Remember in February when Thomas Peterffy said:
"We have come dangerously close to the collapse of the entire system."
I just had a very stimulating discussion on the nature of systemic risk, market structure and leverage / shorting.
How is it even possible that GME could've brought something like this about?
Can you imagine if GME was responsible for the entire market grinding to a halt?
What's even crazier? Nothing has changed, 10 months later. We are 10 months after an event that could have brought the entire US market down, and nothing has changed. Nothing has been done. There is systemic risk in market structure that is not being addressed.
This is dangerous for the REAL economy, not just our casino markets. We are not addressing the elephant in the room, because addressing that elephant means taking on rich and powerful people. Look at the SEC GME report, and tell me they're ready to take it on.
The report was watered down because so many regulators have gone through the revolving door and are now incentivized to maintain the status quo. They will lobby and push and do everything they can to prevent hard choices to be made, and incumbent interests to be threatened.
A system that can be brought down by Gamestop is (no offense) a fragile system that should not be underpinning the US economy. Anyone pushing against major systemic changes is making too much money to care about what happens. This is serious.
We saw the intersection of market structure, systemic risk and the real economy in January, and the only reason crisis was averted was because of underhanded actions to stop people from buying stocks and crash the price of a stock. That's never been done before.
And now they're trying to bury it, and sweep it under the rug, rather than confront the difficult choices that need to be made. Anytime someone calls into question the severity of this risk, remind them of what Peterffy said - "the collapse of the entire system." Because of GME.
This is, of course, about so much more than GME. This has been going on for a long time, and will continue to do so if nothing is done. Significant changes are needed to avoid a crisis. But we all need to be clear eyed about what could have happened in January.
If you game out (pun intended) what would have happened, what Peterffy was talking about, it would have meant systemic firms failing, possibly the DTCC failing, and the entire market halting. Because of shorting, leverage and systemic risk.
We cannot allow that to continue.
The more I've learned about this & the more I've talked to people about this, the more convinced I am that this is the intersection of market structure & the real economy. And that we need fundamental changes to avert future catastrophe. That is not tinfoil hatting - that's math.
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Today @GaryGensler will be testifying before the Senate Banking Committee at 10am ET. You can watch the livestream here:
His written testimony is here:
The testimony is written at a very high level, but gives a good overview of the full scope of the SEC's activities and current agenda. I'd encourage everyone to take a look - and importantly the equity market structure reforms that we care so much about are the first agenda items addressed.banking.senate.gov/hearings/09/06… banking.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/…
@GaryGensler First question from Sen Crapo is about MMTLP - he is asking whether the SEC is reviewing the trading halt, and whether the SEC will release the results of the investigation.
Gensler answers that FINRA rules govern this issue, and that the SEC was not involved.
@GaryGensler Crapo asks whether MMTLP situation has been analyzed for naked shorting, fraud or wrongdoing. Will blue sheets be released or a share count?
Gensler: We cannot comment on ongoing investigations. I will follow-up with staff about these data requests.
This is my shocked face. We said exactly this to the SEC in our June meeting, because it was admitted by a big wholesaler on CNBC.
So... maybe... I dunno... eliminate rebates and PFOF?
Turns out, when wholesalers execute orders at a price worse than the midpoint, 75% of the time there's midpoint liquidity on-exchange. Now start routing orders there and reduce adverse selection, and that number will go up significantly.
Big changes to Rule 605 will provide far more transparency on execution quality by broker and market center. This update is first in over 20 years and long overdue.
First - it's extended to brokers with > 100k customer accounts (retail brokers).
Second, 605 reports will be dis-aggregated to produce separate reports for various types of orders, such as retail, institutional, retail auctions, and odd lots.
Third, standardized human readable summary reports will be required - excellent addition.
🧵A high-level thread with our initial view of the proposed rules, which are split into four proposals.
1. Changes to Rule 605 that will modernize execution quality disclosures and extend those disclosures to retail brokers.
This means brokers will finally have to publish standardized execution quality metrics that we can use to compare how good of a job they’re doing at executing orders, and what kind of execution quality they’re getting from their counterparties.
Today the SEC proposed the most significant changes to US market structure since Regulation NMS was passed, in 2005. These proposals incorporate many of the ideas that we - #WeTheInvestors - presented to the SEC earlier and repeatedly this year.
#WeTheInvestors have had a significant impact on the SEC’s actions - through our dialogue, our proposals, and our presence. These rule proposals are the culmination of those efforts.
But these proposals are only the beginning. Over the coming weeks, We The Investors plans to take seven action steps: 1. Read more than 1,600 pages of rule proposals. Yikes!
It's going to be quite a day today! SDNY will unseal their indictment and the FTX hearing in the House will be even more interesting now. SEC has also charged SBF with securities law violations, complaint here: sec.gov/litigation/com…
The SEC complaint doesn't tell us much we didn't already know, but really lays it out simply. He diverted customer funds, Alameda had unlimited credit lines against customer funds and when Alameda couldn't satisfy their loans they raided more customer funds.
Nice use of scare quotes there SEC - it's not a loan if you have no intention of paying it back. Now, the ponzi scheme part of all of this is that maybe he thought he could pay it back with more customer funds, but doesn't much matter. Lotta fraud here, everywhere you look.