So this indictment is puzzling. It concerns Michael Sussman, a lawyer who organized the collection of DNS data from hosting providers allegedly for political purposes. Many of the companies are anonymized, can we tell who they are? (Thread) context-cdn.washingtonpost.com/notes/prod/def…
So we begin with “Internet Company-1”, which is a (major?) DNS resolver.
The executive in question (Tech Executive-1) claims to have been offered a position as Hillary Clinton’s cyberczar if she won, so maybe that’s a clue?
There are two other Internet companies in here. Internet Company-2 collects DNS data (maybe passively) and Internet Company-3 is maybe a threat Intel company owned by company #2. The executive has ownership interest in all three.
In case it isn’t obvious from context, this whole thread is about the Trump-Alfa Bank DNS allegations. Some of these quotes sent between researchers are pretty damning.
Overall this is an awful-looking story. The Clinton campaign and sympathetic executives at tech companies ran wild through private DNS data (which apparently has no protections at all) to concoct a narrative, and then dragged university researchers in to help confirm it.
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Last week I discovered that ChatGPT and Claude will send you their “encrypted raw reasoning” and of course I immediately wasted a weekend trying to do something bad with it. What I got for my trouble was this blog post: blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2026/05/29/foo…
The TL;DR is that frontier LLM providers will ship their “raw reasoning” (not just the summaries you see on ChatGPT) over their APIs for the client to store. But they encrypt and authenticate it to keep it safe from the same clients.
So the interesting question here is: what can you do with this? Can you tamper with reasoning? Are there ways to learn things about what’s in it? I tried a bunch of attacks including replays and side channels, both with some success.
There’s been some reporting that Meta contributed an unfathomable sum to promote age verification laws globally. This is broadly true, but actual situation is a bit more complex. Figured it was worth an update.
The original reporting was OSINT-style reporting: on Reddit and a site (tboteproject.com) but most of it subsequently disappeared. Claimed $2 BN spent, which is an awful lot. An archived version is here: web.archive.org/web/2026031409…
So this reporting is gone, but some of the details are verifiable. Meta did verifiably spend significant sums backing a US bill called the “App Store Accountability” act. Here’s some Bloomberg reporting, which you probably can’t read. bloomberg.com/news/articles/…
“Ghost participants” have been floating around for years as a way to break encrypted messaging. The idea is to add invisible extra people (the police, essentially) to group chats. It’s a dumb idea, and let me explain why.
First, the original idea was proposed by two GCHQ experts (the UK’s equivalent of NSA). For details of their proposal, I wrote about it when they put it forward in 2018. The idea has two components. /1 blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2018/12/17/on-…
First, the observation is that most encrypted messaging apps support group messaging. So a conversation with two people can be easily extended into a group of 3, a group of 10 into a group of 11, etc. So it’s “easy” to add an extra person to most conversations. /2
Meta appears to be reversing its strong stance on encryption. The first obvious casualty is that they’re abandoning and disabling end-to-end encryption in Instagram DMs.
A big tell is the statement by Meta in this article: “very few people were opting in.” Meta knows opt-in encryption doesn’t get adoption, which is why their original strategy was to make encryption on by *default* in WhatsApp, Messenger and their other products.
For those who don’t have context, Bitlocker is the built-in drive encryption in Windows. This is supposed to protect the data on your machine from being accessed without authorization. In many configurations, Windows will upload a recovery key to your Microsoft cloud account.
The problem is that these recovery keys aren’t encrypted end-to-end in a way that Microsoft can’t access. So if law enforcement wants to access your encrypted drive (even without knowing your password) they can just ask Microsoft for the key. And Microsoft will hand it over.
Globally, state after state is hurtling towards digital surveillance just at a time when we need to be having a discussion about how to protect ourselves from the surveillance capabilities of the future. Here, Switzerland. tuta.com/blog/switzerla…
There are many problems with these ideas, not the least of which is that we’re asking for-profit companies to collect even more identifying information on users — information that (even if you fully trust the government) could end up breached or sold.
What I don’t understand about all of these plans (UK, Switzerland, the EU) is the absolute mad rush. Is there a crisis of dangerous crime suddenly in 2025 that needs to be addressed immediately, at any cost to privacy? We can’t wait a few years for safer technology?