This is a very timely and important contribution to the debate on what, exactly, Article 16 allows the U.K. (or, indeed, the EU) to do. Some key points.
This para makes the point that A16 does not on its face permit derogation from express legal obligations. It makes the point that there are different types of derogation: a complete derogation, or eg a derogation from an obligation matched with compensation for not performing it.
Art 16 is not a renegotiation clause. It is about *temporary* solutions, to last for as little time as possible.
(It follows that it is not and cannot be a vehicle for addressing complaints about the structure of the Protocol or the inherent nature of its obligations: eg the role of the ECJ or the obligations in relation to State aid, customs, and goods regulation.)
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The authors rightly IMO point out that the EU can invoke dispute resolution if it thinks Art 16 has been misused.
(See also domestic judicial review in the U.K. courts and action which the EU has an unfettered right to do anyway eg terminate the TCA on 1 year’s notice.)
This is I think a persuasive reading of Article 16.
On some textual aspects: the authors flesh out a point I have made to the effect that the “serious difficulties” can’t be inevitable consequences of the Protocol itself: -
This is an interesting point: the difficulties must be due to the Protocol, so you have to compare them to a counterfactual without the Protocol. If the difficulties would have existed anyway, because of Brexit, A16 won’t help you.
This is on the nail on “trade diversion”: the things that the current government is pointing do probably don’t count.
Two interesting points on “strictly necessary”. 1. The measure must be capable of remedying the difficulty, without disturbing the GFA.
2. If harmonisation (eg of SPS standards) is a solution to the “difficulties” then that is the route that must be taken: in such a case Article 16 measures can’t be “strictly necessary”.
The article shows why, as told to @pmdfoster, the current government is hunting around for rather a lot of legal advice at the moment.
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1. It is incorrect to say that mobility arrangements are an "EU competence". Plenty of EU member states have mobility agreements with third countries.
What is true, and is perhaps what de Fossard is (inaccurately) trying to get at, is that there is debate within the EU as to how mobility agreements with the UK should be handled, with the Commission trying to assert its competence (as it tends to do).
To show why it’s poor, all I need to do is to refer him to a few paragraphs of the judgment setting out what was the legal issue that @UKSupremeCourt had to resolve.
To summarise the summary: legislation requires an environmental impact assessment (EIA); the local authority decided that the EIA didn’t need to include an assessment of the impact on the climate of oil produced by the site; was it lawful for it to take that view?
The 🐘 in the room that it fails to confront (though sometimes hints at): that companies operate in a world where the public expects them to uphold standards in conduct and recruitment and they will suffer *commercially* if they don’t.
An example is the hand-wringing discussion of the growth of ESG funds that simply fails to explain why they’ve grown (the obvious answer being the inconvenient one that they respond to public demand).
Others - see eg - have dealt with the “no big negative impact” claim here (and it isn’t “assume”: it’s looking at the evidence and applying standard analysis). But a couple of points on “and so little use has been made of the opportunities [Brexit] offers”
The current government has taken - in rafts of legislation since 2019 - enormous powers to change EU regulatory rules. That was so even before the Retained EU Law Act (REULA) gave them even greater powers to do so, largely without needing to involve Parliament.
Have they used them? Despite the huge political pressure on them, and every incentive on individual ministers, to find “Brexit opportunities”, hardly at all.
The concerns set out by @GeorgeMonbiot here have powerful and authoritative backing from the 2022 @CMAgovUK report into children’s care. Its conclusion:
Since then, the inability of the children in care system to deal adequately with children in care with complex needs has led to an explosion in “Deprivation of Liberty Orders” (DOLs) - so many that there is now a special court to deal with them. judiciary.uk/launch-of-nati…
Some brief comments on the European Commission’s proposal to get a mandate to negotiate a youth mobility agreement with the UK. ec.europa.eu/commission/pre…
1. The EU is not there yet. The mandate has to be agreed by the Council of Ministers: probably by qualified majority. And it isn’t clear whether a final agreement would need to be ratified by all Member States as well as the EU itself.
2. If the EU does agree a mandate, that is likely to slam the door on any attempt by the UK to negotiate youth mobility agreements with individual Member States (because they have a duty of sincere cooperation). So any agreement would have to cover (say) 🇧🇬 as well as (say) 🇫🇷.