One big-picture lesson of the cascade of failures from the CDC, FDA, and the great COVID test debacle is that American science badly needs a scientific revolution of its own.
Our 20th-century institutions aren't enough to guide 21st-century progress.
This is a piece about Fast Grants—an Operation Warp Speed for scientific funding, from @tylercowen and @patrickc—but it's also about how Fast Grant's success is an important indictment of a big, broken scientific funding system.
I've spent a lot of time the last few months thinking about the problems in the way we fund scientific discovery.
And I think one summary of that reporting is that American science suffers from 3 big paradoxes—of trust, expertise, and experimentation.
1. The trust paradox
People in professional circles like saying that we “believe the science." But the current grant funding apparatus doesn't really actually the best scientists in the world to pursue the research agendas that they themselves think are best.
2. The specialization paradox I
The U.S. education system takes great pains to train scientists to be monkish specialists—but professional scientists are typically forced to spent 25-40% of their time not doing science, but rather begging for money.
2 (cont). The specialization paradox II
This era of specialization has very likely coincided with a measured slowdown in scientific productivity.
3. The experimentation paradox
The first scientific revolution was, in large part, a revolution of experimentation. But the current scientific funding system is the opposite of experimental. It is the bureaucratic extension of a post-WWII hypothesis about how science should work
The pandemic was a reminder that much of human welfare is downstream of scientific progress.
We shouldn’t have to depend on 20th-century institutions to guide 21st-century progress. The lesson of Fast Grants is that we don’t have to.
My big-picture explanation for Trump’s crushing victory is this:
This wasn’t the 1st post-pandemic election. It was the 2nd COVID presidential election.
You can’t explain Trump’s across-the-board romp without seeing the ways—obvious and subtle—that the pandemic haunted 2024
1. Inflation was *a part of* the pandemic.
That is, the economic emergency was as global as the health emergency, and nearly as contagious. But while many voters forgave their leaders for COVID, they blamed their leaders for inflation, making this a horrendous year for incumbents worldwide.
Did Harris underperform. I don't think so. Her performance was total normal, adjusted for Biden’s popularity in a year of global anti-incumbency.
2. I think the 2024 election was, for many, an opportunity to protest the perception of pandemic-era excesses.
I don’t think I have as good a grasp on the significance of cultural changes in America—eg, claims of blue states upending society; or Biden admin attempts to regulate speech for public health reasons; or the salience of trans rights to conservative voters. But I think my frame—2024 was the 2nd COVID election— could easily extend to the cultural realm, too.
America's biggest and richest cities are losing children at an alarming rate.
From 2020 to 2023, the number of kids under 5 declined by
- almost 20% in NYC
- about 15% in LA, SF, Chicago, and St Louis
- >10% in NoLA, Philly, Honolulu
This exodus is not merely the result of past COVID waves.
Even at the slower rate of out-migration since 2021, several counties—Manhattan, Brooklyn, Chicago, Los Angeles, and San Francisco—are on pace to lose 50% of their under-5 child population by the mid-2040s. Insane.
Progressives have a family problem.
It's not the "childless cat lady" problem that Vance etc want to talk about. It's an urban policy.
Progressives preside over counties that young families are leaving. And that's bad.
1. New Fed survey: 72% of Americans say their own finances are "doing at least okay" ... but just 22% say the national economy is good
2. In all 7 swing states, majority say (a) their state’s economy is good, and (b) the nat'l economy is bad
"Everything is terrible but I'm fine" has a lot of parts to it.
But one part of it is ppl have direct experience of their own life but draw impressions of the world from media, which is negative-biased and getting more negative over time.
The most fundamental bias in news is not left, right, pro-corporate, or anti-tech. It's a bad toward catastrophic frames. An analysis of 105,000 different variations of news stories generating 5.7 million clicks found that "for a headline of average length, each additional negative word increased the click-through rate by 2.3%"
2. Extreme opinions drive in-group sharing
On Twitter, 97% of political posts on Twitter come from 10% of the most active users, and 90% of political opinions are represented by less than 3% of tweets. Because these users are disproportionately extreme, it creates a situation where the moderate middle, which might be dominant in corporeal reality, is absent online.