Some initial reactions on AUKUS plans, mainly from an Indonesian perspective👇
Brief 🧵 on key issues and questions:
1) reaction will be divided, publicly and in private.
Publicly, officials are unlikely to come out strongly one way or the other. We know we cannot offer a serious alternative to the regional flux. We also know that regional countries are rightly developing non-ASEAN options.
So publicly, we might see something along the lines of “we hope all countries can exercise restraint and we welcome efforts to strengthen regional stability”. Some might sprinkle "ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific" too somewhere. What else can we say?
2) privately, more than a few are concerned with:
- strategic flux: will AUKUS lead to more or less regional tension? Not sure if there’s a clear answer one way or the other
- strategic overcrowding: extra-regional powers getting more entangled with regional military affairs
- nuclear trajectory: how likely is it that 🇦🇺 “nuclear taboo” could change? how quickly can one move from having SSN to SSBN?
- cross-hairs: given 🇮🇩 geostrategic location, if there’s an increase in likely US-PRC conflict, how would we get caught in the middle, literally?
Overall, this is a deeper problem of 🇮🇩 becoming a "strategic spectator": what can we do other than watching from the sidelines--perhaps w/ occasional ASEAN cheer--as its regional environment continues to deteriorate and regional states are out for themselves?
3) Given AUKUS scope & impact, it’s not surprising that Jakarta was notified/alerted/briefed (not necessarily “consulted” as some would like but that’s a separate debate). RI-AUS bilat ties are perhaps the strongest we’ve seen in decades.
The big question (which I asked last year following 🇦🇺 strategic update):
what happens when there is a mismatch/misalignment between bilateral ties and regional order?
I wonder whether AUKUS will get us closer to a clearer answer, bad or good
"Experts note that middle power Australia has been known to take ASEAN's position for granted, and even tried to undermine or bypass ASEAN in its diplomatic initiatives." #AUKUS
“Indonesia’s concern over AUKUS represents broader worries about great-power politics that has left it feeling powerless” bloomberg.com/news/articles/…
Former FM Natalegawa, "the inception of AUKUS, like the revitalization of Quad before it, was a reminder for ASEAN of the cost of its dithering and indecision on the complex and fast-evolving geopolitical environment."
Rector of Indonesian Defense University: “it is clear that the Indo-Pacific is in the era of hot peace because Australia is one step away from equipping its submarines with nuclear weapons”.
Former Indonesian Navy Chief of Staff, "Indonesia, as well as ASEAN, should have a stronger stance and demeanor as the regional arms race and tensions are rising towards a dangerous level."
🤷🏼♂️🤷🏼♂️
• • •
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to
force a refresh
Reactions from 🇦🇺 🇺🇸mates and others have been largely positive re: capability development plans, even if implementation remains full of risks (many, many threads have been largely on this bandwagon).
“…Richard Marles has said he wants to move even beyond interoperability to “interchangeability” …frequently using each other’s weapons, equipment and ammunition supplies, and coordinating logistics and supply chains more efficiently.” #networkqualitywsj.com/articles/to-co…
“One challenge to further integration between U.S. and allied militaries are U.S. rules, called International Traffic in Arms Regulations, that control the export of defense and military technologies…”
“… Australian officials have been particularly focused recently on improving the ability to partner with U.S. forces. The U.S., meanwhile, is planning to increase its presence in strategic northern Australia, a possible staging ground for any conflict in the Indo-Pacific…”
"Defense-related sales account for only 4 percent of the total sales of major Japanese manufacturing companies, and in 2020, defense-related procurement from domestic manufacturers made up less than 1 percent of Japan’s total industrial production value." foreignpolicy.com/2023/03/09/jap…
"In the past 20 years, more than 100 companies have exited Japan’s defense sector due to a lack of business sustainability. Without reform, many promising companies will continue to withdraw or downsize their operations to invest elsewhere..."
"... if Japan wants to be an attractive supplier, it needs to make the defense transfer process easier and more accessible for potential buyers, particularly developing countries in the Indo-Pacific region..."
"Shifting to smaller, more distributed groupings not only complicates Chinese targeting, but increases the presence of U.S. troops in the arc of islands east of Taiwan." #networkqualitydefensenews.com/pentagon/2023/…
"The two countries also may be considering modest locations from where U.S. Marine or Army forces could operate surveillance drones or launch less expensive, mobile missiles."
"U.S. Army Secretary Christine Wormuth said she’s hopeful the Philippines, alongside Australia, Guam and Japan, will host logistics hubs for pre-positioned fuel and other supplies the Army wants to bring to the region."
“Tim peneliti juga menemukan, hanya 17 persen responden rutin mengikuti berita-berita luar negeri. Bahkan, hanya 25 persen responden pernah mendengar istilah “bebas aktif”. Padahal konsep itu menjadi jangkar politik luar negeri Indonesia sejak merdeka” kompas.id/baca/internasi…
We asked lots of Qs, so there's plenty to chew on. But here's a brief 🧵 on a few personal highlights for me:
1) Indonesians are generally less "internationally plugged in"
- only around 17% follow major overseas events "very closely" and "somewhat closely"
- around 93% do not travel abroad (*though this could be pandemic-related)
2) Indonesians do not know or understand major foreign policy concepts or platforms
- only around 25% have ever heard of "bebas aktif", the sacrosanct principle of RI's entire foreign policy
- less than 30% thought ASEAN is the most important int. org. for RI (G-20 gets 2.5%)