Rodgers tactically outwitted Solskjaer today. Previously, United-Leicester fixtures consisted of head-to-head 4-2-3-1 vs 4-2-3-1 match ups so it was essentially a battle all over the park. However, today, Leicester implemented a 3-2 build-up shape which destroyed United's press.
Below we can see last seasons fixture where both teams built and pressed way in the same way so tactically neither team had the edge (Evans and Justin out of picture in the second picture). It was all about individual player quality on the day.
However, this season, Rodgers created an overload in the build-up against United's pressing line. Partey was the third CB in possession so this completely discombobulated United's pressing structure. Sancho/Greenwood didn't know whether to press the outside CB or the wingbacks.
Below we can see just how easy it was for Leicester to play out of United's press thanks to a combination of their technical quality and overload in the build-up. This meant that United couldn't exert any control on the game off the ball because Leicester kept it every time.
Leicester, on the other hand, pressed United very successfully within an asymmetric 4-4-2/5-3-2 type shape in which the ball side wingback pressed the fullback, whether that be AWB or Shaw. This helped create defensive overloads on the byline with the midfield matching up inside.
Below is an example of Leicester's 5-3-2 block.
Below is an example of it transitioning into a 4-4-2 shape when United's fullbacks receive possession.
So, when pressing high, Leicester still created last seasons 4-4-2 man-for-man high press against United's build-up, which was much more difficult for United to deal with and play through when compared to the ease in which Leicester played through United's press.
The game was still reduced to fine margins considering United have top players all over the pitch (as do Leicester), so it was still razor right. However, Leicester had tactical advantages took what was a big method chance creation & control for United away from them (pressing).
What I would say is that the game was still 50/50 and it was won in moments with the likes of Maguire letting his team down for 2 goals and a decisive goal being a set piece to put Leicester 2-1 up, so luck wasn't on Solskjaer's side either, but it was luck Rodgers deserved.
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Enzo Maresca may be unlucky in certain regards because the expectations at Chelsea are to compete with Liverpool and Arsenal when his squad is quite simply not on that level (the XI is, but the depth behind it is not), but he can't be excused for Chelsea's mid-block or mentality.
Chelsea dominate the ball in most games they play.
And they are incredibly well set-up tactically when they do have the ball.
For example, against José Mourinho's Benfica, Chelsea set up in a 2-3-5 shape with both fullbacks inverted
Defending against teams who use a box midfield or a 3-2 build-up shape in open play.
Liverpool only press with 4 against Palace's 5.
Good teams manipulate this to get time on the ball before playing vertically through Liverpool's block 👇
Arne Slot's idea in this moment is to trap the opposition to one side whilst leaving the far-side opponent unmarked.
This can work, on occasion, and it often works from situations like goal kicks because Liverpool can position themselves where they want from restart moments.
But, in open play, the opposition can often use the overload to their advantage, even more so if they get the goalkeeper involved to create a 6v4.
Simple switches of play or short & sharp combination play amongst the 3-2 shape can get guys like Wharton facing forwards with time.
Xabi Alonso has created the most tactically complete Real Madrid that I have ever seen.
4-2-4 build-up, 3-2-5 attack, man-to-man pressing from the goal kick, & most importantly Madrid are getting effective pressure on the ball in open play!
A breakdown of the new-look Madrid 👇
Alonso has implemented some 🔝 in-possession dynamics.
A positional idea but fluidity/freedom is encouraged within the framework.
For example, Tchouaméni (one of the most intelligent players alive) has taken up a Kroos-esque role in the left half space with Carreras pushing on.
With Tchouaméni dropping outside the shape, he becomes hard to pick up within the opposition's press but it also creates another number higher on the left hand-side of Madrid's attack.
So, instead of attacking with only 3 in a triangle, Tchouaméni makes it a quartet.
Newcastle-Barcelona is another clear example of why you need to actually watch games as opposed to seeking narratives through X.
Newcastle could have been 3-0 up inside 30 minutes & finished the game with more xG even though they often failed to get shots off.
Barca suffered 👇
Newcastle primarily played direct to use their superior physicality to bully Barca (often via restarts), but they also had some superb routines to bypass Barca's aggressive press.
Here, Martín jumps, Trippier sets inside, Elanga comes short, Gordon receives 1v1.
TOP automatism.
Another one.
Barca jump man-to-man, Livramento plays around the corner into the feet of Joelinton, and Newcastle are in a great position to find the space in behind Barca's offside trap.
Plus, when they did find the space beyond (often through Elanga), they were not clinical.
Thomas Frank and Spurs main problem in the 4-3-3 👇
The idea is to create a 3v2 in the first line against a 4-4-2, whether that be with the #6 dropping low or staying in the #6.
But the wide triangles have 2 wide with 1 inside.
Hard to combine like that.
Low AND high width means your team plays in straight lines.
What is the winger meant to do here?
Spence passes to Simons, Pepe back-presses to cut the angle off to Spence, and Simons is stuck with his back to goal with a defender behind AND in front of him.
He loses the ball..
This was a consistent theme for Spurs on both sides.
Even if the fullbacks wants to play in behind for the winger it is much more difficult to play straight balls beyond the defensive line than it is to play an angled one.
Aside from Fulham's goal kicks where United could lock on man-to-man, Ruben Amorim’s defensive idea prevented United from getting reliable pressure on the ball in the game.
As the game wore on, United got even worse defensively.
R. Amorim has to improve.
Post-match analysis 👇
Marco Silva played a 3-1-6 shape with Fulham’s #9 and #10 pinning United’s centre backs and their #8’s overloading the midfield two outside the block.
United's wingbacks were also consistently pinned which prevented them from getting out to Fulham's fullbacks when they were low.
United also struggled to build out from the back and consistently kicked long because of the ever-lasting issues with the centre back inverted into the #6.
This can work because it creates 2nd ball situations with United's great forwards in close proximity, but it invites chaos.