Rodgers tactically outwitted Solskjaer today. Previously, United-Leicester fixtures consisted of head-to-head 4-2-3-1 vs 4-2-3-1 match ups so it was essentially a battle all over the park. However, today, Leicester implemented a 3-2 build-up shape which destroyed United's press.
Below we can see last seasons fixture where both teams built and pressed way in the same way so tactically neither team had the edge (Evans and Justin out of picture in the second picture). It was all about individual player quality on the day.
However, this season, Rodgers created an overload in the build-up against United's pressing line. Partey was the third CB in possession so this completely discombobulated United's pressing structure. Sancho/Greenwood didn't know whether to press the outside CB or the wingbacks.
Below we can see just how easy it was for Leicester to play out of United's press thanks to a combination of their technical quality and overload in the build-up. This meant that United couldn't exert any control on the game off the ball because Leicester kept it every time.
Leicester, on the other hand, pressed United very successfully within an asymmetric 4-4-2/5-3-2 type shape in which the ball side wingback pressed the fullback, whether that be AWB or Shaw. This helped create defensive overloads on the byline with the midfield matching up inside.
Below is an example of Leicester's 5-3-2 block.
Below is an example of it transitioning into a 4-4-2 shape when United's fullbacks receive possession.
So, when pressing high, Leicester still created last seasons 4-4-2 man-for-man high press against United's build-up, which was much more difficult for United to deal with and play through when compared to the ease in which Leicester played through United's press.
The game was still reduced to fine margins considering United have top players all over the pitch (as do Leicester), so it was still razor right. However, Leicester had tactical advantages took what was a big method chance creation & control for United away from them (pressing).
What I would say is that the game was still 50/50 and it was won in moments with the likes of Maguire letting his team down for 2 goals and a decisive goal being a set piece to put Leicester 2-1 up, so luck wasn't on Solskjaer's side either, but it was luck Rodgers deserved.
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A tribute to Arsenal's historical performance at the Bernabéu.
Every player gets a mention before we talk about the man at the helm.
The man who is responsible for this special moment in Arsenal history. The man who constructed a game-plan from heaven, Mikel Arteta.
THREAD! 🔴
David Raya, your ability to assess the press to play short & use the overload in the build-up OR go long against Madrid's man-to-man press & play pinpoint passes deep into Real's half demonstrates braveness beyond comprehension. Not to mention how you claim crosses. Mental giant.
Jurrien Timber, good lord.
Good LORD!
You locked down Vini Jr like it was nothing. Your 1v1 defending was otherworldly. Low centre of gravity, equal body-weight to adjust either side, delaying to let teammates double up or make Vini beat you.
Real Madrid are going to make the Arsenal game not-so-tactical.
They do this because of their collective quality.
Like City vs Madrid match-ups, control is not reliably achievable because Madrid can play through all types of pressure and have beyond elite quality in attack.
🧵
Real Madrid supersede tactics.
It is why they have dominated the Champions League for the last decade or so.
Their press is not bulletproof & they always suffer in moments against good teams because Vinicius/Mbappé don't defend much.
But their mentality/quality bails 'em out..
When we talk about all of Arteta and Arsenal's special tactics and things like this, Madrid don't even take that into consideration, really.
They are a team built on the foundations of players.
The only teams who can do that are the ones with superstars, namely Real Madrid.
The smartest teams press with players in 'half' positions.
PSV are set to play short, but oftentimes teams who come up against man-to-man pressure play over the press & into the top of the pitch.
As such, Nwaneri and Timber are 'half and half.'
In other words, ready for both..
If PSV play short, both Nwaneri and Timber can jump aggressively to their respective men.
If PSG play long, both Nwaneri and Timber are not too aggressively positioned so they can recover and provide Arsenal with an overload to deal with direct play.
A very, very smart approach
Arsenal combine applying maximum pressure to the opposition's build-up with maintaining a numerical advantage on the defensive line like few teams in the sport.
They are coached to an inch of their life.
The players understand Arteta's principles to easily adapt in each game.
Mikel Arteta has elevated Arsenal to a level BEYOND tactical familiarity.
Forget physicality, technical quality & the 'will to win'. It is obvious Arsenal have these qualities.
What is often forgotten is their collective INTELLIGENCE, all of which stems from Arteta.
THREAD! 🔴
The first goal is a prime example of Arsenal's tactical intelligence.
Here we see Arsenal press in zonal fashion with Akanji being the spare man in the build-up.
Stones tries to find him, but Trossard takes the situation into his own hands & jumps to press Akanji.
1-0 Arsenal.
Pep's City are one of the hardest teams to prepare to play against tactically for a coach.
But it's even harder for the players because although the coaches/analysts try to figure out what way the opposition set-up before making adjustments, players have to adjust in real-time..
A thread on Arne Slot's philosophy and tactical approach at Liverpool.
Liverpool's press can be exploited at times because they prefer to stay zonal as opposed to jumping man-to-man, but when they get it right it is the optimal way of pressing.
Why?
They apply near max pressure on the ball whilst maintaining a +1 in defence.
SO hard to beat that.
This is it.
Szoboszlai stands in between both #6's with Diaz & Salah ready to press the centre backs.
When the ball is passed to one side, Trent pushes high, Szoboszlai presses the ball-side #6, Diaz stops the switch, Gakpo tucks in so he can manage the far-side #6 + fullback.