This description from the NYT story on Peril is very interesting. General Milley describes a set of strict procedures for nuclear release that do in fact seem to require CJCS involvement, contrary to what we publicly believe and what @SecDef19 has previously described.
To be clear, the confusion is whether the CJCS is *always* part of nuclear release procedures (or chain of command) or whether s/he could be circumvented at POTUS’s discretion. Gen Milley seems to be implying the former, which is new to many of us in the public domain.
My pure guess is that while the CJCS is not legally *required* for nuclear release, General Milley was reminding/ordering the relevant officers to follow customary procedure to conference CJCS prior to any launch, regardless of whether POTUS requested said conference.

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More from @NarangVipin

14 Sep
👀👀👀
👀👀👀 Take II.
I am reassured crisis comms exist with China. This is not how any of us wanted to find out though.
Read 4 tweets
6 Aug
1/Delighted that Fragile Balance of Terror: Deterrence in a New Nuclear Age, co-edited by Scott Sagan & I, has been approved by that @CornellPress board and should be forthcoming soon. Today, on the 76th anniversary of the first nuclear weapons use, it is more relevant than ever.
2/ In the introductory chapter, Scott and I lay out our argument for why a confluence of factors mark a new nuclear age and why deterrence may be more challenging than during the Cold War and after.
3/ In Chapter 1, @ProfTalmadge analyzes the novel challenges of multipolar nuclear deterrence--both the challenges and opportunities of having to deter multiple peer power simultaneously. Hugely relevant to the US-Russia-China competition today, but also other regional configs.
Read 12 tweets
8 Jul
1/ Matt tries to make the alarmist case for why 120 new Chinese silos throws US nuclear posture-the most lethal and modern-into disarray. Some Chinese developments are concerning (DF-26), but beware of using something entirely predictable to justify radical changes to US posture.
2/ First, this notion that increasingly capable US conventional and nuclear counterforce capabilities and missile defenses WOULD NOT trigger corresponding moves by Beijing and Moscow to enhance survivability and penetrability is absolutely absurd. That is precisely their point.
3/ Second, Matt knows better. Even if China triples or quadruples its strategic nuclear force, the US still *deploys* far greater under New START and *maintains* three times even that in the stockpile. Also, B-61s.
Read 11 tweets

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