Thread by @usacac

THE 1941 GHQ MANEUVERS (Part I)

In 1941, the @USArmy held the largest exercises ever conducted in our history – the 1941 GHQ Maneuvers.

These exercises were a means of testing assumptions made during the Interwar Years when developing new doctrine, or assumptions made when changing the organizational structure, and when selecting new equipment and weapons in the time leading up to US involvement in WWII.

These exercises also provided a means of testing Officers, particularly Field Grade Officers, who would soon be called upon to direct the fate of the largest American military force in US history.

The 1941 GHQ Maneuvers were the culminating events of an incredible pre-war mobilization period at the tail end of the Interwar Years.

The Army Chief of Staff at this time was General George C. Marshall. Twenty years earlier, Marshall had been a Colonel in WWI – an experience that would influence his approach to building the Army we would need.

Once it was decided the US would enter the First World War, it would take a year and a half before we would have “an American field army capable of mounting an offensive on the Western Front.”

This time, GEN Marshall would have something no other Army Chief of Staff had ever had – a period of mobilization that actually preceded the formal declaration of war. And this is a really important fact – we were not at war yet.

Germany invaded Poland on 1 September 1939, launching World War II.

It would be more than 2 years from that point before the Japanese would attack the US at Pearl Harbor.

Marshall had another advantage – a “secret weapon” – Lieutenant General Lesley J. McNair.

(Ok, he wasn't really a secret. But he was instrumental.) @MCalhoun47

McNair was tasked with Army training and he intended for the maneuvers to provide smaller units vital experience in teamwork and combined arms.

Marshall wanted the maneuvers to be “combat college for troop leading” – a place where mistakes can be made and corrected during the exercises, not during battle. This is how we learn to apply doctrine effectively. @USArmyDoctrine @usacactraining @doctrinatrix_C2

This was not the first time we conducted maneuvers like this. Although much smaller in scale, we had conducted maneuvers throughout the 1920s and 1930s. And then the 1940 Maneuvers were a bit of a rude awakening.

While many believed we were making sufficient strides in planning and preparation for another war in Europe, the 1940 summer encampments had demonstrated beyond doubt that the United States was virtually defenseless.

Reading about the 1940 Maneuvers, the American public was shocked to learn units used trucks with the word “TANK” painted on the sides, Springfield rifles labeled “.50 CALIBRE”, and simulated anti-tank guns made from drainpipe.

By the end of the 1940 Maneuvers, Congress authorized the War Department to call up 300,000 National Guardsmen and Reservists for 12 months in federal service. A few weeks later the Selective Service Act cleared and the Army could draft up to 900,000 men for 12 months of service.

“The National Guard’s make-believe guns spoke louder in Congress than they did on the maneuver field.”

A shortage of trained and capable Officers was another problem. Since WWI, there was a logjam of maybe 4200 Officers, mostly Captains and Majors, who just could not make headway in their career progression largely because of the way promotions were being managed.

This was frustrating for many as they watched “inept officers [have] no trouble retaining their rank” while “talented young men had no means of advancing.”

In the summer of 1940, Congress approved a War Department plan to automatically promote Active-Duty Officers according to a schedule that was based on time in service.

Before this, throughout the Interwar Years, promotions were based on seniority and all Officers were in a single promotion list. It didn't matter the Branch of job.

The automatic promotions essentially shoved Majors forward en masse, with the idea being that many would still be young enough to be useful as Lieutenant Colonels. (That logjam in promotions had lasted almost the entire Interwar Period.)

Congress also authorized temporary promotions to and within General Officer ranks. This was done in an effort to fill key positions so the Army could expand properly, with proper leadership in place.

Interestingly, this is a practice the Army does not typically use except during wartime, and we were not at war yet.

Of all the problems the @USArmy faced during this time period, the shortage of time would be the greatest struggle. When we had the time to prepare, the funding was insufficient – and now that money was available, we were running out of time.

McNair was determined to produce the best-trained Army in US history no matter what. The “training program was carefully integrated and progressively structured, even with the need for haste.”

Beginning in 1940-1941, McNair’s plan would have training start with the individual soldier and then progress to successively larger units, step by step.

Soldiers that entered the Army in 1940-41 would begin with a mobilization training program that lasted for 13 weeks. Up until March 1941, soldiers entering the Army would then go on to their permanent units after their mobilization training was complete.

After March 1941, most soldiers entering the Army would complete their mobilization training program and then go to one of 12 replacement training centers. This would free up the tactical units to engage in more advanced training.

Mobilization training would start with a few weeks of “basic training” that involved physical training (PT), instruction in fundamental military knowledge, and an introduction to rudimentary discipline and Army life. Very little was spent on formalities such as close-order drill.

Basic training provided practical knowledge – things like map reading, sanitation, and first aid.

The second phase of mobilization training would train recruits in their service specialties – their MOS. They would also learn how to function as part of a small unit.

If slated to become a rifleman, a soldier would learn to fire his weapon and fulfill his role in squad, platoon, and company tactics. Other soldiers learned to drive, maintain vehicles, serve artillery pieces, cook, and so forth.

At the same time, some officers were selected to attend service schools that were operated by the different combat arms. This was especially encouraged of National Guard and Reserve Officers. @ArmorSchool @CavalryCourse @USAFAS

These courses provided officers with general instruction in the art of command as well as technical training relevant to their Branches. Remember, we started promoting faster to fill out the Army we were expanding.

Division Commanders and Division Staff Officers could attend special 2-month courses offered at the Command and General Staff School as well. @USACGSC

Once soldiers had mastered their individual skills and their roles in small units involving minor tactics, the mobilization training phase ended and the combined training phase began.

The combined training phase was created to develop combined arms teamwork and this would lead to “the forging of field-worthy infantry divisions.”

What kinds of things would soldiers learn in the combined training phase?

Infantry units would learn to request artillery fire and artillery units would learn to deliver that request. Engineering units would perform repairs and demolitions for the other arms. Supply units would gain experience in sustaining combat units.

The focus was largely on the development of the Regimental Combat Team (RCT) which was an infantry regiment reinforced by a battalion of field artillery. Roughly 2/3 of the combined training phase (13 of 16 weeks) would be devoted to the RCT.

The majority of this training took place in the field, where the RCTs would conduct a series of controlled maneuvers of increasing complexity that introduced different types of missions one by one.

By “controlled” we mean “scripted” – this may seem counterintuitive to some, but this is an important part of the process. Before we can effectively apply doctrine to military operations, we have to understand it and this type of training is an important step. @USArmyDoctrine

The very first exercise for the RCT would be simply moving the RCT from one place to another, which is by no means as simple as it sounds, especially when first getting started.

@OPSGRP_NTC @HohenfelsJMRC @OpsGp_Jrtc @MCTP_OGBravo @MCTP_OGCharlie @JRTC_TF1 @TheCOG_Oscar6

Later, the soldiers would learn to deploy the RCT, which was essentially a sub-divisional task force. They would practice attack, defense, and withdrawal under pressure. Building competence and confidence while learning to fully appreciate doctrine.

The RCT field exercises would end with a free (as opposed to "controlled") maneuver period between regiments, testing an RCT’s ability to function as “a well-orchestrated combination of elements.”

Once these units had demonstrated sufficient proficiency, they would move on to about 4 weeks of division level training. In this part of the combined training phase the process would be repeated but at the division level.

Since the regimental level training had been conducted with such emphasis, it became easier for trained soldiers and officers to adapt that knowledge to higher echelons, thus the difference in the 13 vs 3-4 week training phases.

The division level training would continue for a few weeks until the unit could demonstrate capabilities of maneuvering in the field and fighting simulated battles against other divisions. At the end of the division training, the combined training phase would be complete.

Our training for WWI had never been taken to this point, so this was new territory for the @USArmy and it was about to exceed even this point.

The GHQ summer training schedule for 1941 included combining divisions into corps, and combining corps into field armies, with free maneuvers punctuating each phase.

Free maneuvers mean non-scripted, but that does not mean without proper military planning or a storyline off of which to base that planning. @USARMYMCTP @MCTP_OGBravo @MCTP_OGCharlie @OpsGp_Jrtc @JRTC_TF1 @TheCOG_Oscar6 @HohenfelsJMRC

McNair believed “… these steps are the foundation of military efficiency. They can be hurried or slighted only at a price.”

And many steps would be hurried and slighted, or omitted altogether, because of time and scarcity of resources – but in theory, “McNair’s training program was the best that the US Army had ever pursued.”

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