- Signs of a major surge for opposition candidates across Kurdistan; if the trend continues, the New Generation will easily surpass PUK.
- Extremely low turnout across much of Iraq, including in politically charged cities such as Kirkuk.
According to very preliminary results: in every single ballot box reported in Sulauimani province: New Generation's candidates are far ahead of PUK; meanwhile, in Duhok, the Kurdistan Islamic Union candidate appears to be leading in the Duhok/Amedi electoral zone, for now.
Still early but the trend continues so far: New Generation appears to be doing exceptionally well in Sulimania but also in Erbil and Kirkuk.
PUK is doing very poorly but even KDP appears to be doing much more poorly than expected both in Duhok and Erbil.
According to early, unofficial preliminary results:
All the 11 candidates that New Generation filed will likely win seats.
Change movement, which once was challenging PUK and KDP rule before it was co-opted, will take zero seats.
New Generation was the only movement in Kurdistan that officially opposed the 2017 referendum for independence and called for a 'no' vote. The movement's leader, Shaswar Abdulwahid, owns NRT TV which is a very popular news channel in the Kurdish speaking parts of northern Iraq.
One thing to note: it is early and tricky to say how many seats each party have won because the special voting (of security forces and IDPs) may change some of the results.
According to unofficial results, the voting turnout in Kirkuk is only: 22%.
Kirkuk is one of the most diverse provinces in Iraq and used to be one of the most politically changed provinces due to its disputed status between Kurds, Arabs and Turkmen.
- Extremely low turnout due to an active boycott movement who believe elections won't change anything
- Special voting of security forces, IDPs
- Disputed territories outside KRG-controlled areas such as Mosul and Kirkuk.
Among the Yazidi vote in Sinjar and IDP camps in Duhok:
KDP appears to be doing very well but the PUK candidate is also doing surprisingly not bad (he's a chance to take one of the three seats). However, the pro-PKK candidate has done very poorly and is unlikely to win a seat.
Even the Yazidi quota seat which is contested differently from the 3 other seats of Sinjar is likely to be taken by a pro-KDP candidate (the seat is currently controlled by an anti-KDP Yazidi).
This is going to be the first time KDP dominates the entire Yazidi representation.
Voting turnout in Iraqi Kurdistan (unofficial):
Erbil: 43%
Sulaimani: 38%
Duhok: 52%
Kirkuk: 23%
Also, invalid votes among those who voted were unusually high.
Faisal Karimkhan, the brother of the chief of the Bradost tribe who was PUK's candidate in the north Erbil electoral zone appears to have failed to win a seat.
KDP was particularly keen to take him down due to historical animosity between Barzani and Bradost tribe.
PUK has taken seats in each of the Salahaddin and Diyala provinces in central Iraq.
A PUK candidate has won a seat in Salahaddin province for the first time.
Meanwhile, a PUK candidate has won the most votes in the Kurdish Shia majority town of Khanaqin in Diyala province.
KDP Yazidi candidates have performed well even in the Sinjar region including in the YBS-dominated town of Snuni; KDP candidates were blocked from entering the Sinjar region by pro-PKK and pro-PMF folks during the election campaign.
Unofficial results (including special voting) of the three KRG-controlled provinces of Iraqi Kurdistan:
All the 3 seats of Sinjar's electoral zone were won by KDP candidates (for which the Yazidi IDPs in Duhok were also able to vote).
The three candidates: Mahma Khalil, former Sinjar mayor, Viyan Dakhil, former Iraqi MP and Majid Shingali.
The Yazidi quota seat is still disputed.
In the KDP-stronghold Duhok province: in the first electoral zone which covers Duhok and Amedi cities, the candidate of Kurdistan Islamic Union (pro-Muslim brotherhood) has won the most votes; he has garnered nearly 40% of the votes in the entire zone.
KDP media claims their party have won 33 to 34 seats in the Iraqi parliamentary elections (5-6 seats increase compared to 2018):
This is unofficial and only claimed by KDP's media
Voter turnout in the three KRG-controlled provinces of Iraqi Kurdistan: 44%.
This is by far the lowest voter turnout on record.
Sulaimani province, each party's performance by the number of votes they garnered:
1. New Generation: 90024 2. PUK: 80100 3. KDP: 39650
PUK has won seven seats and New Generation five because NG only filed five candidates in the province. KDP has ranked third with three seats.
Iraqi High Electoral Commission is set to announce official preliminary results tomorrow. That will give us a clearer idea about each party's votes and seats.
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Sinjar: clashes reported last night and this morning between the Iraqi army and PKK-backed Yazidi forces; the Iraqi army wants to take over the offices of Ezidxan forces who practically control the west and NW Sinjar region. Casualties reported but the situation is still unclear.
The Iraqi army has vowed been signalling it no longer tolerates the presence of PKK-backed Yazidi militia YBS since two weeks ago when Turkey started a new cross-border Op in Iraqi Kurdistan; interestingly, pro-Iran militias, which YBS is formally part of, have stayed silent.
Iraq has tried to crack down on YBS before but all indications are that this time they are serious - Iraq has an agreement with KRG to remove pro-PKK elements from Sinjar. I suspect Turkey has given an ultimatum, either Iraq removes them or it takes things into its own hands.
Maybe I’m missing something but it is quite telling that there has been far more outrage in western circles about Kavala than Demirtas - this is not to belittle Kavala’s case but Demirtas’s arrest is really a bigger deal for Turkish democracy - if this is about Turkish democracy.
As someone rightly mentions in the replies, Kavala is a Turkish citizen vs Khashoggi who is Saudi (even if murdered in TR) so not sure such comparison helps Kavala’s case - or to be more precise, it might likely feed into Erdogan’s theory (which AKP media will gladly weaponise.)
Turkish military has started a new cross-border military operation dubbed ‘Claw-Lock’ against the PKK in Iraqi Kurdistan; last night, Turkish airborne commandos and special forces were dropped in some PKK heartland, clashes have equipped in several areas.
A rolling thread.
Turkish military has released this video claiming to be the bombardment of PKK positions in Iraqi Kurdistan last night:
Pro-PKK media footage claims to be KDP forces, the ruling party in Iraqi Kurdistan, deployed to the one of the areas where clashes ongoing between Turkish military and PKK.
PKK has claimed that KDP is actively supporting the Turkish attack against them.
The political, economic, and social regression in Iraqi Kurdistan is just sad and in many ways much worse than outsiders assume. This medieval superstitious attitude did disappear for a while but have re-emerged thanks to the Barzani family and their weird followers.
And what I am struggling to understand is how quite a few diaspora Kurds who are hardcore 'progressives' in the countries where they reside support this literally superstitious medieval mentality - either directly or indirectly under the pretext of 'loving' Kurdistan.
Not to mention the endless number of male Barzanis emergence every few years - note not a single female Barzani is allowed in public; this is just too backward by any standard, even by Kurdistan's.
"A senior US official who was briefed on the strikes said the building hit in Erbil served as an Israeli intelligence and training facility...The US official and another US official confirmed that Israel has conducted intelligence operations against Iran from Kurdistan" - NYTimes
I was sceptical at first but my assessment now - based on many factors (not just foreign reports): it is highly likely that the house hit was indeed a Mossad facility.