Tamer Badawi تامر بدوي Profile picture
Nov 8, 2021 7 tweets 3 min read Read on X
The Tansiqiya (IRCC), a semi-anonymized joint #Iraq-i paramilitary front, condemned in a statement (Nov. 7) the drone attack on the house of Iraqi PM #Kadhimi.

Which resistance axis faction implicitly backed the statement? Who ignored it?

Thread 🧵
Translation (brief): "We condemn the targeting of the outgoing PM's house which we consider an act of targeting the Iraqi state that we have built with our blood and this position [the premiership] is exclusively among the most important state institutions....
...and we consider it the biggest achievement that the [Shiite] majority acquired after the fall of the dictatorship...who perpetrated this attack aimed for a false flag operation...
...especially that we have been strongly calling for conducting a investigation to get justice from who killed our martyrs..." (end)
1. It was not shared by the Tansiqiya's Telegram channel. The last statement the channel shared was on Oct. 18 asking pro-PMF protesters to refrain from violence.

The fact that Nov. 7 statement was not shared on the channel strongly indicate that not all key members concurred.
2. Who likely supported it:

There is some evidence from Telegram that this could have been supported by: Badr Org. (Baa), Harakat al-Nujaba (Nujaba TV/Qaher), and Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq (Ahad TV). The media platforms affiliated with those groups shared the Nov. 7 Tansiqya statement.
3. Who might have not?

Kata'ib Hezbollah is unlikely to have supported it. Why? Usually, Kaf, a KH-affiliated Telegram channel, shares Tansiqiya statements. But it did not this time. The last time it did share a Tansiqiya statement was on Oct. 18.

Sabereen News did not share.

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More from @Tamerbadawi1

May 20, 2022
'The interior minister of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) secretly visited Iran this week and signed several security agreements with Tehran officials, a source close to Iraq's ruling elites told The New Arab.'
english.alaraby.co.uk/news/iraqi-kur…
'Rebar Ahmed, the candidate of the ruling Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) for Iraq's presidency, spoke with Iranian officials on key security and border issues affecting Tehran, including the presence of a US airbase near Erbil, Iraqi-Kurdistan.'
'The KRG and Iran also agreed that Harir Airbase, a military base near Erbil hosting the US and the coalition forces that was targeted in recent months, will be overseen by the Iraqi federal government and the airbase will only be used for duties that Baghdad demands...'
Read 4 tweets
May 17, 2022
Please read my latest for @SadaJournal: I argue that a major armed clash between the Sadrist movement and Iran-allied paramilitary groups risks further aggravating tribal violence in southern Iraq and vice versa.
carnegieendowment.org/sada/87147
Data compiled from @ACLEDINFO shows that Iraq's three southern governorates Basra, Thi Qar, and Maysan are seeing historical high levels of incidents of tribal violence, particularly in Maysan where they have been skyrocketing. Image
Elections appeared to temper tribal violence in the south in the run up to polls, but that wasn't the case of Maysan. ACLED's recorded incidents show that Maysan's incidents even eclipsed Basra.
Read 17 tweets
Feb 2, 2022
Two things to look at: 1) UAE's engagement w Israel has a cost in Iran, and for Iran to make itself relevant in the run-up to the 5th talks w Saudi in Iraq, such a strike could be useful. 2) Frustration felt by resistance groups in Iraq from politics need to be channeled somehow.
But what if political frustration was replaced by content thanks to electoral gain? That would have put the resistance on a path of greater access 2 resources (let's see the upcoming gov.) and empowerment. So what's the difference? There are differences. This is food for thought.
Strikes against UAE come when Turkish posts in Ninewa are also under increased resistance fire. Those have been increasing for a while. But Attacks on both find reasons in Iraq (pol. frustration): Taqadum+Azm rise is attributed to the Turkish-Emirati rapprochement.
Read 4 tweets
Jan 28, 2022
Thread 🧵

Abu Ali al-Askari, security spox of KH makes a statement:

1) Congratulates the Yemeni Ansar/Houthis for targeting the UAE & KSA and attributes "victories" to the resistance axis as a whole. Asks resistance to be on stand by in case adversaries capitulate. Image
2) Accuses those who "rigged elections" of targeting BGD's airport. Askari calls upon those who are faithful in the ISF as well as PMF security directorate to investigate.
3) He points out to increasingly frequent attacks that target the ISF and the PMF in Anbar and accuses gov. actors of conducting them.
Read 8 tweets
Dec 22, 2021
Two key winners from Iraq's elections are Muqtada Sadr & Akram Kabi. Two Sadrists leading v. different paramilitaries. There could be short-term fragile convergence btw. them, yet their parallel rise brings risks, I argue in my latest for @MiddleEastEye
middleeasteye.net/opinion/iraq-e…
Sadr & Kabi took radically different decisions towards elections. Sadr v. heavily invested in it and Kabi kept his group's hands-off policy. Kabi's group, Nujaba, was careful in media over how it sided w/ its allies in the elections dispute. @MiddleEastEye
middleeasteye.net/opinion/iraq-e…
Once Sadr won the elections he felt more empowered to repeat his paramilitary disarmament call & even cut ties with PMF's Muhammadawi. At the same time, AAH and KH were really invested in mobilizing their partisans in their elections cause. @MiddleEastEye
middleeasteye.net/opinion/iraq-e…
Read 10 tweets
Nov 8, 2021
Keep an eye on this very interesting rumor: PM #Kadhimi, AAH SG Khazali, and KH SG Hamidawi allegedly in one room to sort out the drone attack crisis.
Awaiting more confirmation, the rumor seems to be partially correct; President Salih, the PM, and the Shia Coordination Framework leaders met (at least this means AAH's Khazali was present).
Sabereen News responds to me saying that "no faction attended any SCF meeting" (implying that KH SG Hamidawi was not present in a meeting with #Kadhimi).
Read 4 tweets

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