1/6
Chinese consumption growth in October surprised on the upside, with annualized month-on-month growth (5.28%) exceeding that of industrial production (4.78%) by 0.5 percentage points. That's fine, but it's not nearly enough.
scmp.com/economy/china-… via @scmpnews
2/6
Consider that retail sales for the first ten months of 2021 grew by an average of 4.0% a year in the past two years, while industrial production grew in that period by an average of 6.3%. This means that the consumption imbalance is much worse today than it was two years ago.
3/6
If consumption growth continues to outpace production growth, can the former grow fast enough relative to the latter that next year the consumption imbalance is no worse than it was in 2019?
4/6
The math is pretty easy, and depends on how much GDP grows next year, but basically annual retail sales growth must outpace annual growth in industrial production by roughly 4.7 percentage points next year to get us back to 2019 levels.
5/6
Is that likely? In the first ten months of this year, when most of the reversal in 2020's consumption contraction has taken place, the gap between the two was only 4.0 percentage points, and in the last month, the gap has dropped to half a percentage point.
6/6
That makes it pretty clear that unless Beijing takes dramatic steps to accelerate the rebalancing process, it is unlikely that we will return to 2019 levels of imbalance by 2022, or even 2023.

• • •

Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to force a refresh
 

Keep Current with Michael Pettis

Michael Pettis Profile picture

Stay in touch and get notified when new unrolls are available from this author!

Read all threads

This Thread may be Removed Anytime!

PDF

Twitter may remove this content at anytime! Save it as PDF for later use!

Try unrolling a thread yourself!

how to unroll video
  1. Follow @ThreadReaderApp to mention us!

  2. From a Twitter thread mention us with a keyword "unroll"
@threadreaderapp unroll

Practice here first or read more on our help page!

More from @michaelxpettis

16 Nov
1/6
There are two very different types of “wasted” infrastructure spending by the government, and each has a different impact on the overall economy. One kind of waste consists of spending $110 of resources and labor to produce...

wsj.com/articles/who-w… via @WSJopinion
2/6
something that raises economic productivity by $100. In that case the country is poorer overall by $10.

Another very different kind of waste consists of spending $90 of resources and labor and $20 in bureaucratic costs (including graft) to produce something...
3/6
that raises economic productivity by $100. In that case the country is still richer by $10, but there has also been a $20 transfer within the country from one sector of the economy to another.
Read 6 tweets
15 Nov
1/10
In October China's economy continued to rebalance towards consumption, as in recent months, but much too slowly to make up for the deep worsening of the imbalance that occurred last year. Retail sales were up in October by 4.9% compared to last year.

reuters.com/world/china/ch…
2/10
They rose by an average of 4.6% a year compared to 2019. This was higher than consensus expectations, but still fairly low. During the first ten months of 2021, retail sales were up by 14.9% compared to last year and by an average of 4.0% a year compared to 2019.
3/10
Industrial production was up in October by 3.5% compared to last year and by an average of 5.2% a year compared to 2019. This was also higher than expectations, but also still fairly low.
Read 10 tweets
14 Nov
1/3
Interesting article. There are two important points I think it illustrates. First, Beijing is already starting to ease growth constraints in the property sector. This is because not to do so would mean much slower growth in 2022 than it can tolerate.
ft.com/content/b946f5…
2/4
Second, state developers seem to be expanding their share of the market at the expense of private developers. This is no accident.
3/4
As long as much of the investment in the property sector is speculative or non-productive, enterprises that do not operate under hard-budget constraints must expand their share at the expense of enterprises that do.
Read 4 tweets
12 Nov
1/4
Good article, reflecting what I think is an emerging, if still subdued, consensus in China's financial community. Among other things it points out that "The effects of China’s long-running campaign to stamp out speculation in...
caixinglobal.com/2021-11-11/in-…
2/4
the residential property market, control prices and rein in the excessive debt of real-estate developers have become more obvious this year. Government and industry data show sales growth has plummeted as have investment and land acquisitions by property companies."
3/4
That was always the problem which for so long many analysts, policy advisors and policymakers had failed to understand. Speculative activity and the surge in Chinese debt ratios weren't simply unfortunate accidents caused by a few bad apples.
Read 4 tweets
12 Nov
1/6
From @M_C_Klein's important article on Janos Kornai: "For Kornai, the essential feature of the 'capitalist' economies is that businesses face 'hard budget constraints'."
ft.com/content/9d842b…
2/6
The constraint: "If they do not make money enough from their operations, they need to raise funds from banks or the capital markets. And if they can’t raise funds, they go bust."
3/6
In contrast, he points out, enterprises that operate under soft budget constrains "had unlimited financial support from the government [and] could always 'afford' to employ workers, invest in physical capital and accumulate raw materials."
Read 6 tweets
11 Nov
1/4
Unfortunately trade negotiators in most countries are still stuck within an obsolete trade framework in which trade imbalances are mostly caused by implicit and explicit trade restrictions.
scmp.com/news/china/dip… via @scmpnews
2/4
If that were still the case, policies aimed at opening up markets and liberalizing previously-restricted sectors might help rebalance trade and increase the economic benefits of greater global integration.
3/4
But that is no longer the case, and hasn't been since at least the 1980s. The reason for deeply unbalanced trade has primarily to do with domestic savings imbalances and distortions in some countries in the distribution of income. It has little to do with trade restrictions.
Read 4 tweets

Did Thread Reader help you today?

Support us! We are indie developers!


This site is made by just two indie developers on a laptop doing marketing, support and development! Read more about the story.

Become a Premium Member ($3/month or $30/year) and get exclusive features!

Become Premium

Too expensive? Make a small donation by buying us coffee ($5) or help with server cost ($10)

Donate via Paypal

Thank you for your support!

Follow Us on Twitter!

:(