Thread by @housetrotter

Part two of our series with @Aaron_Good_ and Peter Dale Scott drops tomorrow. Subjects: the long history of US protection for al Qaeda, a CIA/GID operation that protected two alleged hijackers in the US for 18 months, and DCI Tenet’s personal complicity in the events of 9/11.

As promised, part 2 is up. Read on to learn how the US spent over a decade protecting al Qaeda after it had recognized them as a terrorist organization, and how top CIA officials protected two alleged 9/11 hijackers in the US.

https://twitter.com/Aaron_Good_/status/1437481254505619465

The very first domestic al Qaeda/MAK operation, the assassination of Jewish Defense League leader Meir Kahane in 1990, was the subject of a massive coverup by the FBI. They were protecting long-time CIA and FBI asset Ali Mohamed.

Mohamed was again protected when he insisted the Mounties who were detaining him call a number he gave them. On the other end was his FBI handler, who ordered him released. A couple months later, a cell which Mohamed helped train blew up the WTC basement.

The FBI had another asset within the cell that bombed the WTC in 1993: one Emad Salem, who was in a position to stop the bombing, but was told by his FBI handlers not to.

Before the 98 Embassy bombings, the NSA was tapping a key al Qaeda hub in Yemen. Via this hub, they listened in on calls which informed them of the oncoming attack. They neglected to warn anyone, likely because top NSA leaders blocked the information.

This takes us to the Cole Bombing and 9/11, and the curious involvement of the Alec Station. Ostensibly created to collate and distribute information about al Qaeda, instead it was a black hole, ensuring that key elements of al Qaeda’s operations were protected.

Richard Blee, who ran Alec Station, was a fast-track agency brat with close ties to DCI Tenet. His dad was legendary within the Agency for helping to squeeze Angleton out.

Blee’s appointment to Alec Station Chief coincided with his Central Asian adventures, where he forged partnerships with the Northern Alliance, preparing the groundwork for the invasion which was to come after 9/11. Blee himself became Kabul Station Chief after the war started.

During this entire period, however, Blee was simultaneously protecting two of alleged al Qaeda hijackers, whose alleged actions on 9/11 provided the pretext for the war Blee planned on. He provided this protection while he was warning of “spectacular” terrorist attacks.

When alleged hijackers al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi traveled to Malaysia for a meeting, the CIA became aware that al-Mihdhar had a US visa. FBI agents assigned to the Alec station tried to pass this information to the FBI, but were blocked by Blee’s deputy Tom Wilshire.

In May of 2001, Wilshire read a March 2000 cable, detailing al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar’s travel to the US. At this time, Blee began warning NSA Rice and Counter-Terror Czar Clarke of an impending terrorist attack.

In July of 2001, Blee made the very prescient prediction to Rice that “the attacks will be spectacular.” At this time, his deputy Wilshire was warning him that al-Mihdhar, the man they had been protecting for 18 months, was likely to be involved in this upcoming attack.

Neither Blee nor Wilshire warned anyone of al-Mihdhar. In fact, according to DCI Tenet, Blee told him “they’re [al Qaeda are] coming here,” without mentioning he knew well “they” were already here.

day job calls, will get back to this later

It might be prudent at this point to look at what happens when the FBI actually does catch on to the unfolding plot. The Moussaoui case is interesting for this reason. He was a known entity to French and British intelligence by the late 90s.

FBI agents in Minneapolis picked him up based on a tip from a flight school he was training at. His connections to bin Laden were quickly surmised from French intelligence sources, and so the FBI sought to search his laptop. But their attempts at securing a warrant were blocked.

They were blocked by FBI HQ staffers who were aware of FBI memos indicating al Qaeda operatives were training to fly planes. The interference was so egregious that Minneapolis FBI agents joked that there must have been an al Qaeda mole at FBI HQ.

Enter Tom Wilshire who, as mentioned earlier was protecting two other alleged hijackers at this time. He was in contact with these FBI HQ staffers and encouraged their erroneous evaluation that Moussaoui wasn’t a threat.

Had Moussaoui been properly investigated, it’s likely at least a significant portion of the plot would have been rolled up, denying those who planned 9/11 their pretext for the wars that followed.

DCI Tenet himself was aware of Moussaoui, and yet never mentioned it to anyone. This is despite the fact that, as soon as he was informed of the 9/11 attacks, he understood well that Moussaoui was connected.

As mentioned, DCI Tenet and Blee were close. When Blee’s actions first faced sections scrutiny in 2011, Tenet defended him and his actions.

Indeed, during the official investigations which followed 9/11, Tenet lied, apparently to protect Blee and Wilshire.

Now we move to a very interesting topic: Wilshire’s July 2001 cables. Wilshire protected al-Mihdhar for a period of 18 months. Why then, in July 2001, did he send a number of cables which indicated he knew the man he was protecting posed a serious threat?

Wilshire’s first cable warning about al-Mihdhar on July 5 coincides very nicely with al-Mihdhar’s re-entry into the United States on July 4. Was he aware of al-Mihdhar’s movements and seeking to cover his ass?

How plausible is it Wilshire and others in the Alec Station would have known of the alleged hijackers’ movements? As Prince Bandar revealed in 2007, the Saudi intelligence agency (GID) was monitoring the alleged hijackers. Could they have learned from this source?

As is now well established, the GID was handling the alleged hijackers in San Diego via their assets Bayoumi and Basnan. Prince Bandar apparently paid both men directly for this service.

Basnan even met with a high-ranking Saudi prince who had responsibility for intelligence matters in the spring of 02 and received “a significant amount of cash” from him.

As Bandar seems to have been personally appraised of this GID operation in San Diego, his relationship with Tenet is worth detailing. The two were close, and Tenet had a history of getting information directly from the Saudis, not informing the rest of the CIA what he had learned

This direct CIA/GID relationship harkens back to the Safari Club days, where the CIA worked with foreign intelligence agencies to avoid Congressional oversight. The Tenet-Bandar axis seems a likely suspect for information sharing about al-Mihdhar.

Another venue for CIA/GID information sharing regarding the presence of the alleged hijackers in the US is a little known liaison agreement which existed between the two agencies. This would have provided the legal pretext for excluding certain individuals from key facts.

These facts, while circumstantial, are strongly suggestive of CIA/GID information sharing regarding al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar’s presence in the US, effectively making their handling a joint CIA/GID operation.

Tenet’s actions to protect an individual who was arrested in Yemen following the Cole bombing are further proof of his role in protecting the alleged hijackers. At this time, his golden boy Blee was protecting al-Mihdhar, who had himself become a suspect in the Cole bombing.

In this case, it’s also important to note that Tenet was protecting this individual from the FBI specifically, just as Blee was doing with al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi.

It seems that the person Tenet was protecting was none other than Anwar al-Awlaki. Al-Awlaki was suspected by the FBI of having provided support for al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar, the men Blee was protecting, while they were living in San Diego and Virginia.

Following 9/11, al-Awlaki apparently became an FBI asset.

This is extremely interesting, considering the FBI was certainly aware after 9/11 that al-Awlaki was supporting the alleged 9/11 hijackers. But perhaps more interesting is the fact that the CIA was likely aware of this before 9/11, via Bayoumi and their GID surveillance.

That Tenet protected al-Awlaki from the FBI’s Cole bombing investigation had grave implications. It seems possible that the FBI may have been able roll up significant elements of the plot if they had been able to interview him.

It’s not lost on me that al-Awlaki, as wel as his children, were extra-judicially murdered by the US government. The FBI prevented the 9/11 Commission from contacting him. What did he know about al-Hazmi, al-Mihdhar, and US involvement in 9/11? We’ll never know.

At this point, we have established that there was a CIA/GID operation to sneak al Qaeda operatives into the US; that DCI Tenet was involved in this operation; that one consequence of this operation was to allow 9/11 to happen; that the CIA was prepared for the wars which resulted

As a bit of a postscript, recently declassified documents seem to support that the GID was involved in handling the alleged hijackers. My fear is that this will contribute to a secondary “Saudis-did-it” cover story. As we have developed here, anything the GID did, the CIA did.

Thanks for reading to the end. If you’ve gotten this far, you may as well read the article. covertactionmagazine.com/2021/09/13/the…