1/7 Very interesting article. A series of Chinese studies may be discovering something about the high-speed rail system that France had already learned: rather than boost the economies of secondary cities, being connected...
2/7 to the HSR may actually reduce economic activity and encourage a brain drain. Even patent applications in secondary cities have dropped significantly, according to one study, after the city was connected to a high-speed line.
3/7 If this is true, it undermines the claim that even if much of the HSR is not economically viable today, it will generate enough growth in the less economically advanced areas to become viable in the future. The value of HSR is more likely to decline than to increase.
4/7 This reinforces a point I have made many times before, including in the linked essay. The idea that concentrating investment in poorer regions will drive economic convergence is based on a confusion about what drives growth.
5/7 Poorer regions are usually poorer because their social, economic, legal, and cultural institutions prevent businesses and workers from being able to absorb high levels of capital productively.
6/7 In that case more investment only generates sustainable growth when these regions are relatively underinvested, and this doesn't mean relative to more advanced regions but rather relative to their own specific institutional capacity (what I call the Hirschman level).
7/7 Once each region has as much investment as it can productively absorb — and in China most regions reached that point well over a decade ago — more investment doesn't help. What it needs is more institutional reform.
1/4 The point of this thread is not to suggest that investment in HSR, or capital deepening more generally, is economically a bad idea. It is in fact often a very good idea – for example infrastructure investment in China in the 1990s, or in the US today – but we should ...
2/4 understand both the conditions under which it can accelerate economic development and those under which further economic development will not occur without the right institutional reforms, in which case further capital deepening can actually reduce future growth.
3/4 As a corollary, the longer an investment-driven growth model has proven successful, the more politically entrenched it is likely to become – that is certainly what the historical precedents suggest – but in fact the less successful it is likely to be...
4/4 in the future as it closes the gap between actual investment and the amount of investment the region can productively absorb.
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1/16
This article notes that Xi Gao's recent attack on the claims by Ray Dalio that excess debt accumulation inevitably results in financial crises "is part of the ongoing debate between deficit hawks and doves in China over debt-fuelled fiscal spending." chinabankingnews.com/p/chinese-econ…
2/16
This debate is important because it will determine how long China's excessively high GDP growth targets can be maintained. If Chinese economic activity is to "grow" by more than the underlying economy can productively sustain, the way to so is by forcing those parts of...
3/16
the economy that don't operate under hard budget constraints (local governments, SOEs, business sectors with preferred access to credit) to boost investment, whether or not that investment is economically justified (and by now it mostly isn't). carnegieendowment.org/posts/2025/02/…
1/6 It takes real effort to miss the point as completely as Albrech does. If income is constant, then it is obvious that lower prices will boost consumption. But to separate income from production, as he does, requires a very bizarre understanding of economics.
2/6 The point I made is that if the real value of American production rises, Americans will be able to consume more—regardless of whether prices rise or fall nominally. If it declines, even falling nominal prices will not prevent them from consuming less without a rise in debt.
3/6 That's why it is silly for Albrech to claim that only import prices determine whether or not American consumers benefit from trade. This only makes sense if he assumes either that income is independent of production or that production is independent of trade.
1/4 Yicai: "China’s margin trading balance on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets topped CNY2 trillion yesterday for the first time in a decade. The balance has been climbing steadily since early June", rising by just over 12% as of yesterday.
2/4 For the past year I've been telling my clients that I expected more upside than downside on mainland stock markets, and Shanghai CSI is up nearly 30% from a year ago, but as margin levels rise, it becomes more complicated.
3/4 Margin financing adds buying power, so stocks will most likely continue rising for a while longer, but of course it also means that any decline in prices is likely to be magnified, so that when the current rally ends, it could drop very sharply.
1/8 SCMP: "Beijing now employs a wider arsenal of tools to manage volatility, with the key challenge being whether the yuan can open the door wider to market pricing and secure a larger international role – without destabilising swings." scmp.com/economy/china-…
2/8 That is indeed the key challenge, and one about whose resolution we should be very skeptical. For the yuan to become more open to market pricing and to secure a larger international role, Beijing would have to reduce and even remove restrictions on the capital account.
3/8 But this means that it would be external conditions (along with domestic confidence about internal conditions, including flight capital) that would determine, to a large extent, the size and direction of China's capital and trade accounts.
1/7 WSJ: "China’s exports grew at a faster clip in July, showing that U.S. tariffs so far haven’t curtailed China’s export machine, although trade with America has fallen."
2/7 I wish we could just abandon the mistaken idea that if US tariffs on Chinese exports reduce China's exports to the US, they're likely to reduce total Chinese exports. That's not how trade works. What matters is what happens to total US net imports.
3/7 As long as the Chinese economy is structurally locked into an expanding trade surplus, and as long as the US trade deficit continues to rise, China's net exports will continue to grow whether trade with the US expands or contracts.
1/8 SCMP makes the rather strange claim that "after a sweeping debt-restructuring campaign", China is finally starting to bring its debt problem under control. scmp.com/economy/china-…
2/8 But this "debt-restructuring campaign" was not actually about bringing debt under control but rather about recognizing (some of) the hidden liabilities of local governments and shifting them back on to local-government or central-government balance sheets.
3/8 Inner Mongolia's success in getting off the government's "high-debt risk" list, for example, was not because its debt had been reduced to a low level, but rather because it was forced to recognize about two-thirds of this hidden debt.