1/7 Very interesting article. A series of Chinese studies may be discovering something about the high-speed rail system that France had already learned: rather than boost the economies of secondary cities, being connected...
2/7 to the HSR may actually reduce economic activity and encourage a brain drain. Even patent applications in secondary cities have dropped significantly, according to one study, after the city was connected to a high-speed line.
3/7 If this is true, it undermines the claim that even if much of the HSR is not economically viable today, it will generate enough growth in the less economically advanced areas to become viable in the future. The value of HSR is more likely to decline than to increase.
4/7 This reinforces a point I have made many times before, including in the linked essay. The idea that concentrating investment in poorer regions will drive economic convergence is based on a confusion about what drives growth.
5/7 Poorer regions are usually poorer because their social, economic, legal, and cultural institutions prevent businesses and workers from being able to absorb high levels of capital productively.
6/7 In that case more investment only generates sustainable growth when these regions are relatively underinvested, and this doesn't mean relative to more advanced regions but rather relative to their own specific institutional capacity (what I call the Hirschman level).
7/7 Once each region has as much investment as it can productively absorb — and in China most regions reached that point well over a decade ago — more investment doesn't help. What it needs is more institutional reform.
1/4 The point of this thread is not to suggest that investment in HSR, or capital deepening more generally, is economically a bad idea. It is in fact often a very good idea – for example infrastructure investment in China in the 1990s, or in the US today – but we should ...
2/4 understand both the conditions under which it can accelerate economic development and those under which further economic development will not occur without the right institutional reforms, in which case further capital deepening can actually reduce future growth.
3/4 As a corollary, the longer an investment-driven growth model has proven successful, the more politically entrenched it is likely to become – that is certainly what the historical precedents suggest – but in fact the less successful it is likely to be...
4/4 in the future as it closes the gap between actual investment and the amount of investment the region can productively absorb.
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1/7 Gillian Tett: "Indeed, as an IMF blog recently noted, there are already signs that many non-American central banks are diversifying away from the dollar — albeit very slowly and modestly from a high base, and mostly into minor currencies."
2/7 I wish this were true, but I doubt it. If you count not just the official reserves of central banks but also hidden reserves held by state-affiliated entities, and certainly if you include all non-US entities, The amount of US assets held by foreigners is rising, not falling.
3/7 How do I know? Because net foreign purchases of US assets are simply the obverse of the US current account deficit, and both have been rising in recent years. Foreigners own more US assets than ever.
1/7 FT: "China’s government bond market has opened 2025 with a clear warning for policymakers: without more determined stimulus, investors expect deflationary pressures to become even more entrenched in the world’s second-largest economy."
2/7 In fact China does not need "more stimulus" nor even "more monetary easing" to boost inflation and raise bond prices, nor is that what the bond markets are saying. On the contrary, a quick glance at the debt numbers shows that China has had...
3/7 plenty of both, and rather than raise prices, years of more fiscal stimulus and greater monetary easing have in fact accommodated a weakening consumption share of GDP, bigger-than-ever trade surpluses, and disinflation.
1/10
FT: "A cheaper renminbi would help Chinese exporters remain competitive in the face of higher tariffs in the US, but it could also leave China open to the accusation of currency manipulation, a charge levelled by the previous Trump administration." ft.com/content/215e50…
2/10
It seems that traders are betting that the combination of an increasingly sluggish Chinese economy and a potential rise in US tariffs will force down the value of the RMB.
But I think this is a much more complicated issue than these traders might think.
3/10
One complication is that devaluing the RMB in response to US tariffs means retaliating not just against the US but in fact against all of China's trade partners. This might simply increase the incentive for the rest of the world to implement tariffs.
1/8 As always, Dani Rodrik presents a nuanced discussion of tariffs without the hysteria that usually surrounds any such discussion. He notes that "an import tariff is a specific combination of two different policies: a tax on... project-syndicate.org/commentary/tru…
2/8 consumption of the imported good and a production subsidy for its domestic supply", and of course I fully agree. A tariff is just an industrial policy that works by taxing consumption and subsidizing production. In that sense, it is a lot like devaluing the currency.
3/8 But that is also why I only partly agree with him when he says "Like all barriers to market exchanges, tariffs create inefficiency."
I would argue that, like with currency devaluation, it depends on the underlying conditions.
1/6 Very interesting FT article: "Chinese venture capitalists are hounding failed founders, pursuing personal assets and adding them to a national debtor blacklist when they fail to pay up, throwing the country’s start-up funding ecosystem into crisis." ft.com/content/38f1e5…
2/6 Around 80% of VC deals in the past included redemption provisions, which require issuers "to buy back investors’ shares plus interest if certain targets such as an initial public offering timeline, valuation goals or revenue metrics are not met."
3/6 These VC provisions are a classic form of "inverted" balance sheet structure, exacerbating volatility by reinforcing prices both on the way up and (especially) on the way down. Once the VC bubble ended, it was always likely that these provisions would prove deadly.
1/16
Barry Naughton: "Japan spent almost a decade trying to painlessly restructure a financial system that had suffered a huge reduction in the value of its assets. And now China seems to be repeating some parts of that." thewirechina.com/2025/01/05/bar…
2/16
Naughton is right, and on an issue that is widely misunderstood. The huge surge in China's debt burden has been an enormous problem, but not because the debt itself is the problem. It is just the symptom of the problem. ft.com/content/630f82…
3/16
In itself, debt is simply a set of transfers – an explicit transfer today followed by an explicit or implicit transfer tomorrow.
In China's case, most of the accumulated debt has been used to fund investment, but if this investment had been productive, then by...