gives his stock answer - almost word-for-word his reply in debate 1. Doesn't rule out a deal with Left but stresses importance of foreign and defence policy.
As before: Scholz would prefer not to govern with Left but wants to maximise leverage in coalition talks.
Laschet back on attack: "German citizens do not want the Left in government but you don't rule that out today". Negative and cynical, but it's probably one of the better lines that a struggling Laschet campaign has left. And Wahlkampf ist Wahlkampf...
This is starting out very differently than the first debate. That led in with substance (foreign policy). Tonight has begun with dubiously informative coalition hypotheticals and dubiously sincere attacks on Scholz from Laschet. And I'm not sure that's a change for the better.
Scholz under attack over Wirecard (payments firm that collapsed, under his financial regulation watch) and Warburg (Hamburg-based bank caught up in fraud scandal, with which he had links as Hamburg mayor). Baerbock stronger as broadens out to wider corporate governance issues.
Scholz holds his ground: "I have done what had to be done" re auditing and regulation.
If this debate has a theme so far it is: is Olaf Scholz up the chancellorship? Confirmation of his and the SPD's preeminence in the campaign, unthinkable a couple of months ago.
He handled the grilling well with solid answers that didn't give the impression of ducking the questions. Being bone-dry in rhetorical style may not fire up your audience but it does mean you tend not to sound flappy / defensive in such moments...
Laschet asked about the bonkers right-wing (I paraphrase) CDU candidate and former intelligence chief (yep, long story) Hans-Georg Maaßen. Invited to criticise Karin Prien, member of his "Team Future" who suggested she wouldn't vote for H-GM, he essentially backs her. Rightly.
Baerbock takes on Laschet's implied equation of the Left party and the AfD, puts him on the back foot (one of the patterns of this campaign has been the feisty, scrappy exchanges between the two of them and I'm 100% here for it).
A strength of Baerbock's has been broadening out the ad-hominem points to wider ones about systemic problems:
Now question about vaccination obligations. Laschet waffles, Baerbock open to them, Scholz (again, as in debate 1) takes middle position with comment about case for obligations in certain positions.
Big fan of @ronzheimer's reporting but disagree with him on the case against Baerbock's inclusion. Greens are still polling relatively close to CDU/CSU. And whether you agree with her or not, this debate (like the 1st) is much the more dynamic for her.
Now "digitisation" (German for: "scary online digital new technology stuff... I'll fax you the details"). Interesting as puts Scholz in position of defending the Merkel government's Digital Pact. Pro: he benefits from the comparison with her. Con: the Digital Pact isn't all that.
Now climate change... the subject that Germans tell pollsters matter to them most (and the subject where Germany most conspicuously lags its European peers).
Interesting to see Laschet distance himself from Merkel on this one, coming close to saying that switching off nuclear power stations from 2011 while keeping coal power stations open was badly managed.
On climate change Scholz uses his stock phrase: "it's an industrial project". Laschet offers genial reassurance, Baerbock demands bracing change; the SPD candidate as so often in these dynamics finds a quasi-apolitical third way and makes decarbonisation a question of economics.
And @Khue_P is quite right here. Far too little acceptance of fact that climate transformation won't always be win-win. A weakness of Merkel was her reluctance to shape public debates and assumptions. This debate manifests continuity with that politics.
This was always going to be good opportunity for the Green candidate. Baerbock deploys her party's strongest line: that Germany will in two weeks elects its "last government" capable of stopping runaway climate crisis. Scholz and Laschet look sheepish.
And this was a similarly good opportunity for Laschet. He was asked about the SPD-Left-Green government in the state of Berlin and its contentious rent cap. Readers... you will be shocked to hear that the CDU candidate had Views on this matter.
A more thrusting SPD candidate with Scholz's (relatively good) record on social housing as mayor of Hamburg would have made more of it. Oddly, he didn't.
But now we're into the intricate details of social care and pensions funding and he's in his element. Olaf gonna Olaf.
Scholz pushes the not-very-credible claim that the German pension age can stay at 67. Laschet challenges that: "this will be at the expense of young people". He quotes Norbert Blüm, Kohl's labour minister and social conscience of the CDU. Laschet at his pragmatic, moderate best.
Laschet attacks the return of a wealth tax an assault on "the portrait on the wall or the antique desk".
Fun fact: most Germans don't have expensive portraits/desks and Germany has highest wealth inequality of any big OECD country but US.
Final statements. Each chancellor candidate focuses on one virtue: Laschet goes with trust, Baerbock with change, Scholz with respect.
VERDICT: Like in the 1st debate, Baerbock and Laschet were the most punchy (Baerbock, the most impressive of the three, was this time more confident and incisive). But like last time Scholz broadly kept his cool and didn't make mistakes. So I don't see this moving the dial.
And yet again this was *so* much better than 2017. Substantive issues, including unsexy but important ones like housing and pensions plus a big section on climate change, discussed in a broadly grown-up way that set out real differences.
Here's one poll taken 45 minutes in, matching the pattern from the 1st debate: the placid Scholz ahead of the punchier Baerbock and Laschet.
As ever, thanks to all for reading and full analysis up on @NewStatesman tomorrow morning!
A final thought. Seeing much dismay on here about the lack of Europe/foreign policy discussion, and I agree. But... several big topics tonight (climate, tax, coalitions) were in many ways proxy debates about those subjects. German politics is like that. Don't despair too much.
More on the foreign policy dimension of the 🇩🇪 election (what voters think and want, and how Germany's place in the world is evolving) in this recent episode of our @NewStatesman Germany Elects podcast:
2/10 Lab inherits dire Europe legacy. Not just Brexit per se but squandered trust (conduct of exit talks, breaching withdrawal deal) plus under-appreciated factor of severed relationships & networks of mutual understanding. Windsor Framework helped but didn't change fundamentals.
3/10 UK simply not a first-order priority in most EU capitals. Emphatic, broad consensus that UK is a third country and, to the extent that it seeks change in relationship, the “demandeur” - including in the upcoming review of the Trade and Cooperation Agreement.
Just got back from a week of reporting in Turkey ahead of its general election on May 14, meeting figures from all the main political parties as well as trade unions & 🇹🇷 civil society.
Some thoughts on probably the most important election in the world this year:
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has governed the country for two decades now, first as prime minister (2003-2014) and since then as president (2014-today). He has remade Turkey and its place in the world.
Erdoğan has replaced a pluralistic parliamentary system with an autocratic presidential one; a pro-European foreign policy with a “neo-Ottoman” one; and a secular Turkish order with a more explicitly religious one. Hagia Sophia, a museum since 1935, became a mosque again in 2020.
“Europe” is fundamentally not a peace project, but a post-empire project (and that’s OK).
@TimothyDSnyder’s central observation about the continent’s modern history has never been so relevant:
Lots of really interesting & thoughtful comments in the replies to this, many critical of @TimothyDSnyder's argument about the nature of the European project. For what it’s worth, the above clip is just a brief dip into it; he makes it at much greater length and depth elsewhere.
For example: his 2018 book The Road to Unfreedom (especially Chapter 3: Integration or Empire), this op-ed politico.eu/article/europe… and this lecture: .
Wild, this: early this morning 3,000 police officers raided 130+ homes across Germany and made 25 arrests linked to a far-right coup plot. Conspirators said to include the aristocrat Prince Heinrich XIII, a former AfD MP & a former Bundeswehr commander.
Of the 52 suspects several have military backgrounds and are suspected of stashing weapons. The group had set up a political "Council" and a military wing tasked with seizing power, which had considered storming the Bundestag and taking MPs hostage.
Close to the extremist Reichsbürger scene ("Reich citizens" who do not recognise federal republic), the group had even designated a shadow cabinet, with Heinrich XIII as head of state and former AfD MP & judge (!) Malsack-Winkemann as justice minister.
🇫🇷-🇩🇪 partnership is never fully as close as its grandest ceremonial moments entice one to believe, but rarely quite as bad as the semi-frequent "Paris-Berlin crisis" moments like the current one imply. It's a more transactional, mercurial alliance than either likes to admit.
Partnerships like De Gaulle-Adenauer or Giscard-Schmidt or Mitterrand-Kohl get romanticised in the collective memory (like any political project, the European project needs its myths) but all experienced sporadic periods of tension/animosity like the current one.
Which isn't to dismiss current Macron-Scholz fractures. This is a moment when, more than usual, Europe needs the 🇫🇷-🇩🇪 motor turning. A coalition in Berlin professedly committed to greater European ambition is falling short.
But it is to see those troubles at least in context.
For decades, Britain has been on the run from the reality that it can't have a European social model on a mid-Atlantic tax take. Now it really seems to have run out of road.
In that respect there is a certain underlying intellectual honesty to the Truss-Kwarteng project. They clearly want UK to make a choice: for a more US-style safety net and tax take. You don't have to like that choice (I find it abhorrent) to recognise its internal consistency.
Question (to which I don't know the answer): is this crisis so severe that opponents of the Truss-Kwarteng project can confront British voters with the reality that if they want a European-style social model they need to accept European levels of taxation?