This is a history of the 1983 campaign against spiritual pollution in nine posts. It begins with the summertime crackdown on street crime and "hooliganism," Deng Xiaoping's purge of leftists, and the idea of spiritual civilization to replace revolutionary fervor.
The strike hard campaign against crime was a response to a widespread and not unfounded perception that Reform and Opening had caused social chaos. Crime was through the roof. The criminal code was adjusted. The Public Security Bureau started filling quotas.
The "hooligan" crimes included things not previously criminal but considered morally repugnant. Ma Yanqin famously got the death penalty for holding dance parties. Tens of thousands were rounded up. A few thousand were executed. Even more suspended death sentences were given out.
At around this same time, Deng started carrying out "Party consolidation." He's kicking out the leftists and the old guard. This is part of his elite transformation of the Party, bringing in people without much revolutionary fervor but good ideas. There's resistance.
He gave a concession to one of those leftists—Deng Liqun—and picked up his idea of spiritual pollution. Perhaps this was to give the Maoists something to do. Maybe it was a way to buy the cooperation of key conservatives. Deng Liqun took the lead.
The campaign widened. It targeted not only political issues but also vulgarity, immorality, and blind adoration of the West. The strike hard campaign on crime was winding down, but the moral concerns of the campaign against spiritual pollution seemed to be a continuation.
It spread to the arts. Jia Pingwa was briefly blacklisted. It was also used to attack intellectuals, like Wang Ruoshui, who touched off a firestorm with an article about Marxist idea of alienation under (market) socialism. Supposedly vigilantes attacked people with long hair.
Things began to slow down. Editorials appeared telling everyone to calm down. The criminals that spread pornography would be punished but not artists and intellectuals. You can't build socialist behind closed doors. This came straight from Hu Yaobang.
The campaign continued at a low simmer, led by Deng Liqun and crew, often substituting "spiritual pollution" with other terms. When student protests kicked off in the winter of 1986 at campuses across the country, the conservatives warned that their advice was not being heeded.
The campaign was rekindled in early 1987, partially in response to the student demonstrations at the end of the previous year. It was time to combat bourgeois liberalization through reinforcing "Party leadership over ideology, theory, literature and art."
It's important to understand these conservative campaigns and how Deng Xiaoping balanced them against economic and his own political reforms. Given later events, you can make the case he failed. But the men that took up the leadership of the country learned from his example.
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Coming across Chinese prison fetish videos through social media posts claiming them to be legitimate documentary footage, I scanned through them one night, and contemplated spinning out a thousand words about fetishism of the power of the state itself. Maybe it's there.
They are stranger than I expected. I'm not sure "fetish video" is correct. Most, despite featuring shackles and confinement, don't linger on that aspect, or at least fail, as far as I can tell, to eroticize it. They are heavy on plots intended to produce emotional responses.
They seem, going mostly off my imagination of the latter, closer to morally heavy-handed local state media productions than bondage videos. The episode clipped below is about a city mayor handed the death sentence. She is saved from execution. It is more emotional than erotic.
This is an old piece of industrial boosterism from Wang Xiaodong 王小东, who is identified with what has been called the Industrial Party 工业党. What he advocates is development at any cost, with state resources and direction leading high-tech industrialization. The essay,… twitter.com/i/web/status/1…
Competitiveness in an industrial age relies on these factors: making things that others cannot, making things better, and making things cheaper. To do those things relies on skilled technicians, scientists, and workers. China has a good supply of all of them. There are many… twitter.com/i/web/status/1…
The next section speaks directly to the split between the Industrial Party and what Wang Xiaodong calls the Sentimental Party, which embraces both the left and right. Although he didn't coin these terms, this essay popularized them.
A 2021 survey in Taiwan found the majority of respondents believed that the Japan Self-Defense Forces would be deployed to save them from the People's Liberation Army. It's possible. However, in this poll, only eleven percent of Japanese respondents agreed with the idea.
Fifty-six percent suggested that logistical support should be the extent of SDF aid. Twenty-seven percent said it would be wrong to work with the American military. Seventy percent suggested that the solution to the Taiwan issue was deepening relations with China.
This reflects thoroughgoing pacifism, I believe, but also fear of breaking with the status quo, perhaps skepticism of American-led foreign policy, and recognition that there's not much in it for the Japanese. Intervention would certainly be a disaster.
On the subsistence of the Japanese on apples, North America is not the right comparison. China loves fruit. These markets are nowhere to be found in Japan. No ladies selling mulberries or rambutan on the street, trucks loaded with pineapple (stuck on a nail, skinned, and bagged).
Look at those peaches! The consumption numbers bear out the conclusion. But, again, China is a continental agricultural superpower. You can't compare it to a temperate, mountainous island chain. That's the final answer: this is life on a string of islands in the North Pacific.
I will attach here another note about dietary conservatism, China vs. Japan. I'm not sure "Westernization" can be quantified, so let's adapt the last term to "dietary diversity." The import supermarket does not exist in Japan (Seijo Ishi doesn't count and Nissin is unique). China… twitter.com/i/web/status/1…
I was distracted from my research into the 1995 Ministry of Public Security Notice on Rectification of Drug Rehabilitation Facilities and Kunming heroin markets when this somehow came up in the results: local state monopoly on prostitution, Kunming, 1912-1949.
The system was early on attacked by Confucian societies, merchants, residents, and patriotic women's groups, who demanded that women in the quarter be denied certain hairstyles, as well as unbound feet (they didn't want their daughters mistaken for working girls).
It closed down but eventually re-opened, with more stringent regulation and advanced bureaucratization. State employees administered the brothels. Revenues funded the city. It began to decline in the 1940s when coastal refugees demanded more choice in commercial sex.
Tonight, I enjoyed reading Lin Chengxiang's thesis, "An Epic Poet in the Information Age: Revisiting Haizi at the Intersection of Literature and Science in Postsocialist China." When writing about legal systems engineering and Qian Xuesen, I had not realized he was a key thinker.
Lin lays out Haizi's engagement with Jin Guantao, Alvin Toffler, Hegel, and posthumanism in his academic work, as well as his epic poems. Like Qian, Haizi was interested also in the possibility of qigong and somatic science as more than a metaphor for information theory.
All of this locates Haizi more accurately in the intellectual context of the time. His poetry was informed by currents—cybernetics-enabled interventions in national cultural fever, and qigong-infused takes on three theories fever—that are particularly interesting to me.