1/7 Very interesting article. A series of Chinese studies may be discovering something about the high-speed rail system that France had already learned: rather than boost the economies of secondary cities, being connected...
2/7 to the HSR may actually reduce economic activity and encourage a brain drain. Even patent applications in secondary cities have dropped significantly, according to one study, after the city was connected to a high-speed line.
3/7 If this is true, it undermines the claim that even if much of the HSR is not economically viable today, it will generate enough growth in the less economically advanced areas to become viable in the future. The value of HSR is more likely to decline than to increase.
4/7 This reinforces a point I have made many times before, including in the linked essay. The idea that concentrating investment in poorer regions will drive economic convergence is based on a confusion about what drives growth.
5/7 Poorer regions are usually poorer because their social, economic, legal, and cultural institutions prevent businesses and workers from being able to absorb high levels of capital productively.
6/7 In that case more investment only generates sustainable growth when these regions are relatively underinvested, and this doesn't mean relative to more advanced regions but rather relative to their own specific institutional capacity (what I call the Hirschman level).
7/7 Once each region has as much investment as it can productively absorb — and in China most regions reached that point well over a decade ago — more investment doesn't help. What it needs is more institutional reform.
1/4 The point of this thread is not to suggest that investment in HSR, or capital deepening more generally, is economically a bad idea. It is in fact often a very good idea – for example infrastructure investment in China in the 1990s, or in the US today – but we should ...
2/4 understand both the conditions under which it can accelerate economic development and those under which further economic development will not occur without the right institutional reforms, in which case further capital deepening can actually reduce future growth.
3/4 As a corollary, the longer an investment-driven growth model has proven successful, the more politically entrenched it is likely to become – that is certainly what the historical precedents suggest – but in fact the less successful it is likely to be...
4/4 in the future as it closes the gap between actual investment and the amount of investment the region can productively absorb.
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1/10
WSJ: "What saves American finance is the dollar’s status as the must-have global asset and trading currency. Both roles face challenges, though, and the more the U.S. exploits foreigners, the higher the risk they look elsewhere."
2/10
While this is widely believed, it isn't true. Foreign capital inflows don't fund fiscal deficits. They fund current account deficits, and they must be matched domestically either by higher US investment, higher US unemployment, or higher US household and fiscal debt.
3/10
For those who understand accounting identities, these are the three main ways foreign inflows can result in wider gap between investment and saving. When there is an increase in net foreign inflows, in other words, one (or some combination) of these must occur.
1/12
Weijian Shan is right: China does need to let the renminbi rise, and substantially. An appreciating currency would "subsidize" imports and "tax" exports – the opposite of what tariffs are supposed to do. Given that households are net importers... ft.com/content/5bb8ed…
2/12
and manufacturers are net exporters, an appreciating currency is effectively an income transfer from manufacturers to households.
This, as former PBoC governor Zhou Xiaochuan explained many years ago, would be a very effective part of the income rebalancing process.
3/12
In fact any policy that correctly rebalances the distribution of income towards more domestic consumption works the same way, raising the household share of GDP – by increasing wages relative to productivity, raising interest rates, expanding social welfare spending, etc.
1/8 Xinhua: "China aims to "achieve a notable increase in household consumption as a share of GDP," and to increase the role of domestic demand as the principal engine of economic growth over the next five years, according to the new MIIT plan". english.news.cn/20251127/5539c…
2/8 But while everyone in government now acknowledges the urgent need to raise the consumption share of GDP, and wants to be seen doing something to achieve the goal, it isn't clear that they know what to do. This new "comprehensive" plan "to improve the alignment of...
3/8 the supply and demand of consumer goods" seems mainly to focus on producing more and better consumer goods, as if the problem in China is that households have plenty of money to spend, and are eager to spend it, but just don't have anything to spend it on.
1/18
Martin Wolf wonders whether the US or China will be the first to abandon its current follies on trade imbalances, but I don't think this is the right way to understand the current "fracturing" of globalization.
via @ft@ftft.com/content/b5157c…
2/18
As I see it, everyone (even Europe, eventually) is relearning what we used to know: a highly globalized trading regime can only work when all major economies choose more or less the same tradeoff between global integration and economic sovereignty.
3/18
That's because economies that exert more control than their trading partners over their external accounts (i.e. choose more economic sovereignty and less global integration) are also able to exert more control over their internal accounts, i.e. they are able to structure...
1/7 Good FT article on declining investment growth in China: "A sharp decline in reported investment in China suggests President Xi Jinping’s campaign against excessive industrial competition may be having an impact on the Chinese economy."
2/7 While some of the decline may reflect “a statistical correction of previously over-reported data”, as Goldman suggests, at least part of it shows that Beijing's battle against involution is working.
3/7 But here's the problem. The massive, post-2022 surge in investment in the industries that later suffered from involution was no accident. It was the engineered response to the collapse in property investment after 2021-22.
1/14
This very good Robin Harding article points out that the purpose of trade should be the exchange of goods, and not the mercantilist accumulation of assets abroad. ft.com/content/f294be…
2/14
However he makes a mistake when he says: "There is nothing that China wants to import, nothing it does not believe it can make better and cheaper, nothing for which it wants to rely on foreigners a single day longer than it has to."
3/14
That is not why China (or any other surplus country) doesn't import nearly as much as it exports. There are always foreign goods that people would like to import, especially from Europe, and in a well-managed global trading system, even in the extremely unlikely case that...