(TLDR: Socrates' appearance--ugly, snub-nosed, satyr-like--was a later construction by Plato, Xenophon & others seeking to rehabilitate him, & philosophy, in the decades after his trial.) 2/11
After Socrates was put to death by the Athenians, the community was split: some supporting the verdict against him, others (mainly philosophers) opposing it. 3/11
The portraits we have of Socrates, originals of which date to the 4th C (so, the century after he died), are very striking: Socrates is pointedly *not* depicted like a beautiful "kalos k' agathos" (noble and good) Athenian gentleman. 4/11
Note: (1) The satyr-like appearance of the portraits corresponds to how he's described in Xenophon's Symposium and Plato's Symposium, and nowhere else (2) those two texts have a remarkably apologetic character (they defend Socrates against the charges from his trial) 5/11
Could it be that Socrates just actually looked like a Satyr in real life? 6/11
There's good reason to think the answer is no. "No text earlier than Plato’s and Xenophon’s symposium dialogues mentions Socrates’s ugly appearance. Indeed, his individual physiognomy is never commented upon at all." The best evidence is Aristophanes' silence, see below. 7/11
Connecting Socrates' story with that of the satyr Marsyas suggests a (new) narrative template into which to insert the story of Socrates' trial... 8/11
...and, in addition, the surprising ugliness of the satyr image is meant to prompt the viewer/reader into rethinking what they thought they knew about Socrates the "criminal" 9/11
Ultimately, the revisionist project was astonishingly successful, not only at rehabilitating philosophy and Socrates, but at (literally) giving him a new face. 10/11
Here's the paper again in case you want to read the whole thing, thanks to the authors Maria Luisa Catoni and Luca Giuliani for this excellent work. 11/11 journals.uchicago.edu/doi/full/10.10…
(Maria Luisa Catoni does not seem to be on twitter, "Luca Giuliani," on the other hand, is, a hundredfold--if you happen to know that the author of this paper is one of them, please tag him!)
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I'll append some highlights from my vibecamp experience to this thread
Sitting around campfire, guitarist singing "Flowers Never Bend With The Rainfall" blanks at 2nd stanza.
I swoop in to the rescue: "A mirror on the wall--", & he continues.
Who knew my teenage obsession with Simon & Garfunkel would pay off 30 yrs later?
I want to explain something, for the sake of the profession of philosophy, the field of academia, and the health of workplace gender relations more broadly:
Conflating potential abuses of power with actual abuses of power benefits no one.
Recently a profile of me described how 12 yrs ago my husband Arnold, then a first year graduate student taking one of my courses, told me he was in love with me.
I said I felt the same, we decided nothing could happen between us, and the next day I got on a plane for New York...
(I am going to leave out the parts of the story connected to my divorce, you can read about them in the profile, this thread is focused on the power issue)
From NY, I called a number of colleagues and looked into the university's rules. I learned that there was a protocol:
I liked this book by @mrianleslie so I am going to tell you why in this 🧵🧵🧵🧵🧵🧵🧵🧵🧵🧵🧵🧵🧵🧵🧵🧵🧵🧵🧵🧵🧵🧵🧵🧵🧵🧵🧵🧵🧵🧵🧵🧵🧵🧵🧵🧵🧵🧵🧵🧵🧵🧵🧵🧵🧵🧵🧵🧵🧵🧵🧵🧵🧵🧵🧵🧵🧵🧵🧵🧵🧵🧵🧵🧵🧵🧵🧵🧵🧵🧵🧵🧵🧵🧵🧵🧵🧵🧵🧵🧵🧵🧵🧵🧵🧵🧵🧵
Helpful distinction between high and low context
Why are we so much more moralistic online?
A genuinely interesting question I will continue to ponder.
🧵on rationality:
I've been thinking about a convo w/ @TheZvi about whether rationality is a skill or a virtue.
Starting to think it depends on one's "position" in relation to the question.
Imagine 2 positions you might occupy at a criminal trial:
1 juror
2 defendant's mother
Supposing the juror starts with few assumptions about the case, they will find their mental states (roughly) tracking the evidence. For the mother, rationality is more expensive, bc it comes at the cost of psychological pain (acknowledging the possible guilt of her child).
The juror may come to an irrational decision due to failures in cognitive processing--these would be signs of a lack of rationality as skill--but (unless there is some way that the case is personal for him) rationality as virtue is not so much on the table for him.
This got me thinking about how tech optimism feels performative to me--performatively upbeat ("what will Friday bring?!") & performatively naive (see @paulg on "earnestness" linked below)--and then I thought about "virtue-signaling" and...1/X paulgraham.com/earnest.html
...maybe the performative aspect of emotion *is just emotion*...?
The conceit, in dismissing some expression of emotion as "signaling" or "performance", is that the person isn't really feeling it--that they are *not* experiencing the relevant emotion privately, it's "fake." 2/X
But what's the contrast case supposed to be? Private emotion? Is there such a thing? Emotion "wants out," it needs expression, and that's because it doesn't even fully get to be the emotion that it is until it is expressed. 3/X
The first real Greek class I took was on Plato’s Apology, with the eminent classicist Arthur Adkins. We translated the Apology, line by line. When we stumbled over a construction—many of were beginners—Adkins would gently correct us. That was the whole class, that was it. 1/4
Adkins was dying, in a wheelchair, there was a guy in the class to remind him to take certain pills every 20 mins. He died a month or so after the class ended, but he made it through. I wish I could convey the atmosphere of that class: the hushed silence, the fierce attention.
Somehow, without ever saying it, Adkins telegraphed: Socrates knows he is going to die, but he has to give this speech first. I know I'm going to die, but I have to teach this last class. We are all dying, all the time, but there are some things we have to do before that happens.