A characteristic common to evolving smart/digital sights is the necessity for the fire control system to control the release of the shot in some modes.
You can see on my 📸 of SMASH in the orange dummy that this is more than “just a sight”.
The patent documents confirm this. 1/
Refer to the “Firing Actuator”. Similar on concept to a tank fire control system, this iteration of sight, in some modes, only releases the shot once the first has pulled the trigger *&* the prerequisites for shot release have been met (e.g. barrel passing in front of target). 2/
As can be seen, this kind of system requires more than level 1 integration into a convenient rail mount to the rifle. It requires an interface with the rifle’s mechanical fire control system (sear, hammer, etc). Otherwise the shot cannot be released. 3/
Okay, so what? Without arguing for or against the efficacy of such smart/digital fire control systems, we’re brought rather neatly to my favourite: #neverabullpup
Why? It comes down to the comparative physical displacement of the trigger to the fire control system. 4/
To release the shot, the trigger, once pulled, mechanically disengages the sear allowing the hammer, now released, to fly forward to hit the back of the firing pin. Conventionally configured rifles locate the trigger/sear/hammer in immediate proximity. Not so on bullpups /5
This is why triggers on almost all bullpup rifles are “mushy” compared to conventionally configured rifles. This mushiness becomes more pronounced the further the trigger is located from the mechanical fire control unit/mechanism. Worse still with a progressive trigger. /6
Bullpup triggers, whilst pretty average, are “good enough” for combat applications. For a lot of users, their (bullpup) service rifle will be the only rifle they use, so training can compensate for a technically sub-standard trigger.
Hang on: wasn’t this about smart sights? /7
Absolutely! As mentioned, smart sights are closer to AFV fire control systems than to a traditional optic sight. They do more than bolt onto a rail.
What happens if you’re an army w/a largely orphan fleet of bullpup rifles that have been “good enough” for decades? /8
In an era of smart sights? Your bullpup fleet lags further behind in terms of technical relevance.
Small fleets w/little engineering depth for technical integration drive up costs & introduce capability risk as they fall further behind. Doesn’t mean you can’t win, oc. /9
Like most engineering problems (AJAX), the integration challenges presented by bullpups wrt smart sights can be solved with clever engineering, elaborately resourced schedules, & lots of $£€.
Bullpups continue to “solve” one problem (barrel length, less & less relevant)…/10
But introduce more (length of pull - no, a moveable pistol grip or a long optics rails aren’t solutions to this), while hamstringing easy integration of the current & next generation of digital smart sights. Opportunity costs of nano-fleets of bullpups continue to escalate. /11
Anyway, some more factors to take into account when people are discussing why their service rifle is “good enough” or they sprout off traditional metrics to emphasise why there’s no reason to change horses.
Off to find a cloud to yell at /fin
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As I talk to soldiers, engineers, ammunition techs, & procurement folk about the US Army’s recently-fielded Next Generation Squad Weapon program, it’s clear that it’s easier to focus on the firearm than on the ammunition.
To the uninitiated, these rifles look broadly similar. 1/
Ignore calibres for this discussion. Even if each of the five rifles illustrated were in the same calibre, only one can fire the hybrid cartridge case ammunition. It is this ammunition, regardless of calibre, that delivers such a fundamental change to the soldier. 2/
I’ve called the new ammunition & the platforms designed to fire it“revolution incognito.”
The kit looks the same. How could it be any better or different? Two decades of fighting in the sandpit, plus the post-assault weapons ban US civilian market, has focused on tweaks. 3/
Revolution incognito - how dramatic changes in technology, performance, & effectiveness can pass relatively unnoticed at the time, becoming noticeable in hindsight.
Another infantry small arms thread.
With a side of stalwarts & holdouts protecting their patch. 1/
Standard caveats, this is an overview, generalisations are made in good faith, only public domain information is sourced or used, &, wherever possible, I’ve referenced public domain information, not internet opinion…though this is one! 2/
The thought of some radical technology shift in infantry small arms delivering an unspecified capability improvement is seductive, elusive, & a historic. Looking for the a phased plasma rifle in the 40-watt range is unlikely to deliver much beyond profits to consultants. 3/
Upping operating pressures, increasing kinetic energy, chopping barrels, changing cover into concealment, & the small arms ballistic technology revolution that passed you by. Or, how the Next Generation Squad Weapon’s calibre is a distraction. 1/
Standard caveats, this is an overview, generalisations are made in good faith, only public domain information is sourced or used, &, wherever possible, I’ve referenced public domain information, not internet opinion…though this is one! 2/
I’ve covered operating pressures of infantry small arms & the upward trend of their operating pressures in the linked thread.
Brown Bess was 12.5kpsi, current Gen 5.56mm is 61kpsi. NGSW *starts at* circa 80kpsi. 3/
After a bit of a chat with the relevant PM, I’ve learnt a little more about the AbramsX concept demonstrator.
Sadly, I’ll be unable to illustrate with a lot of pics, but I’ll do my best. 1/
Let’s talk powerpacks. A diesel electric hybrid has a couple of benefits. It can travel quietly & stand watch. It also enables the same range using half the fuel. A benefit of this is that the fuel cells flanking the driver on a conventional Abrams can be deleted. 2/
So what? That space is now occupied by two more soldiers, migrating the crew from the turret to the hull. Though currently configured with the commander in the centre, the digital nature of the implementation means that the crew stations are interchangeable. 3/
Thread covering operational availability, HUMS, & how non-obvious factors affect infantry small arms. Like the Tiger tank, there’s no point in having the ‘best’ if it’s inherently unreliable, disproportionately expensive or difficult to maintain to the point of irrelevance. 1/
Standard caveats, this is an overview, generalisations are made in good faith, only public domain information is sourced or used, &, wherever possible, I’ve referenced public domain information, not internet opinion…though this is one! 2/
Western militaries concern themselves with the technical integrity of their materiel, that is, weapons, vehicles, & equipment. Programs, policies, & frameworks are put in place to ensure that the equipment is safe to operate by appropriately trained soldiers. 3/