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Matthew Green Profile picture
@matthew_d_green
Sep 17, 2021 • 6 tweets • 2 min read • Read on X
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So this indictment is puzzling. It concerns Michael Sussman, a lawyer who organized the collection of DNS data from hosting providers allegedly for political purposes. Many of the companies are anonymized, can we tell who they are? (Thread) context-cdn.washingtonpost.com/notes/prod/def…
So we begin with “Internet Company-1”, which is a (major?) DNS resolver. Image
The executive in question (Tech Executive-1) claims to have been offered a position as Hillary Clinton’s cyberczar if she won, so maybe that’s a clue? Image
There are two other Internet companies in here. Internet Company-2 collects DNS data (maybe passively) and Internet Company-3 is maybe a threat Intel company owned by company #2. The executive has ownership interest in all three. Image
In case it isn’t obvious from context, this whole thread is about the Trump-Alfa Bank DNS allegations. Some of these quotes sent between researchers are pretty damning. Image
Overall this is an awful-looking story. The Clinton campaign and sympathetic executives at tech companies ran wild through private DNS data (which apparently has no protections at all) to concoct a narrative, and then dragged university researchers in to help confirm it. Image

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More from @matthew_d_green

Matthew Green Profile picture
Sep 19
Most of cryptography research is developing a really nice mental model for what’s possible and impossible in the field, so you can avoid wasting time on dead ends. But every now and then someone kicks down a door and blows up that intuition, which is the best kind of result.
One of the most surprising privacy results of the last 5 years is the LMW “doubly efficient PIR” paper. The basic idea is that I can load an item from a public database without the operator seeing which item I’m loading & without it having to touch every item in the DB each time.
Short background: Private Information Retrieval isn’t a new idea. It lets me load items from a (remote) public database without the operator learning what item I’m asking for. But traditionally there’s a *huge* performance hit for doing this.
Read 14 tweets
Matthew Green Profile picture
Sep 12
The new and revived Chat Control regulation is back. It still appears to demand client side scanning in encrypted messengers. But removes “detection of new CSAM” and simply demands detection of known CSAM. However: it retains the option to change this requirement back.
For those who haven’t been paying attention, the EU Council and Commission have been relentlessly pushing a regulation that would break encryption. It died last year, but it’s back again — this time with Hungary in the driver’s seat. And the timelines are short. Image
The goal is to require all apps to scan messages for child sexual abuse content (at first: other types of content have been proposed, and will probably be added later.) This is not possible for encrypted messengers without new technology that may break encryption.
Read 4 tweets
Matthew Green Profile picture
Sep 10
One of the things we need to discuss is that LLMs listening to your conversations and phone calls, reading your texts and emails — this is all going to be normalized and inevitable within seven years.
In a very short timespan it’s going to be expected that your phone can answer questions about what you did or talked about recently, what restaurants you went to. More capability is going to drive more data access, and people will grant it.
I absolutely do believe that (at least initially), vendors will try to do this privately. The models will live on your device or, like Apple Intelligence, they’ll use some kind of secure outsourcing. It’ll be required for adoption.
Read 6 tweets
Matthew Green Profile picture
Aug 26
I hope that the arrest of Pavel Durov does not lead to him or Telegram being held up as some hero of privacy. Telegram has consistently acted to collect huge amounts of unnecessary private data on their servers, and their only measure to protect it was “trust us.”
For years people begged them to roll out even rudimentary default encryption, and they pretty aggressively did not of that. Their response was to move their data centers to various middle eastern countries, and to argue that this made your data safe. Somehow.
Over the years I’ve heard dozens of theories about which nation-states were gaining access to that giant mousetrap full of data they’d built. I have no idea if any of those theories were true. Maybe none were, maybe they all were.
Read 6 tweets
Matthew Green Profile picture
Aug 25
Apropos Pavel Durov’s arrest, I wrote a short post about whether Telegram is an “encrypted messaging app”. blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2024/08/25/tel…
The TL;DR here is that Telegram has an optional end-to-end encryption mode that you have to turn on manually. It only works for individual conversations, not for group chats. This is so relatively annoying to turn on (and invisible to most users) that I doubt many people do.
This on paper isn’t that big a deal, but Telegram’s decision to market itself as a secure messenger means that loads of people (and policymakers) probably assume that lots of its content is end-to-end encrypted. Why wouldn’t you?
Read 5 tweets
Matthew Green Profile picture
Jul 13
If you want to avoid disasters like the AT&T breach, there are basically only three solutions:

1. Don’t store data
2. Don’t store unencrypted data
3. Have security practices like Google

Very few companies can handle (3), certainly not AT&T.
One of the things policymakers refuse to understand is that securing large amounts of customer data, particularly data that needs to be “hot” and continually queried (eg by law enforcement) is just beyond the means of most US companies.
If you’re a policymaker and the your policy requires company X \notin {Apple, Google, Microsoft, Meta}* to store “hot” databases of customer data: congrats, it’s 1941 and you just anchored all the aircraft carriers at Pearl Harbor.

* Frankly I’m being generous with this list.
Read 5 tweets

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