1/7 Very interesting article. A series of Chinese studies may be discovering something about the high-speed rail system that France had already learned: rather than boost the economies of secondary cities, being connected...
2/7 to the HSR may actually reduce economic activity and encourage a brain drain. Even patent applications in secondary cities have dropped significantly, according to one study, after the city was connected to a high-speed line.
3/7 If this is true, it undermines the claim that even if much of the HSR is not economically viable today, it will generate enough growth in the less economically advanced areas to become viable in the future. The value of HSR is more likely to decline than to increase.
4/7 This reinforces a point I have made many times before, including in the linked essay. The idea that concentrating investment in poorer regions will drive economic convergence is based on a confusion about what drives growth.
5/7 Poorer regions are usually poorer because their social, economic, legal, and cultural institutions prevent businesses and workers from being able to absorb high levels of capital productively.
6/7 In that case more investment only generates sustainable growth when these regions are relatively underinvested, and this doesn't mean relative to more advanced regions but rather relative to their own specific institutional capacity (what I call the Hirschman level).
7/7 Once each region has as much investment as it can productively absorb — and in China most regions reached that point well over a decade ago — more investment doesn't help. What it needs is more institutional reform.
1/4 The point of this thread is not to suggest that investment in HSR, or capital deepening more generally, is economically a bad idea. It is in fact often a very good idea – for example infrastructure investment in China in the 1990s, or in the US today – but we should ...
2/4 understand both the conditions under which it can accelerate economic development and those under which further economic development will not occur without the right institutional reforms, in which case further capital deepening can actually reduce future growth.
3/4 As a corollary, the longer an investment-driven growth model has proven successful, the more politically entrenched it is likely to become – that is certainly what the historical precedents suggest – but in fact the less successful it is likely to be...
4/4 in the future as it closes the gap between actual investment and the amount of investment the region can productively absorb.
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1/7 FT: "According to economic theory, productivity and real wages should grow in tandem, with the benefits of new technology being shared with the workers who produce the stuff. But in the US, Europe and Japan, pay growth has decoupled from... ft.com/content/974120…
2/7 productivity growth, with the latter having pulled ahead."
Even more so in China.
The problem is that in advanced and developing economies in which investment isn't constrained by scarce saving, consumption must rise in line with productivity to justify higher production.
3/7 If it doesn't, inventory will pile up as production exceeds demand, and producers will eventually cut back, and so lay off workers. Unemployed workers, of course, will further reduce their consumption thus exacerbating the demand problem.
1/9 This interesting Soumaya Keynes piece makes several important points about the success (or lack) of Trump's tariff policies, but I think she makes one important mistake in assessing the impact of tariffs that too many other analysts also make. ft.com/content/7b5303…
2/9 She seems to argue that tariffs are ineffective to the extent that they are "paid for" by American consumers rather than by foreign exporters.
But this gets it backwards. Tariffs are in fact effective mainly to the extent that they are paid for by American consumers.
3/9 That's because if tariffs are to succeed in rebalancing the economy towards more domestic production and fewer foreign imports, they must do so by changing the income balance between domestic production and domestic consumption.
1/6 FT: "“This is a structural transformation of Japan,” says an economist who has tracked the country’s three-decade-long struggle to emerge from deflation. “It is a shift from being a demand-shortage economy to a supply-shortage economy.”" ft.com/content/397c04…
2/6 Being a "supply-shortage economy" is not a good thing either, because the only sustainable way to grow consumption is to grow production, but it is important that it took Japan 35 years of weak growth and a collapse in its share of global manufacturing for it to adjust.
3/6 It's more "normal" for countries with excessively low consumption shares to adjust much more quickly and brutally, but while "slow" Japanese-style adjustments are often economically much more costly over the longer term, socially and politically they are much less costly.
1/6 Good SCMP article that illustrates one dilemma facing the Chinese economy: "While official manufacturing data for June showed continued expansion, electronics exporters in the region – one of China’s biggest industrial areas and a bellwether for the... sc.mp/l1qix?utm_sour…
2/6 national economy – said last week that a pickup in orders had yet to lift their bottom lines."
Or, as a friend who owns a medium-sized manufacturing business in China puts it: "Why is it so hard to find the happy people you'd expect to find in an economy growing at 5%?"
3/6 Analysts often say that China's soaring exports and its widening trade surplus are the bright spots for the economy, but it's not as simple as that. These are brights spots in the sense that they contribute to economic activity and allow China to keep production growing.
1/10
The FT's Edward White argues that China urgently needs someone to close down huge swathes of China's inefficient and money-losing industries, much as former premier Zhu Rongji did in the late 1990s and early 2000s. ft.com/content/9c4fe0…
2/10
In the former case, he writes, "the cuts ripped through China’s north-eastern rustbelt. Thousands of mines, steel mills and other industrial sites were shut for good. An estimated 30mn to 40mn workers lost their jobs."
3/10
White notes that today, "the share of lossmaking industrial businesses jumped from about 10 per cent in 2010 to nearly 25 per cent last year. This dynamic exists across everything from steel and cement to cars, computer chips and robots."
1/8 FT: "That said, “the weakness in consumption is more structural”, Logan Wright added."
He's right. Every month there are incremental explanations as to why consumption was weak "last month", but the problem is not temporary. It is structural. ft.com/content/7db729…
2/8 The property sector can stabilize, the Iran war can end, the weather can get better, a new toy fad can emerge, Beijing can launch another consumption program, but while these may all cause temporary increases in consumption, overall consumption will continue to struggle.
3/8 The reason, as I've argued for years, is that China's low consumption is not an accident or an oversight. It is fundamental to the way the economy works. It is China's low household share of GDP that drives both its low consumption share and the "competitiveness" of...