Did energy constraints really stop the Dutch from industrializing? A thread: 1/
In 1650, the most developed country in Europe was the Dutch Republic, not England. High living standards were accompanied and supported by unprecedented urbanization and agricultural productivity. 2/
Some associate the 17th c. "Dutch Golden Age" with the carrying trade, but while commerce provided some capital, the Netherlands really grew because of industry—it exported a wide range of manufactured goods, from finished textiles and sawn timber to beer and refined sugar. 3/
Dutch industry was extremely energy-intensive: to blow glass, refine salt, make bricks, and bake bread, you need heat. Most countries used some combination of wood/charcoal and coal. But the Dutch, having cut down their forests by 1640, had neither. 4/
How did the Dutch do it? Answer: they dug up and burned peat on a titanic scale. 5/
Peat forms in marshy areas when plant matter fails to fully decay due to a lack of oxygen. It's an intermediate stage in the formation of coal and has a little more than half the energy density. So you can burn it as a fossil fuel. 6/
Dutch peat was also close to the water table, so it was relatively cheap to build connector canals between waterways and "peateries." This was crucial, as peat is bulkier than charcoal or coal. 7/
Initial peat extraction in the Low Countries began in Flanders in the 12th and 13th centuries, supplying Bruges, Ghent and Ypres, but as the coastal Belgian bogs ran out, Holland took over, exporting to Antwerp. 8/
By 1530, reserves in Holland and Utrecht were dwindling, partly because existing techniques required diggers to harvest only the top layer (of 4.5m) to prevent flooding. 9/
In response, the Dutch invented the "baggerbeugel," a dredging net on a long pole. Using the "slagturven" method, diggers stood on boats and pulled up peat from below the waterline. (this intensification actually caused land to sink, but the Dutch were skilled at pumping). 10/
Holland still couldn't satisfy urban demand, however, so areas in Groningen, Friesland, and Drenthe—higher elevation—were exploited after 1580. Digging in the "hoogveen" required capital investment in canals, and was thus conducted by large investor consortia from the cities. 11/
All this did come at a cost to farming (by flooding land), contributing to the Dutch need for food imports. But this sacrifice made the Dutch Europe's most energy-intensive society—getting two times the output of British coal during the mid-17th century, by one estimate. 12/
Cheap energy became the basis of the Golden Age Dutch economy, making Dutch exports exceptionally low-cost and raising wages. The high wage-cheap energy/capital combination (sound familiar?) encourage labor-saving through invention and K/L substitution. 13/
Peat was used everywhere: salt pans, beer breweries, sugar refineries, shipbuilding, distilleries, cloth finishing, dyeworks, bakeries, and forges. Industries became increasingly concentrated in locations with easy water access, increasing urbanization. 14/
During the seventeenth century, the Dutch Republic was the richest and most urbanized country on earth. But after 1650/70, the gap with England started to close. 15/
Part of this was inevitable catch-up growth: the Dutch had the world's best, lowest-cost techniques in construction, milling, and manufacturing, which were highly sought across Europe. Rival powers attracted Dutch engineers, adopted Dutch methods, and seized Dutch markets. 16/
At the same time, however, the Dutch began to run out of peat. Output dramatically slowed during the 1660s (by 20 percent) and prices rose as energy demand outran supply. Since peat stores were being depleted at a peak rate of 3-5% per year, this was inevitable. 17/
By 1750, per capita energy use had fallen by 15-20 percent. GDP per head was no higher, and urbanization and agricultural productivity were lower. Was this the first great energy crisis of an early modern "advanced agrarian economy," as suggested by Wrigley? 18/
I'm skeptical. While the Dutch may have lacked domestic energy sources, they could import coal—the *same* Tyneside coal that London used—by sea. After all, it's not appreciably harder to ship coal from Newcastle to the Thames than to the Dutch coast. 19/
Even during the 17th century, the Dutch were importing significant amounts of British coal, which was available in Amsterdam at comparable prices to London. In 1800, coal supplied the same power that peat had in 1660. 20/
I suggest that the story is demand-side: a stagnating economy lowered energy consumption, not a supply bottleneck. Had the Golden Age persisted, alternative sources would have been found. 21/
Listened to the Mercatus panel on *How the World Became Rich.* Quick thoughts:
1) The Mokyr remark about the Spanish armada was taken out of context -- whether he believes it strongly or not, the suggestion was just a slightly flippant part of a broader point about the ...
... contingency of the Great Enrichment in the face of shocks. This leads us to
1b) Mokyr's argument that modern economic growth is sustained by increased resiliency to shocks, as a result of its dependence on knowledge, which is hard to kill via persecution and book-burning.
But it still seems that economic and political factors are really good at suppressing the generation/implementation of ideas over long spells. Why murder scientists if you can just cut their funding and silence them? Many states today aren't innovative even when they try to be.
My ten favorite books read in 2022, in chronological order ...
1) Dreadnought, by Robert K. Massie. A moving portrait of the politicians and diplomats who sleepwalked into the First World War, framed within the narrative of the Anglo-German naval arms race.
2) Apologies, one more military history. Meyer's *A World Undone* applies the grace, poignancy, and raw excitement of Barbara Tuchman to the entirety of World War I. Listened to as an audiobook, which is brilliantly narrated by Robin Sachs.
3) Finally got around to reading this after @oliverwkim pestered me for months. Most of you are familiar with the bellicist theory of state formation, so I'll just note that Tilly's explication of how the relative initial power of the landed and mercantile classes is fascinating.
Did not realize that Adam Tooze has a 2007 JEH article on economic growth in fin-de-siecle Bulgaria whose main argument is that Bulgarian agriculture, demographic transition, and mass literacy emerged under the liberal market economy of the interwar era, but there you have it.
Indeed, the spread of literacy was remarkably rapid.
The broader argument is that neither Nazi nor Soviet planning may have been necessary to produce economic transformation on the European periphery. Labor productivity in agriculture looks pretty disappointing up to 1945, but it's possible that early estimates were too high.
For weird technical reasons, I can't reply to Pseudo directly, but I think Inikori's first formulation of the "endogenize everything to trade" thesis is this 1987 essay responding to the Brenner/CT debate.
Trade, not property rights, is the real manna from heaven!
In the 'rude state of nature' without foreign trade, pop. growth stagnates, but with it, pop. growth and demand for land increase; falling land abundance => development of private property rights + creation of a landless wage laboring class. Agrarian capitalism is owed to trade.
By the end of the 16th c., surplus labor (hence Pseudo's Lewis reference) was such that only with increased opportunities outside ag. could pop. growth, and thus the expansion of the domestic market, continue.
Eleven of my favorite books on the First World War, in no particular order.
We start with overall histories. G. J. Meyer's *A World Undone* is a fabulous, sad, and gripping narrative account, sweeping from the July Crisis to the Armistice, and from the Somme to the Balkans. 1/
For a relatively rigorous perspective on the war's geopolitics, tactics, and grand strategy, John Keegan's *The First World War* is an exemplar of tight prose and studied analysis. Especially good on the opening battlefield moves in August 1914 and on the tragedy in Gallipoli. 2/
For the war at sea, neglected in standard histories—which understandably focus on the trenches—Robert K. Massie's *Castles of Steel* is essential. No other book captures the exhilaration and awe of a high-speed battlecruiser chase or the horror of an exploding gun turret. 3/
Just realized that I never noted the passing of Sir E. A. Wrigley, the legendary British demographer and economic historian, on February 24. Here's a short thread on someone whose research and writing made a big difference to the way that I think about the Industrial Revolution.
For over five decades, Wrigley was a titan among economic historians of Britain's Industrial Revolution—an area where it's hard to stand out. He was a pioneer of quantitative methods in Britain, at a time when the cliometric revolution was mostly an American phenomenon.
Wrigley's early work focused on demographic change during British industrialization. This culminated in *The Population History of England 1541-1871* (1981) with R. Schofield, a mammoth tome laying out novel methods for converting parish register data into population statistics.