1/7 Very interesting article. A series of Chinese studies may be discovering something about the high-speed rail system that France had already learned: rather than boost the economies of secondary cities, being connected...
2/7 to the HSR may actually reduce economic activity and encourage a brain drain. Even patent applications in secondary cities have dropped significantly, according to one study, after the city was connected to a high-speed line.
3/7 If this is true, it undermines the claim that even if much of the HSR is not economically viable today, it will generate enough growth in the less economically advanced areas to become viable in the future. The value of HSR is more likely to decline than to increase.
4/7 This reinforces a point I have made many times before, including in the linked essay. The idea that concentrating investment in poorer regions will drive economic convergence is based on a confusion about what drives growth.
5/7 Poorer regions are usually poorer because their social, economic, legal, and cultural institutions prevent businesses and workers from being able to absorb high levels of capital productively.
6/7 In that case more investment only generates sustainable growth when these regions are relatively underinvested, and this doesn't mean relative to more advanced regions but rather relative to their own specific institutional capacity (what I call the Hirschman level).
7/7 Once each region has as much investment as it can productively absorb — and in China most regions reached that point well over a decade ago — more investment doesn't help. What it needs is more institutional reform.
1/4 The point of this thread is not to suggest that investment in HSR, or capital deepening more generally, is economically a bad idea. It is in fact often a very good idea – for example infrastructure investment in China in the 1990s, or in the US today – but we should ...
2/4 understand both the conditions under which it can accelerate economic development and those under which further economic development will not occur without the right institutional reforms, in which case further capital deepening can actually reduce future growth.
3/4 As a corollary, the longer an investment-driven growth model has proven successful, the more politically entrenched it is likely to become – that is certainly what the historical precedents suggest – but in fact the less successful it is likely to be...
4/4 in the future as it closes the gap between actual investment and the amount of investment the region can productively absorb.
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1/10
Important Benn Steil article on globalization, free trade, and the cost of underwriting both. He cites Wendell Willkie in 1944 as "recognizing how perilous it would be to integrate market economies with state-directed ones."
@ProSyn @BennSteil prosyn.org/LkdDyx7
2/10
"When global prices fail to reflect supply-and-demand dynamics," Steil cites Willkie as arguing, "they distort production and trade flows, killing off more efficient enterprises, fueling imbalances, and breeding resentment."
3/10
This is a point I've often made, although in a different way, including in an upcoming piece in Foreign Affairs.
We start with the widely-recognized insight that every country's internal imbalances must always be perfectly consistent with its external imbalances.
1/7 China's fixed-asset investment declined 1.7% year on year in the first 10 months of 2025, more than twice the expected rate of decline, and well above the 0.5% decline during the first nine months of the year.
2/7 Excluding a 14.7% decline in the property sector, investment rose by 1.7% during the first ten months of 2025, led by a 2.7% rise in manufacturing investment.
As I see it, the weakness in investment growth suggests that the fight against "involution" is working so far.
3/7 It suggests that the post-2022 surge in investment in preferred manufacturing sectors, such as EVs, batteries and solar panels, is being reversed.
But this leaves us with the same questions that we were left with following the post-2022 collapse in property investment.
1/5 Good Setser piece on rising global imbalances. Thanks in part to his work, central bankers and mainstream economists are slowly beginning to acknowledge that rising global imbalances can be a problem for the global economy.
2/5 Most mainstream economists know that every country's internal imbalances are always perfectly consistent with its external imbalances, just as its external imbalances are always perfectly consistent with the external imbalances of its trade partners.
3/5 But they are rarely able to understand the implications. When each country's external economy is linked through nearly-frictionless trade and capital flows, each country's domestic economy is also linked through the same mechanism. A country with deep internal imbalances...
1/4 Caixin: "A significant increase in the household consumption ratio hinges on Beijing’s ability to solve a chronic problem of low household spending, a challenge rooted in sluggish income growth, widening inequality and inadequate public services."
2/4 It is by now widely recognized among academics and policy advisors that China's weak consumption is a function of a low household income share of GDP, and that the solution is to implement "demand-side measures to boost employment, income and confidence."
3/4 What still isn't much discussed, at least publicly, is the structural relationship between China's supply-side strength and its demand-side weakness. For all the talk of boosting domestic demand, in other words, no one has really wanted to discuss...
1/5 FT: “German Chancellor Friedrich Merz has backed protectionist measures to shield the country’s ailing steel industry from cheap Chinese imports, in a striking departure from the country’s traditional commitment to free trade.”
via @ftft.com/content/a02d77…
2/5 I’d argue that what Germany traditionally displayed wasn’t a commitment to free trade so much as the standard trade-surplus country’s insistence that their trade partners don’t intervene against their abilities to run trade surpluses.
3/5 Germany’s post-2003 trade surplus, after all, didn’t emerge from free trade. It emerged from labor reforms that effectively pushed down the household share of GDP, combined with the role of the newly-created euro in preventing “normal” currency and interest rate adjustments.
1/10
NYT: "China has offset the decline from America with breathtaking speed. Shipments to other parts of the world have surged this year, demonstrating that China’s manufacturing dominance will not be easily slowed." nytimes.com/interactive/20…
2/10
"That’s because." the New York Times explains, "China was prepared. It has been seeking out new customers for years, and its massive manufacturing investment allows it to sell goods at low prices."
This explanation shows just how confused analysts remain about trade.
3/10
It also illustrates why my mentor at Columbia, Michael Adler, threatened to fail any student who mentioned bilateral trade imbalances. In a our hyperglobalized world of extremely low transportation costs, bilateral trade imbalances tell us almost nothing about trade pressures.