With every new WEO come a gazillion new ideas to reflect on and write about. This is no summary of the main points, but some of the data points I found particularly interesting. A thread on the @IEA WEO 2021:
First, we are witnessing a profound transformation in the geopolitics of energy. By 2050, the geopolitics of energy will mean critical minerals and hydrogen rather than oil and gas. This is what we will trade. This is a big part of what we will need to manage across borders.
Having said that, the geography of hydrogen will not merely follow the geography of gas. It is too soon to speculate on trade routes for hydrogen by 2050, but this graph makes a key point: hydrogen trade routes will likely be limited. Think about hydrogen in its own terms.
Oil, gas and coal are far more diversified markets than many critical minerals. But this also begs a question: is there an inverse relationship between size and concentration? I think there is. The concentration problem will lessen over time. But only with our hard work.
This chart also struck me. The scales are different so don’t rush to read it, but it makes a crucial point close to my heart: de-capitalizing oil and gas is not the same as capitalizing clean energy. Those are two distinct things. And the gap for clean energy is *huge*.
There are so many jobs associated with the energy transition. But there are also major job losses, often in different places. More than 4 million jobs in oil, gas, and coal lost by 2030 in a net zero path. An immense challenge for the just transitions community.
I couldn’t help but pause as this graph. We need nuclear to step up. Not just in emerging economies but in advanced economies too. And just to maintain what we have—to build new reactors. What a challenge.
This graph is also striking. Based on the news, it seems like the moment of hydrogen and CCUS. Yet when you look at the announced pledges versus the trajectory for a net zero world, there is a huge gap. We have barely started the hydrogen and CCUS journeys.
Finally, two images on water stress and physical infrastructure. It is an interplay we are only beginning to fully digest—and water is just one stressor. What we have is not secure for the world that’s coming. This is a map to print and put on one’s wall.
As ever, this is an immense piece of scholarship and the starting point for any serious discussion about what we need to do. So many ideas to come back to. Huge congratulations to @Laura_Cozzi_, @tim_gould_, and the whole @IEA team under @fbirol.
PS. Don't miss the IEA data visualization appreciation tweet:
Μύθος: Τα ελληνικά νοικοκυριά πληρώνουν τις υψηλότερες τιμές στην Ευρώπη
Τα στοιχεία της Eurostat δείχνουν ότι οι τιμές ρεύματος για τα νοικοκυριά είναι διαχρονικά χαμηλότερες από τον ευρωπαϊκό μέσο όρο. (Το ίδιο δείχνουν και τα δεδομένα του Household Energy Price Index.)
Μύθος: Η ελληνική βιομηχανία χωλαίνει λόγω του υψηλού κόστους ενέργειας
Ο δείκτης μεταποίησης, που έπεσε 30% στα χρόνια της οικονομικής κρίσης, έχει σχεδόν ανακτήσει όλο το χαμένο έδαφος, με μια σημαντική επιτάχυνση μετά το 2021.
On December 19, the energy ministers of the European Union agreed on a Market Correction Mechanism for natural gas. Why do we need such a mechanism? What might it accomplish?
A thread.
The starting point for the intervention is a diagnosis of market failure in European gas:
✅ Prices untethered from fundamentals
✅ Manipulation by a dominant player
✅ Sharp drops in liquidity
✅ Extreme volatility
In this context, the question is *how* to intervene, not if.
The parameters of the intervention were laid out in Article 23 of a proposed Council Regulation published on October 18.
The objectives:
✅ Do not jeopardize supply
✅ Ensure demand keeps falling
✅ Protect gas flows within Europe
✅ Do not trigger added financial stress
The @IEA WEO is always a delight to read—full of beautiful graphs and penetrating insights, a roadmap for building the energy system of the future.
This year, I want to highlight a few charts that really underscore Europe’s energy security predicament. 🧵
The increase in energy prices represents a *massive* macro-economic shock. The global trade in natural gas is usually $200 to $400 bn. This year it might reach $800 bn. Europe accounts for most of this increase on the import side. This is a shock whose ripple effects will last.
I never tire of this chart because 1 ½ years since gas prices started to get out of control this graph can still surprise me. Versus Sept 2020, TTF went up almost 25 times. 25x. Yes it then fell, but it's still hard to fathom what this means. Our systems are not built for this.
The European discourse on energy often conflates two distinct ideas: market forces and market design.
Market forces say that Europe must pay more for energy. But market design can determine how much more.
We cannot escape market forces. But we can design markets differently. 🧵
The European gas market suffers from two market failures. First, a dominant player can easily manipulate prices to serve their political ends.
No government would let a domestic market operate untouched under such duress. Why should Europe?
Second, liquidity is low.
Look at TTF (on August 26). In a few hours, prices swung by €60/MWh. That’s about $100 per barrel of oil equivalent. The “market” changed its view by $100/b in a few hours!
These swings happen often. Yet these limited trades set prices for everyone.
Instant takes can be dangerous in a rapidly evolving situation. We are learning more every hour.
But I’ve appreciated the chance to think out loud before on this platform. So here are some ideas swirling in my head about Russia cutting gas to Poland and Bulgaria.
1/ I wonder if we are tripping over a technicality. European firms are paying in hard currency. The fact that Russia is converting these euros into rubles seems irrelevant to me. (I’ve read plenty on the specifics of the scheme; I am still baffled by it.)
We sanctioned the Russian Central Bank largely to freeze its assets. We have not sanctioned Russian energy. If Europe wants to sanction Russian energy, fine; but we cannot let the mechanics of a financial transaction trigger a policy shift of this magnitude.