2/ This by the team @BessemerVP is a great starting point
They discuss
1. What's changed that makes B2B marketplaces possible today 2. The qualities of successful B2B marketplaces 3. B2B marketplace models esp for high-friction goods
6/ This convo with AJ Rohde of @thomabravo is a good one
AJ is firmly in the camp for B2B marketplaces that the demand side is what you have to ‘tip’ first stating “you get a lot more done when the demand side (OEMs) blesses you.”
Versus AJ, Fabrice believes B2B startups "lock in your supply by offering biz a free SaaS tool to incorporate into their workflows & manage their teams”
10/ For B2B marketplaces, a couple of pts in it are particularly relevant
#3 Where the technology offering greatly enhances the user experience
#9 Being part of the payment flow is superior to not being a part of the payment flow.
11/ We are seeing an incredible diversity in B2B marketplaces right now
And they're starting to attack more complex, highly variable "SKUs" and higher consideration B2B buying decisions
12/ This evolution in B2B marketplaces we're seeing from low variability SKUs to more highly variable SKUs is very analogous to what we've observed in consumer-focused marketplaces
13/ This by @jbreinlinger which is from 7 years ago on what type of marketplace are you is very enlightening
Given AOV and complexity of B2B purchases, it would seem most will be double commit but not always
16/ Bowery metrics to evaluate both buy and sell side liquidity
"Liquidity is simply how easily and quickly buyers and sellers can find each other in the marketplace. A2-sided B2B marketplace should track both seller & buyer liquidity"
So it's public peers are 4x to 5x larger in terms terms of revenue
And they're growing 2.5x to 4.5x faster
Add in a further discount for illiquidity given Airtable is private, the valuation is prob south of $991 million
Asana has the lowest price/revenue multiple of the bunch at 6.61x which is how we arrive at the $991M
Asana is also growing at almost 3x the rate of Airtable off revenue that is 4x larger
It's not hard to imagine that this brings down the multiple of Airtable to 3 to 5x which would equate to a valation of
$450M to $750M
That'd be a discount of 93-96% vs that Dec 2021 valuation
The company is cutting costs and repositioning for profitability which makes sense in this market but given the current likely valuation, all investors after the March 2018 Series B are likely underwater
They're also talking about a future IPO but getting back to anywhere close to that $11.7B valuation would require reigniting massive growth and making that price:revenue to growth ratio look more appealing
As always, if you believe any of my assumptions in the above are incorrect, please comment and I'll update the analysis if the additional context dramatically changes the results
If you want to go deep on the space, we analyzed @airtable & peers as well as products in the space in Jan 2023
The numbers have evolved a bit but the storyline remains the same.
The massive Airtable equity funding tally was something that caught our eye then as well
If you're a fan of math, you might also like this analysis of Flexport's valuation
Bragging about headcount was 1 of the most corrosive trends in startup land over the last many years
I was guilty of it too
Somehow larger growing headcount became a positive signal of success for companies
When in reality, it may more often than not be a negative signal
If you look at articles about unicorns, you'd rarely see revenue figures but you'd see founders/CEOs bragging about taking the team to 800 by year-end
Fundraising and headcount became 2 false proxies for success
But what are the real negatives of more headcount?
It may be symptomatic of or lead to ("may" is important here)
- indicate lack of focus
- belief that scale comes from ppl not systems
- a lack of focus on culture
- a non-performance driven culture
- execs motivated by empire-building
- excess complexity & slower velocity