Let's play the superlative game: the biggest story in global climate is unfolding in real time right now in China's EV market which is absolutely off the hook. EV (NEV) sales are headed towards 3 million this year, as ICE sales get absolutely crushed. 1/
In my latest newsletter I showed that after ICE sales peaked at 28.1 million units in 2017, China's road fuel demand stopped growing. While we can't count on fuel demand to stay flat (on-road ICE fleet in China is mighty) ICE sales are on course to be < 22 million this year. 2/
Kinda fascinating is that China's data agencies have started reporting electricity demand from the emerging EV fleet. Counter to people's intuitions, it's not much. But it's not nothing. 3 million EV hitting the road in 2021 places roughly 10 TWh of new demand on the grid. 3/
Let's place that in context. China generated 7780 TWh of power in 2020. And as I tirelessly point out, China creates so much new power each year from *wind and solar alone* that it overwhelmingly covers new EV demand. 2020: 61 TWh from *new* wind. 37 TWh from *new* solar. 4/
But what's unfolding right now in China's car market is far closer to some of the heady forecasts from a couple years back, that at the time just seemed dreamy and wishful. 3 million NEV sales in a 25 million unit market already, in 2021? That is absolutely brutal for oil. 5/
Care to make a guess where we're headed, with EV starting to blow past 10% market share in China? How about 7 million EV sales in a 28 million unit market during 2025? Through the lever of petroleum product demand, what is the signal to oil markets from this point forward? 6/
To set the context for oil, here is our current position:
Something folks may not know about me: I used to be an oil market trader 2002-2008. My entire edge was trading against the hatred of higher oil prices, because I knew, and was correct, there was a structural shortage problem. A multi-year problem. What do I see now? 8/
I have never seen the global oil market in its current position: a really scary house of cards, with enormous spare capacity held by OPEC, and "turn it on" flexibility outside of OPEC. And all this is shrouded currently in logistical delivery issues, and high prices. #cuidado 9/
We are therefore exiting the period when early EV adoption globally was unable to have much of an effect on oil demand. Exiting quickly now, more quickly than can be easily absorbed or accepted--to a new domain where EV are like a WTF? Viking Raid on ICE, and oil. 10/fin.
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Now that global oil demand growth is over, and we enter a plateau-of-consumption period of at least several years where demand oscillates (but does not fall, yet), trading price is imo going to be far more difficult than ever. Here are some themes: 1/
Price is going to stay firmer than one would expect: The end of demand growth has long been anticipated by the industry, which has been rapidly converting to a strategy of capital discipline. So, ex-NOCs, the pressure in to conform to supply constraint is in place.
Within NOCs and OPEC however, we are going to see more constant brinksmanship, cheating, and the herding of cats problem. The opposite dynamic. You are already seeing this wrt Putin. His geo-pol blunder has now converted to a cash flow problem. 3/
So IEA sees such a bright three year run through 2025 in global powergrid decarbonization, that it's forecasting renewables and nuclear take 90% of marginal growth, thus suppressing power sector emissions effectively. iea.org/reports/electr… 1/
And Euro group Rystad Energy is also coming to a similar conclusion, both within and outside the power sector two, and actually sees a peak in power sector emissions right here, right now. rystadenergy.com/news/fossil-fu… 2/
But I'm not seeing the same, encouraging outcome. Some context; I have been very extremely on board for years with the idea that wind and solar would eventually crowd out marginal growth in FF sources in the powergrid. A good portion of that prospect has indeed come true. 3/
For about 30 years now there's been a notion in western think tanks and financial market research that Non-OECD per capita oil consumption would inexorably move towards OECD per capita use. Directionally, this was right of course. They just got the magnitude all wrong.
OECD per capita oil consumption growth was a one-time, spectacular mash-up of multiple economic drivers, concurrent with the rollout of ICE vehicles. Transposing that to the Non-OECD, say, post 1990 was irresistible I guess. But it's not even useful. It's a big analytical miss.
Now obviously, oil per capita growth in the Non-OECD was going to move higher. And it is. The utility of oil is so rich that adopting small amounts would be transformative. Think: a 2 wheeler, and say 6-12 liters per month. This was the justifiably imposing reality staring down..
California put 237, 618 new EV on the road last year.
Conservatively speaking (i.e. being generous and cautious) that represents nearly 1 new TWh of electricity demand needed (0.95 TWh).
How much *newly created* electricity from wind+solar alone, in CA last year? --> 8.45 TWh.
The bitter complaint that we can't possibly run the cars on wind and solar will press onward as we create overwhelming surpluses of wind and solar, from which we will indeed power the cars. It's fun, and it's already happening.
China check-up: a country where ICE sales peaked five years ago, and where EV adoption is skyrocketing, is a country that needs to create gobs of new wind and solar. Wonder how they're coming along. :-)
The most common assumption I read currently in oil analysis is the view that production growth absolutely must come from somewhere soon, to serve demand growth that's coming next year. This assumption is often paired with the view that western oil producers are making.... 1/
...a kind of policy mistake in their cautious reluctance to return to growth-oriented drilling. I'm on the other side of both assumptions. Indeed, I think western oil companies see--and have seen for some time--a very serious risk that total global oil demand.... 2/
...will not grow much or at all, in the years ahead. Why the divergence? Why do politically minded people and oil and gas fund managers have such a different view than oil companies themselves? I could speculate. But suffice to say, the no-growth risk has been mounting... 3/
1/ I'm moderately concerned the Reddit Army, should it decide to choose $SLV as its next short squeeze target, may wind up causing some near term disruption to the global PV market. To be sure, global PV manufacturers are what's known as 'commercials' and as such, they...
2/ ...routinely hedge their silver exposure, just as an industrial concern hedges their future expected need for all manner of inputs, from oil to industrial metals. That's why I'm only moderately concerned. However, the chatter on WSB is very much about wanting to disrupt...
3... the physical market, by pushing the futures market into extreme territory. My general guess is the Reddit Army will find it far more challenging to disrupt the silver market. Unless of course we see a repeat, as we did last week, when much larger players got involved.